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PREFACE
The European University Institute (EUI) and the Wharton 
Financial Institutions Center (FIC, Wharton School, University 
of Pennsylvania) organised a conference entitled “Bearing the 
Losses from Bank and Sovereign Default in the Eurozone”, 
which was held at the EUI in Florence, Italy, on 24 April 2014. 
The conference brought together leading economists, lawyers, 
historians and policy makers to discuss the current econom-
ic situation in the Eurozone with particular emphasis on the 
new regulatory and supervisory architecture in the Eurozone, 
and loss distribution in the event of default of both banks and 
sovereigns. The aim was to have an open discussion on these 
timely and important topics to achieve a better understanding 
on the future developments of the Eurozone. 
The Director of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced 
Studies at the EUI, Professor Brigid Laffan, opened the event, 
which consisted of three panels, a keynote speech and a dinner 
speech. The first panel, chaired by Elena Carletti (EUI), consid-
ered the Asset Quality Review in progress within the Eurozone. 
Claudia Buch (Halle Institute) inaugurated the discussion in 
this panel with an assessment of where the Banking Union 
stands currently and the issues facing it. Bart Joosen (Universi-
ty of Amsterdam) outlined some key legal themes arising out of 
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the AQR to date. Andrea Resti (Bocconi University) discussed 
the supervisory perspective on the stress tests employed by the 
EBA in previous years and the limitations of risk weighted cap-
ital regulation. Till Schuermann (Oliver Wyman) gave some 
insights into the design issues within the AQR. Thomas Mayer 
(Deutsche Bank) broadened the discussion somewhat with a 
proposal for a safe form of deposit to be employed within the 
Banking Union.
In the keynote address to the conference, Miguel Fernández 
Ordóñez (former Governor of the Bank of Spain) cast a retro-
spective look at the crisis and its handling as well as a prospec-
tive look at the measures being adopted for the future within 
the Eurozone and Europe more generally. He emphasised the 
need to be clear as to the distinction between prophylactic, 
preventative regulatory and supervisor policy and measures on 
the one hand, and “exit” policies and measures designed to mi-
nimise the costs of crisis and speed up a return to a steady state 
on the other hand. He stressed the continuing need for vigi-
lance as to both types of measures. He concluded by suggesting 
that economists and political scientists might usefully consider 
whether ideas drawn from behavioural economics could ex-
plain regulatory behaviour and institutional design in the same 
way they can explain investor and consumer behaviour.
The speakers participating in the second panel, chaired 
by Joanna Gray (Newcastle University) addressed the re-
lated topics of Bail-in, State Aid and Bank Resolution. 
Emilos Avgouleas (Edinburgh University) presented a critical 
analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of creditor bail-in 
within the bank resolution regimes of the US and the Europe, 
arguing that bail-in should not be seen as without problems of 
its own. Clemens Kerle (European Commission) considered 
the past, present and possible future pattern of burden-sharing 
under the Commission’s State aid framework for aid to banks. 
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Stefano Miccosi (Assonime) considered in his presentation 
whether or not the bail-in provisions in state aid and resolution 
procedures are consistent with the objective of financial system 
stability. Finally, Huw Pill (Goldman Sachs) took a private sec-
tor, markets oriented perspective on what he saw as the three 
main challenges facing the Banking Union at present.
The final panel, chaired by Erik Nielsen (Unicredit), returned 
to the ever present theme in any discussion within the Euro-
zone of sovereign defaults and banking crises. Mitu Gulati 
(Duke University Law School) highlighted the prevalence of 
contingent sovereign guarantees within the Euro area and ar-
gued that restructuring these contingent liabilities in the fu-
ture may prove challenging. Kris James Mitchener (Warwick 
University) took a longer view of the “diabolic loop” linking 
sovereign debt and banking crises asking what lessons can be 
drawn from these historical precedents of crisis and contagion. 
Tolek Petch (Slaughter & May) applied a legal practitioner’s 
view to the creditor perspective on renegotiating sovereign debt 
in unchartered legal territory. Finally Jeromin Zettelmeyer 
(German Federal Ministry of the Economy) discussed the need 
to create a European sovereign debt restructuring regime as a 
complement to the ESM and the banking union, and put forth 
several proposals as to how design it. 
At dinner Richard Portes (London Business School) intro-
duced Tony Barber (Financial Times) who argued that uncer-
tainty has been an ever present accompaniment to Europe and 
the crisis has shown the need to learn to live with and thrive in 
the face of uncertainty. He urged European policymakers and 
intellectuals to resist the lure of dogma and fixed orthodoxy, 
arguing that declining public trust in Europe showed the need 
to act with humility and imagination in the face of an uncer-
tain future. 
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The conference follows a 2013 conference “Political, Fiscal 
and Banking Union in the Eurozone”, a 2012 conference, 
“Governance for the Eurozone: Integration or Disintegration” 
and that of 2011, “Life in the Eurozone With or Without 
Sovereign Default.” As with all three of those previous confer-
ences, the debate after each panel and guest speakers was lively 
and thoughtful. We prefer not to take a stance here on any of 
the issues but simply present all the papers presented and let 
the reader draw his or her own conclusions. Our hope is once 
again that this book will contribute to making one step further 
in finding the right solutions to preserve the achievements that 
the Eurozone has reached so far. 
The e-book (as well as those for the previous events) is available 
for free download at the following links: 
http://www.eui.eu/Projects/PierreWernerChair/Publications.
aspx
http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/FIC/FICPress/bearing.pdf
Franklin Allen, Elena Carletti and Joanna Gray
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Opening Remarks by 
Brigid Laffan
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies is very pleased 
to host the conference on Bearing the Losses from Bank and Sovereign 
Default in the Eurozone and I congratulate the co-organisers 
Professors Franklin Allen, Elena Carletti and Joanna Gray for their 
initiative and putting together such an impressive programme on 
this very important topic. The crisis in the Eurozone has severely 
tested the political, economic and policy capacity of the EU and its 
euro member states. It brought the design faults of the Maastricht 
Treaty sharply into focus and created a major cleavage within the 
Eurozone between creditor states and those with troubled econo-
mies, the debtor states. The development of a single currency, which 
centralised monetary policy, and the continuing decentralisation of 
financial supervision proved to be a serious fault-line in the Euro-
zone. Banks and sovereigns became linked in a ‘doom loop’ with 
serious economic, social and political consequences. The Eurozone 
crisis impacted more seriously on some countries than others which 
meant that it was very difficult for the member states to agree re-
sponses to the crisis. From spring 2010, the Eurozone struggled to 
contain the crisis, particularly the potential for contagion while at 
the same time developing new policy instruments and rules to ensure 
that Eurozone governance was more robust. The question of ‘Bearing 
the losses’ was central to the crisis from the beginning. Should the 
losses be paid by the private or public sectors and if public, which 
taxpayers? Europe’s tax payers incurred enormous costs in support-
2 Opening Remarks by Brigid Laffan
ing fragile banking systems and Europe’s creditor states risked size-
able amounts in prevent sovereign default in the most troubled euro 
states. For these reasons, a Banking Union was identified as the most 
important building block for a more sustainable Eurozone. The 
Banking Union represents a major centralisation (federalisation) of 
banking supervision with the ECB emerging as a Single Supervisory 
Authority (SSA). A bank resolution mechanism was the necessary 
accompanying measure to the centralisation of supervision. As the 
new system is transformed from paper into a living system, it is very 
important that the academy provides rigorous theoretical and ana-
lytical frameworks in addition to engaging in empirical research on 
the evolving system. The EUI is committed to research and policy 
discussion on this important subject. Again I thank the conference 
organisers for their initiative.
Brigid Laffan
Director
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
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Bearing the Losses from Bank 
and Sovereign Default in the 
Eurozone1
Claudia M. Buch & Benjamin Weigert 
I. Overview
Several years into the crisis on European financial markets, signs of 
acute stress in the markets have dissipated. Market volatility is low, 
and (sovereign) bond spreads have narrowed. Yet, the crisis is not 
over. Policymakers have switched from the mode of acute crisis man-
agement to tackling the reforms of Europe’s institutional structure. 
The Banking Union is one important element of this reform agenda. 
Before starting into the Banking Union with European supervisory 
and restructuring competencies, the European Central Bank (ECB) 
is performing a comprehensive assessment of banks’ balance sheets. 
Currently though, legacies from the past are blocking the way 
towards the new institutional structure – and towards economic 
recovery. Given that banks have incentives to roll over bad loans, the 
necessary structural change is delayed. Also, regulatory privileges for 
investments of banks into government bonds cannot be withdrawn 
1 This short paper summarizes our views put forward in previous publications on 
the role of the Banking Union in the new institutional structure for Europe. For 
a detailed discussion on the issues addressed in this paper, see Buch and Weigert 
(2012), Schmidt and Weigert (2012), and Buch, Körner, and Weigert (2013). 
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easily. The ECB‘s comprehensive assessment thus aims at reducing 
uncertainty about the quality of banks‘ assets by taking stock of the 
value of banks‘ assets, stress testing the portfolios, determining the 
capital shortfalls, and eventually covering capital shortfalls or re-
structuring banks. The goal is to deal with legacy assets at the na-
tional level and before the start of the Banking Union.
The results of the comprehensive assessment of banks’ balance sheets 
will soon be published, and decisions will have to be taken of how to 
deal with banks that cannot close capital shortfalls disclosed by the 
stress tests in due time. Complex legal reforms have thus to be com-
pleted, and difficult policy decisions will need to be taken on how to 
deal with the fact that Europe is “overbanked” (ASC 2014).
In this paper, we argue that the Banking Union, if properly designed, 
can be an important step towards enhanced private sector risk shar-
ing in the Euro Area and beyond. We will start our discussion from 
the concept of the institutional framework of the Euro Area that 
has been developed by the German Council of Economic Experts 
(GCEE 2012). We will then sketch the reforms that are necessary to 
make the Banking Union a success in terms of deepening financial 
markets in Europe.
II. Reforming Europe’s Institutional Structure: Maastricht 2.0
Fixing the shortcomings of the institutional framework for the Euro 
Area requires following the core principle that liability and control 
are properly aligned at the same level – either the European or the 
national level. Liability can be shifted to the European level in an 
incentive-compatible way only in a full political union with member 
states giving up most of their sovereignty. Yet, the probability that 
political union will be on the agenda – and obtain sustained political 
support – is very small. Therefore, for the foreseeable future, align-
ing liability and control with national responsibility for fiscal policy, 
together with improved incentives to adhere to sound fiscal finances 
is the only sustainable avenue to go. 
Based on these principles, the German Council of Economic Experts 
has proposed a new long-run institutional framework which rests on 
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three pillars (GCEF 2010, 2011; Figure 1): A substantially enhanced 
Stability and Growth Pact including strict fi scal rules and an insol-
vency regime for sovereigns, a unifi ed pan-European fi nancial regula-
tion and supervision with a wide range of eff ective instruments and, 
fi nally, a European Crisis Mechanism which is directly linked to the 
insolvency regime for sovereigns.
Figure 1: Proposal for a Long-term Institutional Structure for the Euro Area
Source: GCEE (2012, ﬁ gure 41)
Th e third pillar is the Banking Union – where responsibility will 
shift from the national to the European level. Assigning responsi-
bility for banking supervision to a European authority is, in fact, a 
logical complement to monetary union. Th e problems in Europe’s 
banking sectors and the sovereign debt crisis are not the result of 
common monetary union per se. But they are the result of regula-
tions which did not contain excessive borrowing, of the ineff ective-
ness of (national) supervision to contain these risks, together with 
incentives to shift some of the resulting risks on the central bank’s 
balance sheet. Hence, the principle of aligning liability and control 
has been violated. Moreover, risks of banks and states have become 
dangerously intertwined.
Th ese defi cits in Europe’s institutional structure shall be corrected 
through the Banking Union which has three elements (President of 
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the European Council, 2012): banking supervision at the European 
level, a European authority for bank restructuring and resolution 
fi nanced by a bank resolution fund, and a European deposit insur-
ance fund (Figure 2). An incentive-compatible design of the Banking 
Union requires coordination between national and European super-
visors, while ultimate decision making power would have to rest with 
the European authorities. In case banks have to be restructured or 
eventually resolved, fi nancial means have to be available to ensure 
that orderly resolution is possible. Bank resolution does not necessar-
ily require a European deposit insurance scheme, but national rules 
and regulations need to be harmonized, and risk-adjusted insurance 
premia need to be charged.    
Figure 2: Structure of the European Banking Union
Source: GCEE (2012, ﬁ gure 52)
III. Banking Union and Risk Sharing
On their June 2012 summit, the heads of state of the Euro Area have 
decided upon policy measures towards Banking Union with the aim 
of breaking the “vicious circle between banks and sovereigns”.2 Since 
2012, the elements of the Banking Union have been made more con-
crete, and legislation has been drafted or already passed:3 Th e Single 
2 See the concluding statement of the summit of Euro Area heads of state or govern-
ments of June 29, 2012. 
3 Th ese conditions include direct recapitalizations of banks by the ESM; a common 
European bank resolution fund (Single Resolution Fund); and further harmoniza-
tion of deposit guarantee schemes instead of mutualisation. 
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Supervisory Mechanism as the most advanced pillar will become 
operational in November 2014; harmonized and centralized com-
petencies in bank resolution have been agreed on; basic conditions 
for common financing mechanism for bank resolution have been 
clarified. 
 
The agreement on the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and on 
the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) constitutes a milestone in 
European financial integration. Establishing centralized competen-
cies for bank supervision and resolution is a fundamental step away 
from the original concept of the Single Market where supervision is 
executed by national authorities (home country control), following 
harmonized rules (minimum harmonization) and mutual recogni-
tion of supervisory decisions.
The Banking Union has often been viewed as the key to increased 
public sector risk sharing. Given that public finances in many Euro 
Area countries are strained, national government often lack the 
means to stabilize distressed banks. Hence, common public back-
stops could be a way towards increased fiscal risk sharing (de Grauwe, 
2013; Goyal et al., 2013). Yet, this argument overlooks that banks 
in Europe are currently still burdened with significant legacies from 
the past. Providing a common public backstop would thus de facto 
imply that these legacies assets are not dealt with under national re-
sponsibility. Incentives would thus not be aligned as risks, which 
have materialized under national responsibility, could be mutualized.
Instead, the Banking Union should be regarded as the key to more 
private risk sharing.4 The Banking Union can provide an effective 
mechanism for the bail in of (domestic and international) private 
creditors and for the allocation of losses according to the creditor 
hierarchy. In fact, monetary union of otherwise sovereign states may 
lead to a situation where effective private risk sharing – the distribu-
tion of losses across regions and countries – is limited. As indicated 
by the recent experience in the Euro area, national supervisors were 
not able to prevent or to limit the build-up of (cross border) risks in 
the banking sector before the crisis, and they were not able to coor-
4 See Buch, Körner and Weigert (2013) for details. 
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dinate effectively during the crisis. The ECB, in turn, has stepped in 
as a provider of liquidity of last resort, but in its assessment of the 
solvency of banks, it had to rely on national supervisors. 
Establishing clear and harmonized rules for the restructuring and 
resolution of banks can therefore be an important mechanism for 
possible losses to be borne by domestic and international bank credi-
tors. For such bail in of private creditors of a systemically impor-
tant bank to be credible, fiscal backstops will have to be available 
though at the national level. Ideally, in a systemic crisis, national 
fiscal backstops together with ex-ante (cross-border) burden sharing 
agreements are needed. In such cases, deviations from strict bail-in 
rules might be warranted for reasons of financial stability. As with 
any public guarantee or back-up facility, clear rules with high hurdles 
to limit potential moral hazard are needed. 
Fiscal backstops thus make the bail-in approach more credible and 
strengthen the channels of private risk sharing. Consequently, in this 
setting, financial backstops – common resolution fund and national 
fiscal backstop – are the last rather than the first resort and are not 
elements of increased fiscal risk sharing.
To show the potential importance of private channel of risk shar-
ing, consider the following results of empirical studies for existing 
monetary unions. Estimates of the combined contribution of finan-
cial markets (capital market and credit market) to inter-regional risk 
sharing in the US, Germany, Canada and Sweden are 62% (Asdrub-
ali et al., 1996), 36% until 1994 and 68% after 1995 (Hepp and von 
Hagen, 2013), 53 % (Balli et al., 2012) and at least 59% (Andersson, 
2008), respectively. Moreover, these studies show that there is only 
a relatively small contribution of fiscal risk sharing to inter-regional 
risk sharing – 13% in the US, 54% until 1994 and 11,4 % after 
1995 in Germany, 27% in Canada and 20% in Sweden.5 While the 
exact numbers should certainly be taken with caution, they yet show 
the potential of risk sharing through financial markets. Integration 
of credit and equity markets can thus be an important prerequisite 
to efficient risk sharing in the Euro area (Hoffmann and Sørensen, 
2012). 
5 See Feld and Osterloh (2013) for a detailled discussion of these studies. 
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IV. Steps Towards Improved Private Sector Risk Sharing
Banking Union is a comprehensive project which can help paving 
the way towards deeper integration of financial markets in Europe. 
Deeper financial integration is often associated with breaking the 
link between banks and their domestic sovereigns. These links cur-
rently make it difficult to introduce clear procedures for dealing with 
distressed sovereigns and banks. It has also been argued that break-
ing the bank-sovereign nexus could be achieved only by establishing 
a large common pool for fiscal resources that can be used to finance 
the restructuring and potential resolution of banks. 
In this short paper, we argue to the contrary that the Banking Union 
can contribute to enhanced financial integration in Europe not 
through more public sector risk sharing but through more private 
sector risk sharing. One of the channels through which this can be 
achieved is by making creditors accountable for the losses that they 
assume. Without credible bail in regimes and without applying the 
creditor hierarchy, ex post risk sharing which is fundamental for the 
functioning of credit markets will not be achieved.
To achieve these goals, more work is needed though:
With regard to the SSM, establishing the European supervisor un-
der the roof of the ECB has weaknesses. Banking supervision and 
monetary policy tasks are not sufficiently separated because decisions 
on supervisory issues are ultimately taken by the ECB Governing 
Council. This gives rise to potential conflicts of interest. In addi-
tion, competencies are currently split between the ECB and national 
authorities. This entails the risk of diverging supervisory standards 
and insufficient supervisory powers at the European level. Finally, 
non-Euro area member countries cannot be integrated into the SSM 
in a satisfactory manner.
With regard to the SRM, the current legal framework defined by the 
European Treaties implies that the governance structure in case of 
bank resolution is highly complex. In particular in crisis times this 
makes it less likely that swift action will be taken to restructure an 
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ailing bank when it is most needed. The consequence may be that 
regulators and policymakers shy away from initiating a restructuring 
process, thereby potentially aggravating the adverse consequences of 
banking sector distress for the real economy. 
The bail-in mechanism is an integral part of an insolvency procedure 
that seeks to separate elements of a bank with going concern and 
those with gone concern. In its current form, this mechanism lacks 
credibility and predictability though. The restructuring authorities 
have a high degree of discretion whether to use the bail-in instru-
ment and which claims to exclude from the bail in. To provide a level 
playing field, differences between Euro area and non-Euro members, 
and between large and small banks should also be minimized.
Going beyond the narrow realms of Banking Union, there are two 
additional policy areas that need to be addressed:
The first are additional reforms of the microprudential framework for 
banks. The Banking Union per se leaves the basic regulatory frame-
work for banks unchanged. Yet, in order for the Banking Union to 
achieve its goals – breaking the bank-sovereign link and making fi-
nancial integration in Europe more sustainable –, additional steps 
are needed. The current regulatory framework has several build-in 
incentives for banks to invest into government bonds. Government 
bonds from Euro Area countries carry a zero right weight and are 
exempt from large exposure rules. This incentivises banks to invest 
into these assets and has contributed to the increasing exposures in 
particular of home country bonds.
In addition, most of the regulatory reforms that we have seen in Eu-
rope since the outbreak of the crisis affect credit markets. Given that 
excessive credit creation is typically a trigger for financial crises and 
given the need to make the banking system more resilient to shocks, 
this focus of reforms has certainly been warranted. In order for fi-
nancial markets to provide adequate risk sharing, existing explicit 
and implicit barriers to the full integration of equity markets should 
be lowered though.
11Claudia M. Buch & Benjamin Weigert
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Legal Aspects of the ECB Asset 
Quality Review as part of the 
Comprehensive Assessment
Bart P.M. Joosen1 
1. Introduction
With the adoption of the Single Supervisory Mechanism Regulation2 
(“SSM Regulation”) one of the main legal foundations of the single 
supervisory mechanism (“SSM”) was completed, effectively creating 
the basis for the functioning of the European Central Bank (“ECB”) 
as Europe’s single supervisory authority for banks3 established in the 
1 Prof dr. Bart P.M. Joosen is full professor prudential supervision law and associ-
ated with the Centre for Financial Law of the Faculty of Law of the University of 
Amsterdam. He also works as a lawyer in private practice. 
2 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific 
tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential 
supervision of credit institutions, OJEU, L. 287 of 29 October 2013, p. 63-87. 
3 In this contribution I will address the subject matter of supervision by the ECB 
in the SSM framework referring to the commonly used expression “banks”, rather 
than to the legal correct expression “credit institution”. Reference is made to the 
definition of this expression in article 2, section (3) SSM Regulation that in its turn 
refers to the definition of “credit institution” in article 4 of the Capital Requirements 
Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and 
investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, OJEU L. 176 of 
27 June 2013, p. 1-348). 
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Eurozone. The law makers have chosen to draft the SSM Regula-
tion using strong and resolute language as regards the power and 
authorities of the ECB. This must be seen in the context of the wish 
of European politicians to empower the ECB in the strongest pos-
sible way to exercise its tasks when supervising the European banks 
comprised in the SSM. The political debate towards the establish-
ment of the SSM as part of the Banking Union was “quickly settled”4 
to base the transfer of powers and authorities from national compe-
tent authorities (“NCAs”) to the ECB on article 127, paragraph 6 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”)5. 
With this decision, further challenges similar to the application of 
article 122(2) TFEU as regards the establishment of the European 
Stability Mechanism have been avoided6. A closer look at the provi-
sion of article 127, paragraph 6 TFEU suggests that the lawmak-
ers did not envisage at the time of adoption of that provision to 
establish the far-reaching implications for the role of the ECB in 
banking supervision. But a discussion on the original intentions of 
the lawmakers adopting the TFEU provision is, after the adoption 
of the SSM Regulation, a discussion after the fact of entry into force 
4 Sabine Lautenschläger, ‘A banking union for Europe: How is it best constructed?’, 
17 January 2013, www.bundesbank.de. 
5 Rene Rapasi, ‘Legal issues of the Single European Supervisory Mechanism’, 1 Oc-
tober 2012, The Greens in European Parliament; Howard Davies, ‘Europe’s Flawed 
Banking Union’, Project Syndicate, 18 October 2012; Douglas J. Elliot, ‘Key issues 
on European Banking; Trade-offs and some recommendations’. Global Economy & 
Development, Working Paper 52, November 2012, Global Economy and Develop-
ment at Brookings. See for a critical comment: Bundesbank, ‘Financial Stability 
Review 2012’, p. 82, http://www.bundesbank.de. 
6 See for some contributions to that debate: Bruno de Witte, ‘The European Treaty 
Amendment for the Creation of a Financial Stability Mechanism’, European Policy 
Analysis, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies European Policy Analysis 
2011:6, page 1, www.sieps.se; Antonis Antonadis, ‘Debt Crisis as a Global Emer-
gency: The European Economic Constitution and other Greek Fables’, (Septem-
ber 1, 2010) in: The European Union and Global Emergencies: a Law and Policy 
Analysis, Antonis Antoniadis, Robert Schütze, Eleanor Spaventa, eds., Hart Pub-
lishing, 2011; Steve Peers, ‘Future EU Treaty Reform? Economic Governance and 
Democratic Accountability’, Statewatch ISSN 1756-851X; Boris Ryvkin, ‘Saving 
the Euro: Tensions with European Treaty Law in the European Union’s Efforts to 
Protect the Common Currency’, 45 Cornell Int’l L.J. 227 (2012), p. 228-255. 
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of strong secondary Union law. This regulation undoubtedly forms a 
solid legal basis for the powers and authorities of the ECB fulfilling 
its role in the SSM7. This does not mean that article 127, paragraph 
6 TFEU provides for a comprehensive regulation of all the neces-
sary points needed for the long term institutional organisation of the 
SSM, particularly if such mechanism would need to be expanded 
beyond the territories of the Eurozone member states. 
The current view is that this treaty provision may need to be amend-
ed for a number of reasons. The most important reason being the fact 
that article 127, paragraph 6 TFEU must be placed in the framework 
of the role of the ECB for matters concerning the European Monetary 
Union. The treaty provision falls short of providing sufficiently broad 
scope to include non-euro area member states of the EU desiring 
to opt-in for the SSM for banks established in their jurisdiction. 
Article 127 TFEU also lacks a sound basis for the organisation of 
the authority of (other) European agencies (not being the ECB) in 
the context of the other building blocks of the Banking Union (par-
ticularly the SSM). It is with a view to these (among other) desirable 
7 G. Zavvos, ‘Towards a European Banking Union’, New York, 18 April 2013, 
22nd Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference, Levy Economics Institute Bard Col-
lege, noted the following: “The EU’s choice to designate the ECB as the European 
Banking Supervisor was heavily influenced by institutional and legal considerations. 
Article 127(6) TFEU provides that the Council may unanimously confer specific 
tasks upon the ECB concerning policies for the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions and other financial institutions with the exception of insurance un-
dertakings. The setting up of an agency based on Article 114 TFEU would have 
been more complex as agencies cannot have discretionary powers according to the 
Court of Justice of the EU (“CJEU”) case-law that are essential for supervision.” 
See further: IMF Staff Discussion Note, ‘A Banking Union for the Euro Area’, 
Rishi Goyal, Petya Koeva Brooks, Mahmood Pradhan, Thierry Tressel, Giovanni 
Dell’Ariccia, Ross Leckow, Ceyla Pazarbasioglu, and an IMF Staff team, February 
2013, SDN/13/01, pages 47 and further and Nicolas Véron, ‘A realistic bridge to-
wards European Banking Union’, Bruegel Policy Contribution, Issue 2013/09, June 
2013, Jan Pieter Krahnen, ‘Banking Union in the Eurozone? A panel contribution’, 
in: Political, Fiscal and Banking Union in the Eurozone? edited by Franklin Allen, 
Elena Carletti and Joanna Gray, European University Institute Florence, Italy and 
Wharton Financial Institutions Center University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 
USA, Published by FIC Press Wharton Financial Institutions Center, 2013, pages 
29 and further and Diego Valiante, ‘Framing Banking Union in the Euro Area, 
Some empirical evidence’, CEPS Working Document, No. 388/ February 2014. 
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changes that the European Commission recommended, in late 2012, 
amending the treaty provisions in the future8.
2. Emergency law during the sovereign debt crisis
As the sovereign debt crisis further developed in Europe in the au-
tumn of 2011, European lawmakers where required to address the 
impact bank failures could have on the deteriorating financial posi-
tion of certain member states. The agreed upon strengthening of the 
resilience of banks by increasing the capital base as followed from the 
Basel III accord9, was to be introduced at a quicker pace than fol-
lowed from the ordinary law making process to implement Basel III 
in Europe. The initial proposals for the CRD IV legislation package 
were only published a few months before the sovereign debt crisis 
spun off. The debate on that comprehensive CRD IV proposal of the 
European Commission was only in an early stage. At the same time, 
it became clear that banks in the Eurozone (and in other parts of 
the European Union) faced significant constraints as regards certain 
sovereign debt positions.
 
With the introduction in late 2011 of the measures imposed by the 
European Banking Authority (“EBA”) for 70 larger banks in certain 
member states of the European Union in October 2011, Europe took 
the step to introduce emergency law circumventing the ordinary leg-
islation processes based on the TFEU. The measures aimed at intro-
ducing a “temporary capital buffer against sovereign debt exposures 
to reflect the market prices” in the midst of the sovereign debt crisis10. 
This measure in the form of a “Methodological Note” clearly qualifies 
as “emergency law” in all respects. Nowhere in the documentation 
issued by the EBA to introduce the temporary capital buffer could 
8 European Commission Communication, ‘A blueprint for a deep and genuine eco-
nomic and monetary union; Launching a European Debate’, 30 November 2012, 
COM (2012) 777 final/2 (Corrigendum replacing COM (2012) 777 of 28 Novem-
ber 2012). 
9 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Basel III: A global regulatory frame-
work for more resilient banks and banking systems’, December 2010 (rev June 
2011) www.bis.org. 
10 European Banking Authority, ‘Capital buffers for addressing market concerns 
over sovereign exposures; Methodological Note’, 26 October 2011, www.eba.eu-
ropa.eu. 
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one find references to the legal basis of this measure. The mandate of 
the EBA as set out in the EBA-Regulation11 hardly provides for a ba-
sis for introducing these direct binding measures on the institutions 
concerned. The scope of application of the measure to the 70 banks 
listed in the Annex to the Methodological Note raises questions as 
to the selection of the group of banks concerned; the group consists 
of a combination —bien étonnés de se trouver ensemble— of larger 
banks in Eurozone and a non-Eurozone state, but certainly does not 
represent the group of the largest banks in Europe.
 
The EBA also had to address the qualitative and quantitative defini-
tion of regulatory capital that should be held as temporary capital 
buffer. Pursuant to the Capital Requirements Directive12 (“CRD”) 
applicable at the time of the issue of the Methodological Note, nei-
ther the desired qualitative elements of bank capital to make it fully 
eligible as, what we now call “Core Equity Tier 1 capital” (“CET1”), 
nor the severe quantitative measure of 9% CET1 imposed on the 70 
banks formed part of the applicable legislative provisions.
Moreover, new rules had to be developed to address the impact of in-
vestments in sovereign debt by the banks concerned, and which con-
stituted the main objective for the introduction of this emergency 
measure. New calculation formulae have been introduced removing 
prudential filter effects of the available-to-sale portfolio of EEA-sov-
ereign debt and introducing a new valuation technique for the held-
to-maturity portfolio of the same asset category. These far-reaching 
measures set aside the common rules of CRD where sovereign debt 
issued by EEA-member states had no significant risk weighting mea-
sure at all in the standardised approach. For Internal Rating Based-
11 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European 
Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commis-
sion Decision 2009/78/EC, OJ L 331, 15 December 2010, p. 12–47 as amended 
by Regulation (EU) No 1022/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 22 October 2013 amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 establishing a Euro-
pean Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) as regards the conferral 
of specific tasks on the European Central Bank pursuant to Council Regulation 
(EU) No 1024/2013, OJ L. 287 of 29 October 2013, p. 5-14. 
12 Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 
June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions 
(recast) (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L. 277 of 30 June 2006, p. 1-200. 
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banks, the own bespoke models could, in theory, address the risk 
weighting of sovereign debt exposures, but little information is avail-
able as to whether or not IRB-banks actually organised such capital 
measures for sovereign debt. In any event, the Methodological Note 
required all banks to introduce risk weighting of EEA-sovereign 
debt, no matter which approach was followed to address credit or 
market risks.
The Methodological Note contains many parts that suggest an im-
provisation act of the EBA, referring partly to existing laws and 
partly to laws that had yet to be adopted at the time of publication 
of the Methodological Note. But it also contains certain concepts 
(particularly as regards the computation of exposures in sovereign 
debt positions) that, at a later stage of development of the formal 
legislation package for banks, are not reiterated. The political discus-
sion on risk weighting of sovereign debt moved to another direction 
and final positions as to this subject matter are yet to be developed.
 
EBA was required to sail between Scylla and Charybdis when intro-
ducing this extraordinary measure. It is a clear example of the very 
particular difficulties for exercising uniform and coordinated bank-
ing supervision in Europe in a time where the institutional frame-
work for the Banking Union was not in place yet. European authori-
ties had to find specific solutions to manage the crisis in the markets.
3. ECB Mandate in the SSM Regulation
As noted in the introductory paragraph, the SSM Regulation forms 
the solid basis for the mandate of the ECB to exercise its role in the 
SSM. For obvious reasons, the ECB must apply a careful weighting 
of all its actions based on the mandate provided for in the SSM Reg-
ulation. The ECB will not become an effective supervisory authority, 
if the measures imposed on banks subject to its supervision would 
be subject to challenges from the outset. The reputational risks that 
may originate from such challenges to the legal foundation of ECB 
actions would be every bit as detrimental as in the case where the 
ECB would be considered responsible for supervision of a bank that, 
notwithstanding such supervision, would fail and would be made 
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subject to intervention beyond the control of the ECB. In order to 
manage the latter, the supervision of ECB within the organisation of 
the Banking Union will only commence, after the performance of 
the comprehensive assessment. This assessment aims at setting the 
clock back at zero with respect to the approximately 130 banks com-
prised in the group in respect of which the ECB will perform direct 
supervision. In my address held at the conference of 25 April 2014, I 
have highlighted some of the legal aspects of a part of this Compre-
hensive Assessment, being the legal framework for the Asset Quality 
Review (“AQR”).
 
The AQR conducted from late 2013 concerns the selected banks that, 
most likely, will become subject to direct supervision by the ECB. 
This exercise intends to review the valuation of certain specific assets 
held by the banks forming part of the review group. It should en-
sure that once the supervision of the ECB commences in November 
2014, no material re-assessments of asset values would need to take 
place, requiring an immediate and abrupt recapitalisation of the 
bank concerned. The organisation of this due diligence of gargantu-
an proportions is based on specific provisions of the SSM-Regulation 
providing the ECB with the required mandate.
 
Although the supervisory tasks of the ECB commence from 4 
November 2014, the lawmakers have ensured that the SSM Regulation 
contains proper provisions to authorise the ECB to conduct the 
comprehensive assessment of which the AQR forms part. The com-
prehensive assessment aims to prepare for the exercise of the full au-
thority and powers granted to the ECB in the context of the single 
supervisory mechanism. The entry into force of the ECB’s mandate 
was the effective date of the SSM-Regulation. It would therefore be 
incorrect to conclude that ECB’s mandate would only have an effec-
tive date of 4 November 2014 onwards. The exercise of the authority 
and powers of the ECB will follow a phased-in approach. There is 
little explanation to be found on this subject matter in the recitals of 
the SSM-Regulation, where the only comment is set forth in recital 
83:
“In order to ensure that credit institutions are subject to supervision 
of the highest quality, unfettered by other, non-prudential consider-
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ations, and that the negative mutually reinforcing impacts of market 
developments which concern credit institutions and Member States 
are addressed in a timely and effective way, the ECB should start 
carrying out specific supervisory tasks as soon as possible. However, 
the transfer of supervisory tasks from national supervisors to the ECB 
requires a certain amount of preparation. Therefore, an appropriate 
phasing-in period should be provided for.”
In further provisions of the SSM Regulation the mechanisms appli-
cable in respect of this phased-in approach are clearer and take away 
any doubts one could have as regards the authority of the ECB to 
establish the processes and procedures of the comprehensive assess-
ment, including the AQR.
 
The most important rule determining the effective date of the powers 
and authorities of the ECB is article 33 of the SSM Regulation deal-
ing with the transitional provisions. The first sentence of paragraph 2 
of this provision determines:
“2. The ECB shall assume the tasks conferred on it by this Regula-
tion on 4 November 2014 subject to the implementation arrange-
ments and measures set out in this paragraph.”
This clarifies that the ECB will commence, in principle, the super-
visory tasks as provided for in article 4 SSM Regulation from 4 No-
vember 2014, subject to the completion of certain procedures. These 
procedures are listed in the further paragraphs of article 33. Barring 
a potential recommendation from ECB to delay the commencement 
date of 4 November 2014 for the single supervisory mechanism, 
as this is regulated in the article 33, paragraph 2, section 4 SSM 
Regulation, and barring a potential earlier commencement of the 
supervision of ECB as regards an individual institution based on the 
request of the European Stability Mechanism as “a precondition to 
its recapitalisation” (article 33, paragraph 3, section 2 SSM Regula-
tion), the ECB may not adopt supervisory decisions in respect of any 
bank before 4 November 2014. This phasing-in of the mandate is, 
however, without prejudice to the investigative powers conferred to 
the ECB pursuant to the SSM Regulation (article 33, paragraph 3, 
section 1 SSM Regulation).
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As for the powers and authorities of the ECB (and the NCAs) to 
conduct the comprehensive assessment, including the AQR, a de-
tailed provision is included in paragraph 4 of article 33 SSM Regula-
tion as follows:
“From 3 November 2013, in view of the assumption of its tasks, the 
ECB may require the national competent authorities and the per-
sons referred to in Article 10(1) to provide all relevant information 
for the ECB to carry out a comprehensive assessment, including a 
balance-sheet assessment, of the credit institutions of the participat-
ing Member State. The ECB shall carry out such an assessment at 
least in relation to the credit institutions not covered by Article 6(4). 
The credit institution and the competent authority shall supply the 
information requested.”
With this provision, the authority of the ECB to investigate either 
via the NCAs or directly with the credit institutions (and other enti-
ties subjected to the ECB supervision) is regulated. This authority 
was established with immediate effect and is not following the same 
postponement of the effective date of 4 November 2014 as out-
lined in paragraph 2 of article 33 SSM Regulation. This paragraph 
4 therefore abridges the period from the entry into force of the SSM 
Regulation (being 4 November 2013) until 4 November 2014 and is 
restricted to the power to investigate. There are, however, no restric-
tions as regards the scope of applicability of the investigative powers 
as regards the type of the institutions concerned. In other words, it 
is left to the discretion of the ECB to determine which banks will be 
subject to the investigations, and therefore to the AQR.
4. AQR; discussion on scope of applicability and AQR Manual
There is some, albeit it not very substantial, evidence that the deci-
sions taken by the ECB in the context of the AQR have been sub-
ject to criticism from some of the banks concerned, particularly in 
France and Germany13. In general, the comments made suggested 
that the institutions concerned disagreed with the selections made as 
13 The Economist, ‘The asset-quality review; Gentlemen, start your audits’, 
5 October 2013 and Financial Times, ‘ECB to probe €3.7tn of eurozone bank as-
sets’, 11 March 2014. 
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regards the valuation of assets not being valued in a period less than 
one year. This resulted in an exemption for residential mortgage loan 
portfolios of German banks, as it was claimed that the stability of the 
residential property market in Germany did not require revaluation 
of the assets concerned.
When making the choices as regards the scope of the AQR, the ECB 
clearly made distinctions based on the macro-economic situation in 
the Eurozone jurisdictions, thereby incorporating the different stages 
of recovery of the economies in the various countries. Such choices 
have not been widely debated thus far and it is unlikely that further 
debate is to spin off. The AQR exercise is, at the time this address 
has been held, being conducted at an unprecedented pace and thor-
oughness and the general view is that the institutions concerned are 
complying in a loyal way with the requirements stemming from this 
thorough review.
There is little debate whether the ECB had sufficient powers and 
authority to establish the framework of the AQR and the decisions 
taken as regards the selection of the assets being made subject to 
the quality review. There is also little debate as regards the adoption 
by the ECB of the soft law instruments that determine the process 
of the AQR, such as the Asset Quality Review, Phase 2 Manual of 
March 2014 (“AQR-Manual”). This AQR Manual did not follow 
the process of prior public consultation before it was adopted by 
the ECB, a routine that has been prescribed by article 6, paragraph 
7 SSM Regulation for the Framework Regulation14 regulating the 
(working) relationship between the ECB and the NCAs after the di-
rect supervision of the ECB commences on 4 November 2014. The 
public consultation on the Framework Regulation was broader than 
the requirements imposed on the ECB pursuant to the SSM Regula-
tion, as consultation on this ECB Regulation was only to be made 
with the NCAs, not the general public. The consultation ended with 
36 submissions from different interest parties, of which only 3 were 
14 Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 
establishing the framework for cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mecha-
nism between the European Central Bank and national competent authorities and 
with national designated authorities (SSM Framework Regulation) (ECB/2014/17), 
OJEU L. 141 of 14 May 2014. 
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submitted by national supervisory authorities and the rest was sub-
mitted by private parties. The way the ECB has conducted this pro-
cess of public consultation, may be seen as the fulfilment of the aim 
to carefully build up the role that the ECB will assume in the era that 
it will become the Eurozone exclusive supervisory authority for the 
supervision of banks.
 
For the AQR Manual, as noted here above, there was little time to 
conduct such consultation and perhaps it can be said that the rel-
evant provisions of the SSM Regulation lack clarity as to the need 
for organisation of a process of consultation before the AQR Manual 
was adopted. The exact status of the AQR Manual is also not clear, 
from an institutional perspective. It is neither shaped in the form of 
an ECB regulation (for which the ECB has authority based on the 
TFEU), nor any other form of direct binding (Union) law. It is, if 
this concept is at all relevant in European administrative law, at best 
to be seen as a clear example of European “soft law”.
5. Closing remarks
As emerged from the debate after the panel presentations on 25 April 
2014 in Florence, market participants (particularly the large banks 
with multiple establishments in Europe), are keen to understand 
how the single supervisory mechanism will work in practice. From 
that debate, it seemed that (at least some) internationally operating 
banks may not necessarily pose the greatest resistance to the trans-
fer of their supervision to a single supervisory authority in Europe. 
There will be a price to be paid for such institutions, particularly 
with respect to the overall cost of supervision, as the organisation of 
the single supervisory mechanism will require application of much 
more sophisticated processes and will require a staffing level at the 
ECB that will add to its overall costs. The ECB supervision will also 
be more intrusive, as the ECB will not take any risks as regards its 
reputation as supervisory authority. Finally, the ECB supervision will 
result in a shift of the culture of supervision. Local customs and lo-
cal (perhaps biased) decision making processes in the context of su-
pervision exercised by NCAs will disappear and be replaced by less 
subjective decision making processes conducted by teams that will 
24 Legal Aspects of the ECB Asset Quality Review as part of the Comprehensive Assessment
be organised in such a way, as to avoid as much as possible national 
bias. But the overall sentiment seems to be that larger institutions are 
willing to pay that price. They rather look forward to the establish-
ment of a truly exclusive competent European supervisory authority 
which will end the period of fragmented supervision by the various 
NCAs that are thus far authorised to supervise the various parts of 
the international group.
 
The mandates given to the ECB in the SSM Regulation do not give 
cause for concern as regards the legitimacy of the decision mak-
ing process when exercising supervision after the single supervisory 
mechanism commences on 4 November 2014. Notwithstanding 
possible debates on the strength of the foundation in article 127, 
paragraph 6 of the TFEU, the politicians and lawmakers have taken 
the courageous step to adopt the SSM Regulation postponing fur-
ther debates on the treaty provisions to the future. The SSM Regu-
lation is secondary Union law drafted in the strongest possible and 
resolute language, avoiding further debates as regards the powers and 
authority of the ECB for the foreseeable future.
 
In the preparations for the commencement of the single supervisory 
mechanism, ECB follows where it can (given the time constraints) 
elaborate procedures to organise as much as possible wide acceptance 
of the rules made by the ECB in the context of the single supervisory 
mechanism. Time constraints do, however, put pressure on the or-
ganisation of the framework for the comprehensive assessment, such 
as the AQR, as there is little choice than to proceed with the enor-
mous task and provide the market with the necessary guidance as 
to how to conduct the comprehensive assessment. It seems that this 
approach of the ECB remains unchallenged and that there is little 
debate, which viewed from its immediate perspective has been fortu-
nate, about the appropriateness or legitimacy of the decisions taken 
by the ECB and rules and soft law adopted in this context.
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A Safe Deposit for Banking Union
Thomas Mayer1 
At the end of this year Banking Union will “go live”. It consists of a 
Single Supervisor Mechanism, a function executed by the ECB, and 
a Single Resolution Mechanism. A common deposit insurance, origi-
nally seen as the key component of Banking Union, will not be part 
of it. The main reason for leaving deposit insurance at the national 
level is the risk of mutualisation of public debt in case of bank fail-
ures. Some governments fear that their tax payers will be held liable 
when bank failures in other countries exceed the financial ability of 
these countries to protect the deposits of their residents. However, 
without common deposit insurance Banking Union can hardly be 
regarded as complete.
The problem is that a rejection of mutualisation of public debt and 
full Banking Union are inconsistent in a system of fractional reserve 
banking. We know from historical experience that fractional reserve 
banking is prone to suffer liquidity and solvency crises. Central 
banks have been created to safeguard against systemic liquidity risk 
and government reinsurance of private deposit insurance has been 
introduced to safeguard against systemic solvency risk. The problem 
in EMU is that we do not have a euro area state that could reinsure 
1 Thomas Mayer is Senior Fellow at the Centre for Financial Studies at Goethe 
University Frankfurt This paper is an updated and expanded version of CEPS Policy 
Brief No. 290, published in May 2013. He wishes to thank Daniel Gros for valuable 
comments on an earlier draft. 
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private deposit insurance. Even with maximum bail-in of bank share 
holders and creditors in case of a systemic banking crisis it is not as-
sured that all deposits of up to EUR100,000 are safe as promised by 
the EU Directive for deposit insurance. The amounts needed may 
exceed the common funds available in the Single Resolution Mecha-
nism. Deposits above EUR100,000 are without protection and in 
fact ought to be bailed-in as a rule to avoid market distortions. Such 
distortions could arise if governments with a large fiscal capacity were 
allowed to assure depositors that their deposits are safe in the banks 
within their territory, regardless of the size of the deposit. In times of 
crisis, deposits would then flee from countries with smaller to those 
with larger fiscal capacity. Because of the incompleteness of Banking 
Union it is highly likely that the ECB will have to deal both with sys-
temic liquidity and solvency crises in the event of their occurrence.
However, the contradiction between national responsibility for pub-
lic finances and full Banking Union in a fractional reserve banking 
system can be resolved when we change the system. This paper pro-
poses three simple steps to do this. In step 1, we define as “safe asset“ 
deposits that are fully backed by reserves held with the central bank. 
In step 2 we create a hierarchy of loss absorbing bank liabilities, and 
in step 3 we induce banks to divest from government bonds and treat 
government bonds as “credit”.
Step 1: A 100% reserve requirement for safe deposits
We start by defining the risk-free asset for a euro-area resident with 
short-term and long-term financial liabilities (e.g. living expenses 
and nominal debt): This is the asset that can be converted into legal 
tender at face value at any time and under any circumstance. The 
concept of legal tender is very important in a fiat money system, in 
which money derives its value from government regulation or law, 
because it ensures that we can settle debt with almost worthless paper 
or electronic bits. In a fiat money system the only legal tender is by 
definition central bank money. Hence, an asset is risk-free if it can 
be converted into central bank money at any time. It is easy to see 
that only few assets would qualify as risk-free. Most importantly, the 
debt of governments that do not control the issuance of legal tender, 
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as is the case in EMU, or deposits of banks that are backed by credit 
to entities that also do not control the issuance of legal tender, are 
not risk-free. All these assets are risky because the debtor may not 
be able to convert them into legal tender at any time and under all 
circumstances. 
Hence, in EMU, where governments have no access to the money 
printing press of the European Central Bank (ECB), the only risk-
free asset is cash issued by the central bank and deposits that are 
fully backed by central bank reserves held at the central bank. No 
government sponsored insurance scheme can make deposits risk-free 
because this scheme cannot guarantee the availability of legal tender 
under any circumstances. It thus follows that we need to establish 
safe bank deposits as deposits that are fully backed by banks’ hold-
ings of central bank reserves. In other words, we can effectively in-
sure deposits by introducing a 100% reserve requirement for this 
type of deposits. No industry or state deposit insurance scheme is 
required. A simple 100% reserve requirement is sufficient.2 
But would a deposit insurance scheme based on a 100% reserve re-
quirement be at all possible in our present system? The answer, of 
course, is yes: To back ‘insured’ deposits created earlier by fractional 
reserve banking, banks could borrow central bank reserves in the 
necessary amount and keep them on deposit with the central bank. 
The cost of these safe deposits for the banks would be determined 
by the difference between the lending rate for central bank reserves 
and the deposit rate for central bank money. The cost for the bank 
customer would be determined by the net cost of central bank funds 
for the banks and the banks’ operating costs for the insured deposits. 
The benefit for the customer would be to have a safe asset other than 
only central bank notes, and the ability to use this asset to make non-
cash payments. 
2 The idea of 100% reserve coverage of deposits is of course not new. As Huerta de 
Soto has pointed out, it dates back to the school of Salamanca in the 16th century, 
was taken up in the UK Bank Charter Act of 1844 and is advocated today by fol-
lowers of the Austrian School of Economics and others (see Jesus Huerta de Soto, 
“Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles”, Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn 
AL, 2012). 
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A quantitative limit for safe deposits would not be necessary as the 
central bank could adjust the supply of reserves to the demand for 
safe deposits. But the central bank could influence the demand for 
safe deposits by changing the variable costs, which are given by the 
difference between the cost of central bank reserves and the rate that 
the central bank pays on deposits. This could be used for stabilisa-
tion policy: By influencing the demand for safe deposits relative to 
other deposits, the ECB would also influence credit extension by the 
banks.
Assume that customers switch from investor deposits to safe depos-
its. If the ECB kept the supply of central bank reserves constant, 
banks would need to reduce credit to free funds for deposit with 
the ECB as cover for the additional safe deposits. Credit to the non-
bank sector would go down, and the credit multiplier, defined as 
credit relative to central bank money, would fall. Alternatively, if the 
ECB wanted to accommodate the switch and keep credit to the non-
bank sector constant, they could increase the supply by central bank 
reserves to meet the additional demand. Still the credit multiplier 
would decline, albeit by less than before, because the central bank 
money stock would increase. Finally, if the ECB wanted the credit 
multiplier to remain constant, they could raise the alternative costs 
of holding safe deposits by lowering the deposit rate. The reduction 
of the deposit rate needed to achieve the target level of safe deposits 
could be determined in a reverse refinancing operation, where banks 
submit bids for the deposit rate they are willing to accept (or pay 
when the deposit rate is negative).3 
Step 2: A hierarchy of loss-absorbing bank liabilities
Once we have established reserve-backed deposits as safe assets, all 
other bank liabilities would of course be risky. We can now define 
a hierarchy of loss absorption in a bank resolution regime. The first 
loss would be borne by the equity tranche on the liability side of 
banks’ balance sheets. After having set aside assets pledged to cover 
secured debt, the second and third losses would be borne by junior 
3 Banks in Germany and certain other euro area countries today already hold large 
amounts of central bank reserves. However, these reserve holdings are motivated by 
the banks’ reluctance to lend to other banks in other euro area countries and are not 
earmarked to back deposits. 
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and senior unsecured bank debt. The fourth and last loss would ac-
crue to deposits uncovered by central bank reserves. When all bank 
liabilities except deposits fully covered by central bank reserves con-
tribute to cover losses on bank assets, taxpayer-funded bank bailouts 
would become significantly less likely (and will eventually become 
unnecessary). As long as banks engage in maturity transformation, 
systemic liquidity crises remain possible and a lender-of-last resort 
necessary. But the risk of liquidity support turning into support for 
insolvent banks would be much diminished when there is a clear 
roadmap for bank resolution. Moreover, the risk of a liquidity crisis 
could be reduced if the scope for maturity transformation would be 
limited in the regulatory framework. Finally, when the public fully 
understands the risk associated with an exposure to banks beyond 
the reserve-backed safe deposit, it would be up to banks to reassure 
bank equity investors and creditors that their assets are being man-
aged in a way that makes illiquidity and losses become unlikely.
Step 3: Divest banks from governments by revised regulations for 
government debt
To be able to fund their assets at reasonable costs, banks would need 
to have a comfortable equity cushion and a well-diversified and rea-
sonably liquid portfolio of assets. Most importantly, they would have 
to reduce their exposure to government debt to a level consistent with 
this debt being subject to default risk. Hence, in the new regulatory 
regime, government debt would have to be backed by equity and 
other loss-absorbing bank liabilities, and it would have to be subject 
to limits for single credit exposure. To allow banks’ divestment from 
government debt, the European Central Bank could buy in a one-
off operation the government bonds that banks have pledged to the 
central bank as collateral for obtaining central bank credit, and place 
them in a special account that will be wound down over time.4 As 
4 Since government debt presently does not need to be backed by bank equity, is 
not subject to single credit exposure limits, and is liberally accepted by the ECB as 
collateral for loans of central bank money to banks, banks have in effect become 
intermediaries for ECB credit to governments (though this has been camouflaged by 
keeping government credit on banks’ balance sheets). To end this practice, the ECB 
will have to properly account for its true exposure to government debt by assuming 
the credit to government presently parked on banks’ balance sheets on its own bal-
ance sheet. 
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a result of this operation, risky claims of the banks on governments 
would be replaced by risk-free claims of the banks on the ECB or, 
in other words, by central bank reserves. The ECB would of course 
want to reduce its exposure to government debt over time. 
Since it is very doubtful that all highly indebted euro-area countries 
could repay their debt, governments and the ECB could agree that 
all income from seigniorage would be used to pay down the govern-
ment debt held by the ECB in the special account. In practice this 
would mean that the ECB instead of governments would redeem 
maturing (or repurchase outstanding) bonds and debit governments’ 
seigniorage account with the costs of the transaction. Since the pres-
ent discounted value of seigniorage can be very large, reaching several 
trillion euros in the case of the euro area, depending on interest rates 
on central bank credit and the growth rate of non-interest-bearing 
central bank money, it seems likely that this would be sufficient to 
eventually retire the government debt acquired by the ECB from 
the banks. The arrangement outlined here has some resemblance 
to the debt redemption fund proposed by the German Council of 
Economic Experts. However, an important difference is that in the 
arrangement proposed above, the ECB would withhold revenue to 
pay down the debt and would not have to rely on governments to 
allocate revenue for this purpose.
Part of the reserves obtained by selling government bond holdings to 
the ECB could be used initially by the banks to back safe deposits. 
The rest could be released by the ECB into the banking system and 
the economy at large by setting a rate for central bank deposits below 
the risk-adjusted bank lending rates. With their debt now subject 
to default risk, highly indebted governments might encounter dif-
ficulties accessing the market at reasonable costs to roll over expir-
ing debt. But market access could be improved if the ECB agreed 
to assume the status of a junior creditor for the government bonds 
they have acquired from banks in case of a debt restructuring. Like 
the orderly pay down of the debt, the costs for such a restructuring 
could be covered by future seigniorage income. This would repre-
sent a partial mutualisation of public debt, but because of its limited 
character it would probably be acceptable for countries with stronger 
balance sheets.
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Managing the transition
The introduction of a safe deposit within the framework of our pres-
ent banking system is illustrated in Charts 1-4. The first chart in-
troduces highly simplified balance sheets for a bank and the central 
bank. The Bank has extended credit in the amount of 99 currency 
units (CU) and thereby created deposits of the same amount. It 
holds 1 CU as minimum reserve, funded by a loan obtained from 
the central bank. The latter holds the bank’s reserve and a claim in 
the same amount on the bank.
Chart 1. Bank and Central Bank Today
Chart 2 shows the separation of the bank’s balance sheet into a credit 
and payments department. Both departments can remain within the 
same unit, but they operate under separate liability. In particular, the 
payments department is not liable for any losses of the credit depart-
ment of the bank.
Chart 2. Separation of bank into credit and payments departments
Assets Liabilities
99 K 99 ID
1 MR 1 ZBC
100 100
Assets Liabilities
1 ZBC 1 MR
1 1
Bank Central bank
K = Bank credit; ID = Investor deposit + equity caital; MR = minimum
reserve; ZBC = central bank credit
Assets Liabilities
Credit department
99 K 99 ID
1 MR 1 ZBC
Payments department
0 0
100 100
Assets Liabilities
1 ZBC 1 MR
1 1
Bank Central bank
K = Bank credit; ID = Investor deposit + equity capital; MR = minimum
reserve; ZBC = central bank credit
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Chart 3 shows the creation of excess reserves in the credit depart-
ment of the bank. The bank borrows 9 CU from the central bank 
and deposits the funds back to the central bank.
Chart 3. Creation of excess reserve
Chart 4 shows the decisive step for the creation of the safe deposit. 
Nine CU are transferred from the account for investor deposits in 
the credit department to the safe deposit account of the payments 
department. The safe deposits are fully backed by the simultaneous 
transfer of 9 CU excess reserves from the credit department to the 
payments department. At the end of the process, we have 9 CU of 
completely safe deposits. In case the bank fails and the credit de-
partment is wiped out, the safe deposit holders keep their deposits 
backed by central bank reserves. At the same time, the exposure of 
the central bank has increased. It has lent 9 CU to the credit depart-
ment of the bank for the funding of its assets. However, as the expo-
sure is moderate and the ECB is the Single Supervisor in EMU this 
exposure can be defended. The minimum reserve held by the credit 
department of the bank is of course now redundant and can be used 
to repay the corresponding central bank credit.
Assets Liabilities
Credit department
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Payments department
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Bank Central bank
K = Bank credit; ID = Investor deposit + equity capital; MR = minimum
reserve; ZBC = central bank credit; UR = Excess reserve
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Chart 4. Transfer of  investor deposit to safe deposit
Balance sheet effects of safe deposits
Table 1 shows the stylized structure of banks’ balance sheets after the 
introduction of safe deposits. Abstracting from assets earmarked for 
covered bonds, banks would have central bank reserves and credit on 
the asset side of the balance sheet, as before. However, central bank 
reserves would be tied in the payments department to cover safe de-
posits on the liability side of the balance sheet. All liabilities in the 
credit department would participate in loss absorption in a clearly 
defined hierarchy, with equity providing the first layer and investor 
deposits (not covered to 100% by central bank reserves) the last.
Given our definition of a safe deposit, it corresponds to what are 
at present called “sight deposits”. In April 2013, sight deposits in 
the euro area amounted to €4.4 trillion, representing about 38% of 
total deposits or 44% of GDP. Since customers would probably not 
choose to have all sight deposits in the form of safe deposits, this 
would represent an upper boundary to the level of safe deposits. In 
April 2013, banks held €556 billion as reserves with the Eurosys-
tem (€273 billion of which counted as minimum reserves). Hence, 
the introduction of safe deposits would substantially increase re-
serve holdings and the Eurosystem’s balance sheet (only about €2.5 
trillion). But this would only change the mix between inside and 
Assets Liabilities
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Bank Central bank
K = Bank credit; ID = Investor deposit + equity capital; MR = minimum
reserve; ZBC = central bank credit; UR = Excess reserve; SD = safe
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outside money and not affect the overall size of the balance sheet of 
the monetary and financial system.
Table 2 shows the structure of the balance sheet of the ECB. As 
can be seen from this table together with Table 1, safe deposits, like 
bank notes in circulation, represent a direct liability of the ECB to 
the non-banking sector. Against this stands the ‘good will’ on the 
asset side of the central bank’s balance sheet, which reflects the trust 
invested by the public in money as a means of exchange and store 
of value. At first glance, the backing of money by ‘good will’ in the 
central bank’s balance sheet may look unsound. Proponents of 100% 
reserve backing of deposits have therefore suggested that the central 
bank acquire government debt to back safe deposits and issue money 
against new government bonds when it wants to increase the central 
bank money stock. But this only camouflages the lack of a mate-
rial cover of money in a fiat money system and creates circularity in 
the accounts: The claim of the central bank on the government is 
neutralized by the government’s eventual authority over the central 
bank. Because of this the government may be tempted to use direct 
central bank purchases of government debt as an excuse to fund its 
expenses through the money printing press. The fact is that the only 
cover of money in a fiat money system is people’s trust in money, 
and this is most honestly accounted for by ‘good will’ in the central 
bank’s balance sheet.
Table 1. The structure of bank balance sheets in the new regime
* Participating in losses in ascending order.
Table 2. The structure of the central bank’s balance sheet in the new regime
Assets Liabilities 
Payments department 
                       Central bank reserves                                 Safe deposits 
Credit department 
                       Ring-fenced assets                                 Covered bonds 
                       Other assets                                 Investor-deposits* 
                                Senior debt* 
                                Junior debt* 
                                Equity* 
 
Assets Liabilities 
Good will Deposits of commercial bank 
reserves to cover safe deposits and 
banknotes 
Other assets Other liabilities, reserves, and 
capital 
 
35Thomas Mayer
As explained above, the central bank can influence the mix between 
safe deposits and investor deposits by determining the alternative 
costs of safe deposits. Since investor deposits fund bank credit, this 
allows the central bank to influence credit extension by the banking 
system. Banks can of course still engage in maturity transformation 
by funding longer-term credit with rolling short-term investor de-
posits. But holders of investor deposits would be exposed not only to 
credit but also to liquidity risks associated with maturity transforma-
tion. Since they would demand a risk premium as compensation, 
there would be an economic limit to maturity transformation.
In a growing economy, the central bank may not only want to influ-
ence the mix between safe and investor deposits but also the size of 
the balance sheet of the banking sector. It can do so by writing up 
‘good will’ in its balance sheet and crediting safe deposits with this 
amount (i.e., paying safe deposit holders something like a dividend). 
A write-up of ‘good will’ could be triggered by an increase in the 
demand for money as a result of an increase in potential GDP. In 
this case, the price level would fall if no new money was issued. As 
long as price rigidities exist, this may not seem desirable. Thus, new 
central bank money would come into existence in a neutral way and 
would not benefit any sector in particular (as would be the case if the 
central bank would create new money by buying newly issued gov-
ernment bonds, as suggested by some). Economists of the Austrian 
school have pointed out that the creation of money via bank credit 
or government spending benefits those close to the process of money 
creation and puts at a disadvantage those far away from it. The latter 
will not obtain new money but may suffer from price increases trig-
gered by the money injection.
A more level playing field
The proposed structure for Banking Union would of course change 
the way in which banks operate and governments fund themselves. 
Banks would no longer extend credit and create book money at will. 
Rather, they would assume the dual role of 1) safe keeper of the risk-
free assets, i.e. central bank money, for depositor-savers, and 2) inter-
mediary of funds between investor-savers and entrepreneurs. There 
36 A Safe Deposit for Banking Union
would be no need to limit “deposit insurance” to a certain amount, 
e.g., the EUR100,000 now in force in the euro area, and deny larger 
depositors, e.g. companies, access to a safe store of value. As safe 
keepers of the risk free asset and facilitators of non-cash payments 
banks would of course be entitled to a fee for the services they render, 
which would become a permanent source of revenue for them. By 
the same token, banks would receive fees for acting as agents in capi-
tal markets and generate income as risk takers when using investor-
deposits as a source for credit.
It is possible that bank lending rates would increase in the new re-
gime, but if they do, then only because savers realise that in a frac-
tional reserve banking system bank deposits carry credit risk, unless 
they are fully backed by banks’ holdings of central bank reserves. In 
fact, the widespread misconception that bank deposits in our present 
system of fractional reserve banking are completely safe and can be 
converted into central bank money at any time and in all circum-
stances represents a subsidy to bank lending rates (and bank profits) 
from tax payers, who in times of crises are called upon to stabilize 
banks.
Governments could no longer rely on banks to fund their debt and 
would have to obtain funding from the capital markets. Borrow-
ing costs could also increase for them as they would no longer be 
regarded as offering risk-free assets and could no longer benefit from 
preferential treatment on banks’ balance sheets in the form of zero-
risk weighting for the calculation of regulatory capital requirements 
and exemption from single-credit exposure limits. Again, such an 
increase in borrowing costs would represent the end of a subsidy to 
government borrowing as a result of special regulatory treatment.
Conclusion
To sum up, “common deposit insurance” could be introduced in the 
euro area by requiring banks to fully back safe deposits with central 
bank reserves. This would be the only safe asset in EMU, where, 
as already noted, governments have no command over the money 
printing press of the central bank. All other bank liabilities would 
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participate in covering losses on the asset side of banks’ balance sheets 
in a hierarchical order established by the common bank resolution 
regime in the second step. To help banks divest from government 
bonds, the ECB could buy these bonds from them, replacing risky 
claims of banks on governments by risk-free claims of banks on the 
ECB in the third step. Governments and the ECB could agree to use 
future seigniorage income to pay down the government debt held by 
the ECB. With this, Banking Union would be complete.
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European Supervision And Stress 
Testing: Beware Of False Friends
Andrea Resti* 
1. Foreword
Integrating bank supervision in the European Union is a complex 
and far-reaching process. In this short note, rather than discussing its 
general design and trends, I focus on three specific areas. 
First, I discuss whether the advent of a Single Supervisory Mech-
anism (SSM) in the Eurozone, which is generally considered as a 
major step forward for large European lenders, was well received by 
investors when it was announced. Second, I look back at past stress 
tests in Europe, which were often described as ineffective, to see 
whether such an assessment holds true in light of empirical evidence. 
Third, since bank supervision in Europe (including the SSM and 
the next round of stress test) is set to rely heavily on Risk-Weighted 
Assets (RWAs), I briefly investigate whether regulatory risk weights 
are as unreliable and disconnected from other risk measures as some 
authors have claimed.
I deal with these different issues based on a common intent: to see 
whether conventional wisdom finds support in the empirical evi-
dence or it has rather led to a number of “false” beliefs, which should 
* Department of Finance, Bocconi University, Milan; vice-chair of the Bank-
ing Stakeholder Group, European Banking Authority, London. Comments from 
Brunella Bruno, Giacomo Nocera and Marco Onado are gratefully acknowledged. 
The usual disclaimer applies.
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be further assessed  but have become hard to challenge in the eco-
nomic and policy debate.
2. Was the SSM good news for large European banks?
Figure 1 summarizes the key steps in the introduction of the SSM. 
Th e two initial dates look especially signifi cant.
Th e fi rst one is June 29, 2012, when the European Council an-
nounced it had reached a political agreement on the so-called “Bank-
ing Union”, a wide-ranging initiative focused on Eurozone banks, 
including a single supervisory mechanism (the SSM), an integrated 
resolution mechanism for ailing banks (the so-called “Single Reso-
lution Mechanism”, SRM) and a unifi ed deposit guarantee scheme 
(DGS). Although the details of the project were still to be defi ned, 
a strong political consensus had emerged within the Council on the 
need of creating a single supervisor. Additionally, a legal procedure 
had been agreed that would make it possible to assign strong su-
pervisory powers to the European Central Bank (ECB) on the basis 
of the existing treaties without going through a complex and time-
consuming legislative process.
Figure 1: timeline of the key steps in the introduction of the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism
Th e second relevant date is December 14, 2012, when the Euro-
pean Council approved an amended version of the SSM rules drafted 
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by the European Commission three months before. Those rules as-
signed a clear and wide mandate to the ECB, including the direct 
supervision of about 130 large banking groups. Although no proper 
list of the latter was released, the approved criteria were clear enough 
to enable market participants to guess what banks would fall under 
the ECB’s direct control.
In short, while the June 29 statement informed investors about the 
political willingness to achieve a strongly-integrated model of bank 
supervision in the Eurozone (within a reasonably short time frame), 
the December 14 announcement provided details on the ECB’s 
foreseeable powers and on the (directly) supervised institutions. Al-
though the process would involve some more formal steps in the 
following months, the two key features of the new system had been 
defined.
Figure 2 shows how equity investors reacted to the two 
announcements1. The values in the table denote Cumulative Abnor-
mal Returns (CARs) on a 5-day event window centered on the event 
date (-2, +2). The CARs are based on a standard market model where 
market returns are measured through national stock-market indices 
(an industry-specific benchmark would have been strongly affected 
by the returns of the tested banks). Results are provided for several 
groups of lenders, namely:
- banks to be directly supervised by the ECB according to the 
criteria approved on December 14;
- banks to be directly supervised by the ECB (as above) and 
based in GIIPS countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain);
- banks to be directly supervised by the ECB and based in non-
GIIPS countries;
1 Equity values may not be the only tool to assess whether European banks were 
positively affected by the advent of the SSM. For example,  as argued by Galai and 
Masulis (1976), since shareholders hold a call option on the bank’s assets  they gain 
from an increase  not only in expected asset returns but also in their volatility (some-
thing hardly beneficial in terms of financial stability). However, it would be hard to 
change perspective and compute CARs for debt holders, since for many banks in 
our sample credit default swaps are not  traded actively in liquid markets.  
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- Eurozone banks to remain under the direct control of national 
authorities according to the criteria approved on December 
14;
- non-Eurozone listed banks.
Since the eligibility criteria for ECB direct supervision were not 
available yet at the time of the fi rst event date (June 29), we also 
consider a sub-group of ECB-supervised banks that only includes 
the largest institutions, i.e., those that could be safely assumed to be 
falling under the ECB’s direct mandate.
Figure 2 – Cumulative Abnormal Returns on two key event dates
Th e statistical signifi cance of CARs is tested according to four al-
ternative procedures: a standard Patell test (Patell, 1976), a BMP 
test accounting for event-induced variance (Boehmer et al., 1991), 
augmented versions for the Patell and BMP tests based on the Kolari 
and Pynnonen adjustment for simultaneous announcements (Kolari 
and Pynnönen, 2010). Stars denote signifi cance at 95% (“*”) and 
99% (“**”).
Th e fi rst announcement appears to have a negative impact for Euro-
zone banks, especially the largest ones (that could be safely assumed 
to fall under the ECB’s direct mandate) and those based in GIIPS 
countries. 
Th ere are various reasons for this result. While representing an ambi-
tious step towards further fi nancial integration in Europe, the cre-
ation of the SSM may have fallen short of investors’ expectations. In 
fact, it does not cover non-Eurozone countries (including the UK, 
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where some of Europe’s largest lenders are based) and could be seen 
as a way to postpone direct intervention in banks by the ESM (Eu-
ropean Stability Mechanism) until end 2014 or later. Concerning 
GIIPS-based banks, a further negative eff ect may relate to credibility 
building. As the ECB is completely untested as bank supervisor, it 
needs to establish a reputation for eff ective control of bank risk. To 
that aim, it can be expected to keep a strong grip on the riskiest in-
stitutions, many of which are assumed to be headquartered in GIIPS 
countries.
A positive impact on bank prices is found on the second event date, 
when strong rules and a credible time schedule for the new super-
visory framework were established. Lenders falling under the ECB 
direct mandate experience signifi cantly positive CARs, unlike their 
peers remaining under national supervision or based in non-Euro-
zone countries, where the price impact is virtually nil. Th e strongest 
eff ect emerges for non-GIIPS institutions, which can be assumed to 
be less aff ected by reputation-building issues.
To complement the CAR analysis above, Figure 3 looks at long-run 
impacts. As a measure of price performance, it shows the diff erence 
between two stock market benchmarks: MSCI Europe Banks and 
MSCI World Banks. Positive/increasing values indicate that Euro-
pean banks are performing better than their world counterparties. 
Th e starting point is June 22, one week before the announcement 
issued by the European Council, when the gap is set at zero.
Figure 3 – The long-run impact of the SSM
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Again, the 29 June event is found to have no positive impact on 
European bank prices, which keep performing worse than the world-
wide benchmark. Th e turning point is July 26, when ECB’s presi-
dent Mario Draghi delivered the famous speech in London in which 
he promised to do “whatever it takes” to defend and revive the euro. 
In the following weeks, however, further steps towards the SSM (to-
gether with the introduction of ECB’s Outright Monetary Transac-
tions on August 2 and September 6) seem to have contributed to a 
signifi cant improvement in the relative price performance of Europe-
an lenders. Additionally, it could be argued that, while not triggering 
an immediate rebound in stock prices, the fi rst intergovernmental 
agreement on the SSM provided the political underpinnings for Mr 
Draghi’s straight policy statement a few weeks later.
3. Were past European stress tests really so ineff ective?
One key step in setting up the SSM is the so-called Comprehensive 
Assessment (CA), a 12-month due diligence process on about 130 
Eurozone banks started in October 2013 (see Figure 4). Th e fi nal 
step in the CA will be a stress test, where the eff ects of a 3-year 
downturn scenario on the profi tability, liquidity and capitalization of 
individual banks will be assessed by the ECB, the European Banking 
Authority (“EBA”) and the national supervisors. 
Figure 4 – Key steps in the ECB’s Comprehensive Assessment
In presenting this stress test, the ECB offi  cials have been keen to 
affi  rm that it will diff er signifi cantly from similar exercises carried 
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out in the past2. According to a widespread belief, in fact, previous 
European stress tests have  been able to neither identify weak institu-
tions nor to convey reliable information to market participants (see, 
e.g., Acharya et al., 2013).
Regarding the 2011 exercise, carried out by the then newly-estab-
lished EBA, a widely mentioned “proof” of its ineffectiveness is that 
Dexia, a large Belgian lender that filed for state support only a few 
weeks later, had passed the test without any special warning. Things, 
however, may be slightly more complex.
Dexia’s problems did not originate from a weak capital base but rath-
er from strong liquidity pressures (Acharya and Steffen, 2013). The 
bank had invested heavily in government bonds issued by GIIPS 
countries, using them as collateral to raise funds in the wholesale 
market. Accordingly, when the bonds’ prices dropped and their vola-
tility soared (leading to an increase in repo haircuts), Dexia found it 
increasingly difficult to refinance its positions and to comply with 
margin calls. 
Did the 2011 stress test miss this vulnerability? This is hard to say. In 
fact, the stress test exercise produced two sets of results: the first one 
focused on capital and it was disclosed to investors in full detail; the 
second one concerned liquidity and it was kept confidential because 
of the fear that its disclosure may trigger panics  and self-fulfilling 
spirals. 
Even so, one can use the first set of results to derive a simple mea-
sure of liquidity risk: the increase in funding costs under the stress 
test’s downturn scenario3. While this increase can be sustainable, or 
even moderate, for banks funding themselves on the retail market or 
through long-term bonds, it becomes more dramatic for institutions 
relying mostly on short-term wholesale financing, including repos. 
2 See European Central Bank (2013), where a press representative asks a top ECB 
official the following question: “What makes this exercise more credible and effec-
tive than the previous two EBA exercises? And I won’t rehearse all the problems or 
concerns with the previous stress tests. But what makes this different?” 
3 Stress tests mostly involve a “baseline” scenario representing the expected evolu-
tion of macroeconomic and market fundamentals, as well as a “downturn” scenario 
involving a more challenging economic context.  
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Figure 4 shows values (in basis points) for all listed banks participat-
ing in the 2011 stress test. As it can be seen, Dexia experiences the 
second-largest increase, almost double than the sample median. Th is 
is strong evidence of a weak funding profi le, highly vulnerable to 
liquidity pressures.
Figure 5 – 2011 EBA Stress Test: change in funding costs under the 
downturn scenario
Another widespread belief regarding the 2011 stress tests is that mar-
ket sentiment was unaff ected by the results. In a sense, this is largely 
correct, as the long-run decline of bank prices did not end after the 
stress test results were announced. However, it is hard to see how 
a stress test alone could have changed investors’ beliefs that banks 
were able to cope with a negative market outlook. Unlike its US 
counterpart, the 2009 SCAP, the European stress test was not ac-
companied by an announcement that governments were ready to 
stand behind ailing banks and off er to inject high levels of capital as 
often as needed. In this sense, the EBA was missing a “big bazooka” 
to convince investors that no banks would be left without adequate 
capital (Onado and Resti, 2011).
However, if one looks at the way individual bank stocks reacted when 
the stress test results were announced, about 60% of the abnormal 
returns can be explained by a small set of indicators that could be 
derived from the EBA data fi le. Table 1 (abridged from Petrella and 
Resti, 2013) shows that investors rewarded banks that:
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- started from a higher Tier 1 ratio (including additional rights 
issues carried out in preparation of the stress test);
- experienced a smaller increase in the “total coverage ratio” 
(loan loss provisions over total loans, including performing 
ones) under the downturn scenario;
- posted a stronger rise in the coverage ratio for defaulted expo-
sures (loan loss provisions over bad loans) under the downturn 
scenario;
- suffered a lower increase in funding costs (see Figure 5) under 
the downturn scenario.
Overall, the results in Table 1 show that bank prices have adjusted to 
stress test results. This result may have been modest or short-lived, 
but it may be unfair to say that market participants did not care.
Table 1 - Drivers of individual Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
when the 2011 stress test results were announced 
Source: Petrella and Resti (2013)
In short, the 2011 European stress test did not overlook Dexia’s vul-
nerabilities and did exert an impact on market prices. It may there-
fore be unwise to carry out the 2014 stress test without keeping the 
effects of the previous test in mind. Indeed, the 2011 test repre-
sents a useful benchmark, especially in terms of transparency and 
comprehensiveness of the information released to investors.
4. Should we distrust RWAs?
The CA relies heavily on Risk Weighted Assets (RWAs), as does the 
whole regulatory architecture that resulted from the Basel accords. 
 Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Intercept -0.03 
(0.07) 
Current Tier 1 capital ratio  (including additional capital issues) 0.57 
(0.00) 
Change in total coverage ratio (including performing loans) under stress  -0.89 
(0.00) 
Change in coverage ratio for defaulted exposures under stress 0.07 
(0.01) 
Change in funding costs under stress -0.11 
(0.05) 
Adjusted R-Square 0.58 
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In short, bank assets are converted into a minimum capital charge 
through a system of coefficients known as “risk weights.” Since 2004 
(“Basel II”), large banks have been increasingly allowed to replace 
standard regulatory weights with tailor-made coefficients linked to 
their own internal ratings. While the latter should, in principle, be 
more accurate and risk sensitive than standard weights, they are in-
creasingly seen as a means to “tweak” or “optimize” (some would say 
“squeeze”) capital requirements, thus artificially supporting capital 
ratios.
 
Policy reports and research papers from academics, supervisors 
and supranational institutions (Cannata et al., 2012; Le Leslé and 
Avramova, 2012; Mariathasan and Merrouche, 2013; Vallascas and 
Hagendorff, 2013) are increasingly casting doubts on the reliabil-
ity of RWAs (which apparently stands for “Random, Worthless and 
Arbitrary”). Some large rating agencies have always computed bank 
capital through their own proprietary risk-weights, rather than us-
ing coefficients generated by internal models (de Longevialle et al., 
2008). The Economist magazine, in a widely-cited editorial, defined 
RWAs as “do it yourself capital” (The Economist, 2012).
Figure 6 shows the average risk weights (“risk weight densities”4) for 
a sample of 50 large European lenders in 2008-20125. The riskiness 
of bank assets decreases over time, even when the real economy and 
financial markets experience negative trends.  While some banks 
may have shifted their asset mix towards safer investments, it looks 
unlikely that all European institutions have de-risked their balance 
sheets.
Table 2 refers to the same sample (50 lenders for 5 years) and shows 
how risk weights correlate with a number of variables proxying for 
the banks’ business models, risk management models, risk and capi-
tal levels. As a robustness check, we use two different measures of 
the “average risk weights”: the former (“RWATA”) is computed as 
the ratio of RWAs to total assets; the latter focuses on credit risk and 
divides RWAs (for credit risk only) by the bank’s own estimate of 
4 See Le Leslé and Avramova (2012). 
5 The data in Figure 6 and Table 2 draw on preliminary results of a joint research 
project with Brunella Bruno and Giacomo Nocera. 
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“Exposure At Default” (EAD), an aggregate that, unlike total assets, 
accounts for off -balance sheet items.
Figure 6 – Change in the average risk weight in 2008-2012. Data for the 50 
largest European banking groups. Individual results are reported only for 
countries having at least 3 banks in the sample.
Table 2 –Risk Weights and Bank Characteristics (univariate analysis)
Institutions with larger risk weights tend to be smaller (see Panel I), 
more focused on the traditional loans-and-deposits business, more 
exposed to retail and, to some extent, corporate portfolios (as 
opposed to governments and fi nancial institutions).
       Correlation with 
  Mean Median Max Min Sigma Obs RWATA RWAEAD 
(I) - Business models 
Log of Total Assets 12.5 12.5 14.7 10.3 1.3 250 -65.4%*** -52.5%*** 
Deposits / TA 48.6 48.7 94.7 4.0 15.2 250 45.3%*** 37.5%*** 
Loans / TA 53.9 59.3 81.7 12.2 17.8 250 74.4%*** 57.6%*** 
Retail / total loans 30.8 32.1 58.8 0.0 11.9 239 23.2%*** 15.8%** 
Corporate / total loans 35.2 34.7 54.9 6.3 9.2 239 7.8% 11.9%* 
Institutions / total loans 12.1 9.8 48.2 0.9 9.5 239 -29.0%*** -27.1%*** 
Governments / total loans 12.2 11.9 28.6 0.0 5.9 239 -23.1%*** -22.3%*** 
(II) - Risk models 
Standard / total loans 45.0 37.3 100.0 1.9 30.6 250 74.2%*** 69.6%*** 
IRB / total loans 55.0 62.7 98.1 0.0 30.6 250 -74.2%*** -69.6%*** 
FIRB / total loans 10.5 0.0 92.0 0.0 18.1 250 -9.9% -12.0%* 
AIRB / total loans 43.5 47.7 98.1 0.0 30.7 250 -67.1%*** -61.0%*** 
(III) - Capital and risk 
Stock return volatility 3.4 3.1 10.3 1.0 1.5 240 1.6% 5.9% 
CDS spreads 278.8 154.0 2494 17.0 366.4 205 30.6%*** 18.1%*** 
WACC 3.9 3.6 13.4 0.4 2.1 240 25.1%*** 23.5%*** 
Impaired loans / Total loans 5.8 4.4 32.6 0.4 5.3 250 33.8%*** 30.1%*** 
Tier 1 / RWA 11.0 10.8 21.3 -6.7 3.5 250 -55.5%*** -55.2%*** 
Note: * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; significant at 1%. 
50 European Supervision And Stress Testing: Beware Of False Friends
Low risk weights involve a more widespread usage of Internal Rat-
ings-Based (IRB) models, especially advanced ones (Panel II). This 
was expected, since Basel II allows banks to use IRB on a voluntary 
basis (subject to supervisory approval). As a result, only institutions 
that foresee significant capital savings are willing to invest extensively 
in internal models.
Risk weights correlate significantly (albeit not perfectly – see Panel 
III) with some market-based risk measures, namely the CDS spreads 
and the weighted average cost of capital (WACC, as estimated by 
Bloomberg). This marks an improvement over previous empirical 
tests (Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2013), based on pre-crisis data, 
where no significant link has emerged. Our sample, including years 
of financial distress that triggered considerable variance across banks 
and over time, may make it easier for different risk indicators to 
convey similar signals. Furthermore, banks with higher risk weights 
also show a more significant level of ex post credit risk, as measured 
by the ratio of impaired loans to total loans.
Finally, risk-weights correlate inversely with risk-weighted capital.  As 
a result, banks that trim down their RWAs to unusually low risk lev-
els are apparently required (by supervisors, investors or both) to hold 
a larger cushion of excess capital. Arguably,  institutions can obtain 
supervisory/market approval for more “aggressive” risk weights only 
by holding extra capital above the regulatory minima. This could 
mean that banks (and, again, supervisors and investors) are bound by 
some sort of un-weighted capital ratios, where the product between a 
bank’s risk-weighted Tier 1 capital and its average risk weight cannot 
overly deviate from some “optimal” target level.6
  
5. Conclusions
This note examined widely-shared beliefs about three topics in the 
recent policy debate. First, it is generally agreed that the Banking 
Union should rebuild investors’ confidence in Eurozone banks. 
6 This, however, does not rule out the risk that “banks with higher capital buffer 
[…]may be undercapitalized in spite of holding capital above the minimum require-
ments” (Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2013), consistent with the theoretical underpin-
nings provided in (Allen et al., 2011). 
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We saw that the introduction of the SSM did not trigger positive 
market reactions, although in the following months – as the new su-
pervisory mechanism and its implementation schedule were set out 
in detail – it certainly helped revive bank prices, lending momentum 
to the ECB’s “whatever it takes” stance.
Second, previous European stress tests are sometimes dismissed as 
ineffective.  We showed that this is not necessarily the case, and that 
the work done by EBA in the past may still represent a meaning-
ful benchmark, in terms of transparency and comprehensiveness of 
results.
Finally we saw that, although over the past five years, some banks 
may have used RWAs to reach seemingly higher capital levels, risk-
weights are not absent from market-based risk measures. In addition, 
a negative relationship was found between a bank’s risk density and 
the amount of capital it holds in excess of the regulatory minimum. 
In sum, regardless of what we may think of the appropriateness of 
un-weighted capital requirements, some kind of plain leverage ratio 
seems to exist already.
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Prevent or Exit?  
A Policy Dilemma: Policies to 
Prevent Future Crisis vs. Policies 
to Exit Current Crisis
Miguel Fernández Ordóñez 
The dreadful fall of Lehman Brothers and the immediate collapse of 
nearly all financial markets fortunately provoked a flood of reactions 
of unprecedented geographical and historical dimensions both in the 
fields of research and policy. A large number of academicians, politi-
cians and regulators have worked and continue to work very hard on 
this task. National governments, parliaments, supervisors and central 
banks, new international institutions like the G20 and the FSB, or 
older ones like the International Monetary Fund, the Basel Com-
mittee or the European Commission have dedicated and continue to 
dedicate much time and resources to satisfy a strong public opinion 
demand: “This cannot happen again”.
Virtually all the keys have been touched: regulatory and superviso-
ry policies; monetary, budgetary, fiscal and structural policies, and 
many more. Today I will not discuss any of these policies; I will not 
judge their efficacy or efficiency. My purpose today is to attract your 
attention towards the potential tradeoffs between preventing the next 
crisis and exiting from an ongoing crisis. The simple point I want to 
make is that whenever we are analyzing, designing or implementing 
56 Prevent or Exit? A Policy Dilemma: Policies to Prevent Future Crisis vs. Policies to Exit Current Crisis
any type of policy, we should question ourselves whether we want to 
adopt “prevention policies” or “exit policies” 
I call “prevention policies” those decisions that tried to respond to 
the huge clamor that emerged at the end of 2008 when most markets 
and many banks collapsed and prompted the worst recession since 
the(Great Depression of the 1920´s. I call “exit policies” those that 
aim to exit from the crisis, those that aim to reduce the costs of the 
economic downturn and to shorten the period of adjustment.
To be more precise, the distinction I want to stress today is not be-
tween policies but between the effects of different policies, whatever 
their declared purposes are. The specific idea is being aware of two 
effects of our decisions: on the one hand, their properties to prevent 
the next crisis and, on the other hand, their contribution to exit, to 
get out, from this crisis. 
So, why is it important to consider both, prevention and short term 
macroeconomic impacts? Because there are policies that aim to pre-
vent future crisis without harming, in principle, the exit from the 
current crisis. For example, setting remuneration criteria for bank 
executives, serves to avoid or at least to smooth out the next crisis 
without harming, in principle, the exit from this crisis. In the other 
way, labor market reforms - where needed- help both to fight this 
crisis and to prevent the next crisis. 
But it is not always so easy. Sometimes good policies to prevent the 
next crisis, if they are implemented during the crisis, not only do not 
serve to alleviate the present crisis but they can even aggravate it, or 
delay the recovery. 
Today I will start by reflecting on three cases where policies adopted 
to prevent future crisis by improving incentives, actually worsened 
the crisis. These three examples are the decision to let Lehman Broth-
ers go, the Greek debt restructuring and the Eurogroup agreement 
on the Cyprus crisis. 
In theory, these decisions were taken to ensure that, in the future, 
agents will act much more responsibly and therefore to prevent the 
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appearance of similar crises in the future. But their short term impact 
was harmful. 
The decision to let Lehman go bankrupt is a clear example of a policy 
that had both kinds of effects. On the one hand, it had an impact on 
the economy. It triggered an extraordinary cascade of negative effects 
on many financial firms which increased the depth and duration of 
the crisis. On the other hand, the decision was presented as a step 
forward in fully playing the market discipline mechanisms.
The destructive effect on the world economy of the Lehman decision 
is not discussed today by anybody, even if we accept that not all the 
costs incurred since then would have been avoided if Lehman had 
been bailed out. The costs paid during the crisis came not only from 
bad decisions in managing the crisis but also from the needed adjust-
ments of imbalances accumulated during the bubble, independently 
of how the crisis was managed.
What happened with the second intended effect, the discipline effect 
to prevent future crises? At best, this effect was null since it ended up 
being anecdotal, because neither before Lehman nor after Lehman, 
no exemplary “bail in” policy was applied to any other big financial 
institution. The immediate bail out of AIG confirmed forever the 
realism of the “Too Big to Fail” assumption.
The second decision is the Eurogroup agreement imposing rebates to 
all the deposits of Cypriot banks. In fact, there were two decisions 
because the first one was amended in the following meeting of the 
Euro group. This was another case in which the objective to prevent 
a future crisis predominated over the objective to help to exit the 
current crisis1. It is clear that the first decision, the one to hit the 
insured deposits was one that brutally harmed confidence without 
bringing any other benefit. It even demolished the trust of insured 
depositors which is the pillar on which confidence is built in a finan-
cial system. But even the second decision (haircut only the uninsured 
deposits) is questioned by many analysts who also ask themselves if 
the discipline effect has been worth the cost, taking into account the 
depression that has the Cyprus economy has been suffering since 
then.
1 “We have a new “template “to solve the banks crisis” was said at that time. 
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A third example, although more difficult to analyze, is what is now 
denominated the “Deauville Agreement ” by which the President 
of the French Republic and the German Chancellor announced to 
the world that the Greek sovereign debt should be restructured. The 
effects of that decision taken on a beautiful beach have been with-
out any doubt very harmful, but we should not quickly draw to the 
conclusion that the decision to restructure the Greek debt was inad-
equate. Restructuring is a useful tool to deal with excess leverage. The 
negative effects did not come from restructuring but mainly from its 
announcement. In the old times of fixed exchange rates, everybody 
knew that you should never announce currency devaluation until 
after it is done. 
The three examples mentioned so far refer to decisions that aimed, 
above all, to discipline economic agents. When these decisions were 
adopted they were defended arguing that, by penalizing their behav-
ior, the agents (banks or countries) would in the future engage in 
less irresponsible behavior. But these decisions had negative conse-
quences regarding both “exit” and prevention objectives. Regarding 
the “exit” objective these decisions damaged confidence which aggra-
vated the crisis or delayed the recovery. But they have also been use-
less at preventing irresponsible behaviors because either the decision 
was eventually quickly turned back, or the incurred huge recession 
costs sent a message to the market that authorities will rescue all 
institutions afterward.
These three examples could open a very interesting debate: how to 
set up regulations to prevent moral hazard and how to treat it during 
crisis resolution. Is a declaration of no bailout enough? Is a com-
promise of no bailing out big institutions credible? Should financial 
regulations contain provisions to avoid moral hazard? All these issues 
are important and they are at the center of this seminar, but they are 
not the subject of my speech, centered exclusively in assessing the 
prevention and exit effects of our decisions. 
The three examples I have presented so far are also examples of deci-
sions adopted in the heat of the crisis and could open a debate about 
the problems of deciding under serious public opinion pressure. This 
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is also a very interesting issue but again it goes beyond the topic of 
my speech.
Lehman, Cyprus and Deauville were just particular examples that 
illustrate my general point: the necessity to distinguish between the 
effects on preventing future crisis and the effects on helping to exit 
from this crisis. Next, I will give you some other examples of deci-
sions that show how this general argument can be applied to other 
decisions, how the same trade off emerges in decisions that do not 
have to do with moral hazard, decisions not adopted in the heat of a 
crisis and decisions not even related to banks resolution or sovereign 
debt restructuring.
I will start by giving you an example of regulatory decisions where 
it is equally necessary to evaluate costs and benefits of “preventing” 
and “exiting”. Specifically, I refer to some decisions taken to increase 
banks´ capital requirements during the crisis. 
Rafael Repullo, who is Director of CEMFI, a research center created 
and supported by the Bank of Spain and that many of you know, 
made an interesting presentation last fall in London explaining how 
the decisions to increase the requirements of regulatory capital are, 
without a doubt, a necessary and correct policy in order to have (pro-
mote) safer institutions. But, at the same time, he showed that, by in-
creasing those requirements during the crisis, the problems generated 
by the crisis were amplified. This case equally shows the importance 
of assessing the two different effects and they have nothing to do 
with moral hazard or market discipline.
Certainly some of you know that the Bank of Spain was one of the 
regulators that, before the crisis, during the years of the bubble, in-
troduced countercyclical regulations. The Banco de España required 
the constitution of dynamic provisions with no other basis than the 
credit growth, independently of the quality or performance of the 
granted credits. At that time Spain was criticized for this particular 
regulation and Spanish bankers complained that they were forced 
to make more provisions than banks of other countries. Even the 
European Commission threatened Spain with beginning a sanction 
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procedure if these provision requirements were not scrapped. One 
of the few satisfactions brought by the crisis was that this negative 
view on counter cyclical regulations dramatically changed and finally 
Basel III accepted the idea of building a regulatory scheme that com-
pensated the pro cyclical character of financial firms and financial 
regulation, although, to avoid accounting problems, it was finally 
decided not to solve this problem through additional dynamic provi-
sions but through the constitution of counter cyclical capital buffers. 
Researchers at the Banco de España have always been very sensitive 
to the need to adapt regulatory policies to the cyclical situation of the 
economy and I want to recognize my debt to them when I selected 
the topic of this speech.
Let me continue with this fourth example. The 2008 Great Collapse 
raised a wide consensus on the necessity to increase regulatory capital 
above the requirements of Basel I and Basel II. The problem emerges 
when you ask banks to comply with this increased requirement be-
fore the crisis is over. The problem is that, when a higher capital 
requirement is introduced in the middle of the crisis, the effect is a 
reduction of the credit supplied by banks. This happens because it 
is not easy for banks to raise equity at those moments while reduc-
ing credit is relatively easy; consequently when you introduce the 
requirement to increase the ratio of capital, banks tend to reduce the 
denominator, that is, banks end up reducing credit. To comply with 
the new regulatory ratios, banks will restrict credit even more than 
they would due to the fall in economic activity. And the greater the 
fall of credit, the deeper will be the intensity of the economic crisis. 
The solution to this trade-off might come from requiring greater cap-
ital ratios only when the economy starts to recover but this should 
not be done at the worse moment of the crisis.
There is no easy solution to this trade off because a greater exigency 
of capital may not come exclusively from the regulators and supervi-
sors trying to avoid a similar crisis in the future. Markets themselves 
could ask for a capital increase because, whether we like it or not, 
markets often act with pro cyclical behavior. Those who proposed to 
increase the regulatory capital in the middle of the crisis claimed that 
the ratios of capital before the crisis were already low and, therefore, 
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to allow an additional reduction in capital would increase the dis-
trust of those who finance the banks and this would have negative 
effects on credit and growth. Thus, the argument goes, unfortunately 
we were not in a situation in which we could accept calmly and com-
fortably a reduction in capital.
My intention is not to give simple solutions that could be generally 
applicable but to emphasize that the problem exists and, therefore, 
it must be considered when taking these decisions. My point is that 
before taking these decisions, we should not just analyze them from 
the point of view of preventing a similar crisis. This is a long term 
and fundamental objective and to which logically we must dedicate 
a lot of our efforts, but we should also make an assessment of the ef-
fects of our decisions on the present crisis we are suffering, that is, to 
what extent that decision helps or hinders the exit of the crisis.
Let us reflect on another example that it has nothing to do with ei-
ther the resolution of a banking crisis or with financial regulations. I 
am referring to the Euro zone budgetary policy. As you surely know, 
this policy has undergone three violent zigzags during the crisis. In 
the first place, international organizations demanded the different 
national governments to increase public expenditure to the maxi-
mum to avoid the depression. Soon the theory shifted to require 
an immediate and serious return to austerity. The targets of public 
deficit or national debt that were correct for a normal situation were 
demanded during the crisis without considering the position of the 
economy in the cycle. Today, after a second recession in the Euro-
zone, everybody recognizes that it was a huge mistake demanding 
sudden and large expenditure cuts and rapid increases in taxes be-
cause it worsened the recession and, consequently, not only there was 
no improvement in deficit and debt figures but they even got worse. 
A balanced budget is another example of how reasonable policies 
thought to avoid a future crisis could have negative effects on the 
duration and depth of the present one if the timing is not appropri-
ate and fiscal restraint is required suddenly, in the midst of the crisis.
Some of the problems I have mentioned – for instance, capital re-
quirements increases - were correctly identified at the appropriate 
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moment, and regulators tried to correct these potential problems 
establishing timetables for implementation. The problem was that, 
in some cases the authorities themselves altered these timetables.. In 
other cases, markets themselves demanded more capital and regula-
tors did not react by issuing other regulations that tried to offset this 
pro cyclical tendency of the markets.
We know that decision making, especially in real time, is a difficult 
task. And I do not think that doing, before deciding, a cost-benefit 
analysis on the effects of decisions on prevent and exit from the crisis 
will be a panacea. In some cases it would continue to be difficult to 
solve the trade-off, but in many other cases we could spare ourselves 
wrong decisions resulting not from an inadequate evaluation of dif-
ferent effects but simply because there was no assessment at all.
The idea is that until the crisis is not over should we carefully con-
sider what effects the decisions that we are taking on the evolution 
of the crisis have. We should ask if our decisions serve to alleviate the 
crisis, if they are neutral or even if, as it has happened in some cases, 
they could aggravate it. And while the crisis is not over, the objective 
of exit from the crisis must predominate over preventing the next 
one. Preventing is important, it is very important, and, if it does 
not have effects on the exit of the crisis, prudential regulations must 
be adopted as soon as possible. But, if they have negative effects on 
the economy we must think twice. Or, if you prefer, we must wait a 
little. Costs of postponing a prevention framework exist and must be 
considered, but usually they are not very important in the short run 
because crisis induce prudent behavior in the agents themselves, that 
help to delay a new crisis. Peoples’ - borrowers and lenders - behavior 
is always pro cyclical. They make procyclical decisions in good times 
but equally in bad times. They risk too much in good times but they 
fly away from risk and they are extremely prudent in bad times.
All in all, the work done during the last five years, has been very 
positive. I mentioned to you only the examples of wrong decisions 
but I could give you other important examples where the exit objec-
tive predominated over the prevention objective. Probably the best 
example is the Monetary Policy applied since Lehman collapsed. You 
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surely know the view of the critics on Quantitative Easing or on 
many other unconventional monetary policies implemented up until 
now. These critics go as far as saying that this policy not only will not 
prevent the next crisis but even, they say, it is planting the seeds of 
the next crisis. Of course central bankers have entered in unchartered 
waters and their decisions are not without risks. But they have been 
crucial in avoiding a new Great Depression. 
…….
I am not naive. I do not believe that just by demanding that authori-
ties assess costs and benefits, we will immediately get authorities to 
always act rationally. They will continue to act irrationally as other 
humans. To understand their decisions and to avoid irrational deci-
sions we should apply social psychology to their behavior. Unfor-
tunately there has been little progress in studying the cases when 
national authorities or international institutions have not adopted 
rational decisions in contrast with the significant advancement of be-
havioral economics over the last decades. Thirty years ago Economics 
was based on welfare maximization under the central assumption 
that economic agents act rationally. But throughout those three de-
cades economists like Kanehman, Akerloff, Schiller and many others 
made a lot of progress in analyzing irrational behavior of consumers, 
executives, investors and all economic agents. The result of this work 
is that the paradigm of Economics has changed significantly today. 
Although we now widely accept that investors and consumers can act 
irrationally, we continue assuming that authorities and international 
organizations act rationally. We have learned that investors may act 
as a herd, we discern all kinds of cognitive bias, etc., but we do not 
yet dare to apply these theories to the economic authorities. 
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Abstract
Many of the world’s developed economies have introduced, or are 
planning to introduce, bank bail-in regimes.  Both the planned EU 
resolution regime and the European Stability Mechanism Treaty in-
volve the participation of bank creditors in bearing the costs of bank 
recapitalization via the bail-in process as one of the (main) mecha-
nisms for restoring a failing bank to health. There is a long list of 
actual or hypothetical advantages attached to bail-in centered bank 
recapitalizations. Most importantly the bail-in tool involves replac-
ing the implicit public guarantee, on which fractional reserve bank-
ing has operated, with a system of private penalties. The bail-in tool 
may, indeed, be much superior in the case of idiosyncratic failure. 
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Nonetheless, there is need for a closer examination of the bail-in 
process, if it is to become a successful substitute to the unpopular 
bailout approach. This paper discusses some of its key potential 
shortcomings. It explains why bail-in regimes will fail to eradicate 
the need for an injection of public funds where there is a threat of 
systemic collapse, because a number of banks have simultaneously 
entered into difficulties, or in the event of the failure of a large com-
plex cross-border bank, except in those cases where failure was clearly 
idiosyncratic.
A. Introductory Remarks
The scale of losses flowing from bank failures is initially independent 
of the identity of those upon whom the burden of meeting that loss 
falls.  But, such losses also can then entail critical externalities. These 
have traditionally justified the public bailouts to avoid the systemic 
threat that the failure of any bank beyond a certain size carries with 
it. 
Nevertheless, public bailouts of banks are a source of moral hazard 
and they undermine market discipline. One of the key principles of 
a free market economy is that owners and creditors are supposed to 
bear the losses of a failed venture. Bailouts can also have a destabiliz-
ing impact on public finances and sovereign debt, with UK and Irish 
finances being held as illustrative examples of the impact of such 
costs.1 
These concerns have given rise to reforms to internalize the costs of 
bank failure of which the foremost is the drawing up of bank credi-
tor bail-ins. Essentially, bailing in bank creditors constitutes a radical 
rethinking of who bears the ultimate costs of the operation of frac-
tional reserve banking.
A great momentum has built up for basing resolution on bail-in, 
which sometimes resembles a ‘chorus’ (wording used in McAn-
drews, et al, (2014), p. 14).  The regulatory authorities in most of the 
1 This is a nearly undisputable argument against bailouts and is fully endorsed in 
this paper. However, bailout costs cannot be accurately measured unless the costs of 
the alternative potential instability are also counted (Dewatripont, 2014). 
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world’s developed economies have developed, or are in the process of 
developing, resolution regimes that allow, in principle, banks to fail 
without resorting to public funding. 
The bail-in approach is intended to counter the dual threat of sys-
temic disruption and sovereign over-indebtedness. It is based on the 
penalty principle, namely, that the costs of bank failures are shifted 
to where they best belong: bank shareholders and creditors.  Namely, 
bail-in replaces the public subsidy with private penalty (Huertas, 
2013) or with private insurance forcing banks to internalize the cost 
of risks, which they assume. 
In these new schemes, apart from the shareholders, the losses of 
bank failure are to be borne by ex ante (or ex post) funded resolu-
tion funds, financed by industry levies, and certain classes of bank 
creditors whose fixed debt claims on the bank will be converted to 
equity, thereby restoring the equity buffer needed for on-going bank 
operation.  
This is an important development, since in the past banks’ subordi-
nated debt did not provide any cover when bank liquidation was not 
an option, which meant that subordinated creditors were bailed out 
alongside senior creditors by taxpayers (Gleeson, 2012). This led to 
creditor inertia. 
Turning unsecured debt into bail-in-able debt should incentivize 
creditors to resume a monitoring function, thereby helping to restore 
market discipline. For example, as the potential costs of bank failure 
would fall on creditors, in addition to shareholders, such creditors 
should become more alert about the levels of leverage the bank car-
ries (Coffee, 2011), limiting one of the most likely causes of bank 
failures and the governance costs associated with excessive leverage 
(Admati et al. 2013; Avgouleas and Cullen, 2014b). Normally, share-
holders have every incentive to build leverage to maximize their re-
turn on equity (Admati et al. 2012; Avgouleas and Cullen 2014a). 
Such monitoring might, in turn, reduce the scale of loss in the event 
of a bank failure: creditors could force the bank to behave more cau-
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tiously, especially where the bail-in regime allows for earlier interven-
tion and closure than a bail-out mechanism. It should also, in prin-
ciple, eliminate the ‘too-big-to-fail’ subsidy enjoyed by bigger banks. 
Essentially, bail-in provisions mean that, to a certain extent, a pre-
planned contract replaces the bankruptcy process giving greater 
certainty (Coffee, 2011) as regards the sufficiency of funds to cover 
bank losses and facilitating early recapitalisation. Moreover, the bail-
in tool can be used to keep the bank as a going concern and avoid 
disruptive liquidation or dis-membering of the financial institution 
in distress.
But the idea that the penalty for failure can be shifted onto an in-
stitution, such as a bank, is incorrect.  Ultimately all penalties, and 
similarly benefits, have to be absorbed by individuals, not inanimate 
institutions. When it is said that the bank will pay the penalty of 
failure, this essentially means that such penalty is paid in the guise 
of worsened terms, by bank managers, bank staff, bank creditors or 
borrowers. The real question is which individuals will be asked to 
absorb the cost.  
The goals of the bail-in process are not the same in every jurisdiction. 
In the United States the process through which bail-in and subse-
quent conversion of creditor claims takes place for SIFIs is imbedded 
in the mechanics and architecture of the resolution process that is 
applied to systemically important institutions, the so-called Orderly 
Liquidation Authority (OLA) of Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. This means 
that triggering the bail-in process under Title II aims at providing 
with sufficient capital the entities that will emerge following liquida-
tion of the resolved parent institution (see section B below). 
In the European Union, on the other hand, the doom-loop between 
bank instability and sovereign indebtedness has left Eurozone gov-
ernments with a major conundrum. The traditional route of a pub-
lic bailout is increasingly ruled out, not only due to a principled 
adherence to the avoidance of moral hazard, but also due to its 
potential impact on already heavily indebted countries. To answer 
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this challenge, the Eurozone has established the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) to act, amongst other purposes, as an essential 
component of the European Banking Union (EBU). Both the ESM 
statute and the new EU Resolution regime based on the forthcom-
ing EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) require 
the prior participation of bank creditors in meeting the costs of bank 
resolution. This means that either the bank remains a going concern 
and the bail-in process is triggered to effect bank recapitalization to 
restore it to health (‘‘open bank’’ bail-in process) or in conjunction 
with the exercise of resolution powers treating the bank as gone con-
cern (‘‘closed bank” bail-in process). This contrasts with DFA’s ap-
proach to SIFI resolution, discussed in section B(1) below, where 
only the second approach is used. This bifurcation is likely to prove 
problematic.2 
 
Similarly, the intention is that intervention will be sooner (forbear-
ance less), so that losses will be less, but whether that hope will be 
justified is yet to be seen.  We discuss this further in section C below.
 
The desire to find an effective way to replace the public subsidy and 
the unpopular bailout process is entirely understandable and can 
lead to welfare enhancing outcomes. At the same, time, there is a 
danger of over-reliance on bail-ins, in part owing to the growing mo-
mentum for its introduction. In placing bail-in at the heart of bank 
resolution regimes, legislators and regulatory authorities ought not 
to overlook some important shortcomings attached to this approach. 
This paper sets out to discuss these shortcomings and to explain why, 
arguably, bail-in regimes will not remove, in the case of resolution of 
a large complex cross-border bank, (unless the risk is idiosyncratic, 
for example fraud), or in the event of a systemic crisis, the need for 
public injection of funds. In our analysis we particularly focus on 
BRRD’s distinction between the resolution of banks that have be-
2 Notably, although both the US and the European authorities are moving simul-
taneously towards reliance on bail-in mechanisms, we are struck by how little at-
tention appears to be paid in each to the detail of what the other is doing.  It is 
instructive that in the FRBNY Special Issue on ‘Large and Complex Banks’ (2014), 
the papers by McAndrews, et al, and Sommer hardly mention Basel III, the BRRD 
or any European initiative. Equally much of the discussion within Europe on its 
own resolution mechanisms ignores the DFA, and looks inwards. 
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come bankrupt (“gone concern”), from the recapitalization (also as 
part of the resolution regime) of banks that have become so fragile 
as to need intervention and recapitalization, but are not (yet) bank-
rupt, (“going concern”).  Although this distinction is hallowed in the 
literature, we argue that it may be less clear-cut in practice than is 
sometimes suggested. 
B. The Architecture of the Bail-in Process
1. Bank resolution and Bank Bail-in under the Dodd Frank Act 
(DFA)
(a) Overview
Under section 204(a) (1) of the Dodd Frank Act creditors and share-
holders bear all the losses of the financial company that has entered 
OLA. This is in accord with one of the Act’s explicit aims, as stated in 
its preamble: “to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts.” 
To this effect, Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act provides the FDIC 
with new powers to resolve SIFIs. Under OLA, the FDIC may be 
appointed receiver for any U.S. financial company that meets speci-
fied criteria when resolution under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (or 
other relevant insolvency process) would be likely to create systemic 
instability. 
In order to make group resolution effective and to minimize systemic 
disruption, the FDIC has decided that it will follow the Single Point 
of Entry approach (SPOE) (FDIC, 2013), which is the final step in 
the implementation of the ‘‘source-of-strength” doctrine (enshrined 
in section 616(d) of the DFA). In the event of bank failure the top-
tier holding company will have to enter into receivership and atten-
dant losses will be borne by the holding company’s shareholders and 
unsecured creditors. Section 210(a)(1)(M) of the Act provides that 
the FDIC, as the receiver for a covered financial company, succeeds 
by operation of law to all the rights, titles, powers, and privileges 
possessed by, inter alia, the creditors of the resolved and all rights 
and claims that the stockholders and creditors of the resolved insti-
tution may have against its assets are terminated, but for their right 
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to receive payment under the provisions of section 210. The FDIC 
would then form a bridge holding company (“Newco”)  and transfer 
the failed holding company’s ownership of healthy operating subsid-
iaries into it, leaving the holding company shareholders and credi-
tors behind in the estate of the failed holding company.  Operating 
subsidiaries that face no solvency problem will be transferred to the 
new solvent entity or entities (NewCo).3
 Section 210 requires the FDIC to conduct a claims process and es-
tablish a claims priority pyramid for the satisfaction of claims against 
the resolved entity without the use of taxpayer funds. At the conclu-
sion of this process claims against the receivership would be satisfied 
through a debt-for-securities exchange in accordance with their pri-
ority under section 210 through the issuance of debt and equity in 
the new holding company. 
Prior to the exchange of securities for claims, the FDIC would deter-
mine the value of the bridge financial company based upon a valua-
tion performed by the consultants selected by the board of the bridge 
financial company. Yet the FDIC has stated that it expects “share-
holders’ equity, subordinated debt and a substantial portion of the 
unsecured liabilities of the holding company—with the exception of 
essential vendors’ claims— to remain as claims against the receiver-
ship.” (FDIC, 2013). 
This is essentially the bail-in process under Title II, which aims at 
giving the NewCo what is essentially a clean bill of health rather than 
turning unsecured creditors into NewCo shareholders. OLA’s bail-
in process will be utilized to resolve the holding company (‘‘closed 
bank” process), although the operating subsidiaries remain unaffect-
ed, and, thus, it differs from the BRRD approach that provides, in 
addition, the option to use an “open bank” bail-in process. 
By establishing the bridge financial company with significant assets 
of the parent holding company and many fewer liabilities, it is hoped 
that the bridge financial company would have a strong balance sheet 
3 “The term ‘bridge financial company’ means a new financial company organized 
by the Corporation in accordance with section 210(h) for the purpose of resolving 
a covered financial company.” (Dodd-Frank, Title II, Sec. 201 (3)). 
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that would put it in a good position to borrow money from custom-
ary market sources. The FDIC has indicated that contingent value 
rights, such as warrants or options allowing the purchase of equity 
in the new holding company or other instruments, might be issued 
to enable funding the transition/resolution (FDIC, 2013). If there 
are shortfalls or these sources of funding are not readily available, the 
SPOE approach offers the benefit of FDIC’s access to the Orderly 
Liquidation Fund (OLF), provided that borrowings from the fund 
can be fully secured and repaid. Any costs incurred by the FDIC as 
the appointed receiver or other public authority which cannot be 
covered by the above will be recovered from the industry.
The bail-in approach is not new in US bank resolution practice. For 
example, in 2008, the FDIC exercised its existing powers and re-
solved the part of the Washington Mutual group that was not sold 
to JP Morgan Chase, mainly claims by equity holders and creditors, 
under the least-cost resolution method. It imposed serious losses on 
the unsecured creditors and uninsured depositors (deposit amount 
above USD 100,000).4 OLA further expands the resolution author-
ity of FDIC, including its power to cherry-pick which assets and 
liabilities to transfer to a third party, (though these will be subject 
to strict conditions to be further detailed by the FDIC) and to treat 
similarly situated creditors differently, e.g., favouring short-term 
creditors over long-term creditors or favouring operating creditors 
over lenders or bondholders. This discretion is curbed by the intro-
duction of a safeguard that creditors are entitled to receive at least 
what they would have received if liquidation had taken place under 
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code (comparable to the “best interests 
of creditors” test under the Bankruptcy Code).
(b) Evaluation 
Although TARP and other forms of direct bank capitalization by the 
US Treasury during the 2008 crisis did not prove to be loss-making, 
the issue of moral hazard and principled opposition to a private com-
pany receiving public assistance in bankruptcy means that one of 
4 FDIC Press Release, ‘Information for Claimants in Washington Mutual Bank’ 
29 September 2008, available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/
pr08085b.html 
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DFA’s key rationales is exclusion of bailouts. Thus, as mentioned ear-
lier, OLA treats the holding company as a bankrupt (gone) concern. 
There may, however, be some caveats.
First, the dismemberment of the parent holding company, in order 
to provide the necessary funding for the recapitalization of the op-
erating banking subsidiary(ies) may have reputational impact on the 
entire group, including the (seemingly unaffected) operating subsid-
iaries. 
Could the subsidiary bank, with help from the authorities, really 
handle the reputational fall-out?5 Historical evidence of reputational 
contagion, e.g. in the case of certain solvent subsidiaries of BCCI, 
would suggest that this could be a real danger.  If such depositor 
flight should then occur, the Central Bank (or in the USA the Or-
derly Liquidation Fund) might have to pump in large amounts of 
liquidity.  While this would be protected by seniority and collateral, 
the previous buffer represented by the holding company’s capital 
would, at least initially, no longer be there.  So a large portion of the 
operating company’s continuing liabilities might come either from 
the Central Bank (or OLF) or be backed by the deposit insurance 
fund, with some potential call on public support.
The second question is about the speed of rebuilding the capital 
structure of a  new holding company (“HoldCo”) after the bank-
ruptcy of the initial holding company.  While bail-in is not taken in 
isolation but is part of a restructuring process under which manage-
ment is replaced and group business restructured, if the new Hold-
Co’s capital structure is not rapidly rebuilt, one would be left with 
an initially thinly capitalized operating bank (Sommer, 2014) plus 
large public sector liabilities. The government cannot force private 
sector buyers to purchase new equity and (subordinated) debt in a 
new HoldCo, and the prior experience would make private buyers 
wary. Of course, the authorities could massively expedite the process 
by injecting new capital into a new HoldCo, (with the aim of selling 
off such equity later back to the private sector), but that would just 
be another form of bail-out. 
5 No doubt the resolution would have to be accompanied by a careful communica-
tion strategy, but the example of Northern Rock shows how this can go wrong. 
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The third question is about costs to the rest of the sector of roll-
ing over maturing bail-inable debt, once it has been announced that 
losses have been imposed on the original failed holding company’s 
holders of bail-inable debt in the event of that bank’s  failure. The 
cost of such debt could spike and the HoldCos might be tempted to 
let their own buffers slip below the required level.  Of course regula-
tory authorities could impose sanctions in such cases. But in doing 
so they will have to consider the impact of rising funding costs to the 
sector, both in terms of operating costs and in terms of solvency if 
such intervention takes place, as is likely, in a recessionary economic 
climate or worse during a generalized bank asset crisis.
The fourth question relates to the interaction between the DFA ap-
proach and the Basel III capital requirements, which appear to neces-
sitate an earlier intervention approach than DFA’s OLA.  Under the 
latter, the authorities should intervene to resolve a bank whenever its 
core tier 1 equity falls below 4½% of Risk Weighted Assets.  A bank 
with CT1E between 0 and 4½% is not formally insolvent, i.e., it is 
still “going”, rather than “gone”, concern.  It is to be hoped that regu-
lators would intervene in a failing bank before the formal insolvency 
point is reached.  But then they would not be able to bail-in senior 
unsecured debtors under the ‘‘no creditor worse off” (NCWO) con-
dition.  Either all the debt in the HoldCo, comprising subordinated 
debt or contingent capital instruments (Co-Cos), would have to be 
designated as bail-in-able, which could have a considerable effect 
on bank funding costs, or the authorities could just not take pre-
emptive action, disregarding the Basel III requirement.  Either route 
might prove problematic.
2. The FDIC-BoE Approach to Resolving G-SiFIs and Bail-in
Dodd-Frank explicitly authorizes coordination with foreign authori-
ties to take action to resolve those institutions whose collapse threat-
ens financial stability (Title II, section 210, N). A heat-map exercise 
conducted by US regulators determined that the operations of U.S. 
SIFIs are concentrated in a relatively small number of jurisdictions, 
particularly the United Kingdom (UK) (Gruenpeng (Chairman, 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) 2012). Thus, the US and 
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UK authorities proceeded to examine potential impediments to ef-
ficient resolutions and on a cooperative basis explored methods of 
resolving them (Tucker, 2014).
This culminated in the joint discussion paper published by the Bank 
of England (BOE) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC) titled, Resolving Globally Active, Systemically Important, 
Financial Institutions comparing the resolution regime established 
by Dodd Frank Act Title II to the resolution powers of the UK’s 
Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA). To this effect the two au-
thorities have proposed that they will adopt the single point of entry” 
(SPOE) approach, when appropriate,6 in the resolution of G-SIFIs.
Although initially a group taken into resolution would be ‘‘owned” 
by the FDIC (in the US) or, perhaps, under a trustee arrangement 
(in the UK), the intention is that the group would be returned to 
private ownership, with the creditors whose debt is converted into 
equity becoming the new owners of the group. Both the BRRD and 
the UK Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, implement-
ing government’s plans to introduce, with modifications, the Vickers’ 
Report recommendations, include requirements that banks have suf-
ficient capital and debt in issue to make them resolvable using bail-in 
or other resolution tools.
Under the HoldCo approach the continuity of critical economic ac-
tivities is preserved because – in most cases – the subsidiaries of the 
holding company should be able to continue in operation, either 
because they have remained solvent and viable, or because they can 
be recapitalised through the writing down of intra-group loans made 
from the holding company to its subsidiaries. A subsidiary would 
need to be resolved independently only where it had suffered large 
losses.
Under the FDIC-BoE joint paper, in the UK the equity and debt 
of a resolved holding company would be held initially by a trustee, 
though the BRRD now provides alternative methods as well (Arts 
6 The joint Paper recognizes that multiple point of entry (MPE) may be more ap-
propriate in some cases of complex cross-border banks. 
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47, 48, 50 ).  The trustee would hold these securities during a valu-
ation period.  The valuation is undertaken to assess the extent to 
which the size of the losses already incurred by the firm or expected 
to be incurred can be ascertained in order to determine the extent 
of required recapitalization.  Namely, valuation of losses determines 
the extent to which creditor claims should be written down and con-
verted.  During this period, listing of the company’s equity securities 
(and potentially debt securities) would be suspended.  
Once the amount of required recapitalisation requirement has been 
determined, an announcement of the final terms of the bail-in would 
be made to the previous security holders. On completion of the ex-
change the trustee would transfer the equity to the original creditors. 
Creditors unable to hold equity securities (e.g. because they cannot 
legally hold equity shares) will be able to request the trustee to sell 
the equity securities on their behalf. The trust would then be dis-
solved and the equity securities of the firm would resume trading.
3. The European Approach
Bail-in is a pre-condition for bank resolution in the EU and for (ul-
timately) ESM implemented bank recapitalization within the Eu-
rozone. In a nutshell before a Member State is allowed to tap ESM 
resources for direct recapitalization of a failing bank, a round of bail-
in and national contributions must have taken place. National regu-
lators must first impose initial losses representing at least 8% of the 
bank’s liabilities on shareholders and creditors (Art. 38 and 39 of the 
BRRD (as finalized by EU Council Decision, Dec. 2013)) before 
they can use the national resolution fund to absorb losses or to inject 
fresh capital into an institution, and then only up to 5% of the bank’s 
liabilities. In the event that bank losses exceed 13% of its liabilities, 
a further bail-in round may take place in order for the residual losses 
to be absorbed by creditors and non-guaranteed and non- preferred 
depositors before public money and then ESM funds are used. These 
conditions make ESM assistance an absolute last resort in order both 
to counter moral hazard and to allay any fears of de facto mutualiza-
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tion of liability for bank rescues in the Eurozone.7 It is clear that the 
EU holds high hopes about the effectiveness of this mechanism, an 
approximation to which has already been tried in Cyprus in March 
20138 and for the restructuring of the Spanish banking sector.9 It 
is also hoped that bail-in will nullify the need for state aid for the 
banking sector across the EU and not just within the confines of the 
Eurozone (Angeloni, Lenihan, 2014).
Yet the legal entity by legal entity approach raises its own set of diffi-
cult issues. In the case of non-EBU groups, resolution colleges might 
smooth co-ordination issues but a bail-in decision has distributional 
consequences, potentially with clear losers. So in some cases it might 
even create a crisis of confidence in a member state’s banking system, 
and strong disagreements are bound to arise as to which subsidiary 
is bailed-in and which is not. Where there are subsidiaries in non-
EBU European countries such disagreements could even go as far as 
creating serious problems in the relationship of the EBU with non-
EBU European countries, especially where losses are bound to fall 
unevenly. The obvious solution is to follow a group-based resolution 
approach and aggregate all losses to the group entity in accordance 
with the US model, but that would seem to us to reinforce subsid-
iarisation, which goes against the operating principles and constitu-
tional freedoms underpinning the single European market.
C. Problems of Bail-in for a ‘‘going concern” bank
1. Effective Resolution Substitute?
While OLA provides for the liquidation of the bank holding compa-
ny, it uses bail-in to leave operating subsidiaries unaffected. The EU, 
on the other hand, has an “open” bank resolution process that is reli-
ant on the successful bail-in of the ailing bank.  So both jurisdictions 
7 See Arts 1-3 of ESM Guideline on Financial Assistance for the Recapitalisation of 
Financial Institutions. 
8 While the authorities would say that the Cypriot case was very different, given the 
absence of the resolution tools provided by the BRRD, we feel that its implementa-
tion gave important further momentum to the adoption of bail-in processes. 
9 See Bankia Press Release, ‘BFA-Bankia expects to culminate recapitalisation in 
May’ March 2013, available at http://www.bankia.com/en/communication/in-the-
news/news/bfa-bankia-expects-to-culminate-recapitalisation-in-may.html 
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view the bail-in process as a substitute to liquidation of either the 
entire group or of parts of the group, combined of course with the 
use of other resolution tools. This is not an unreasonable approach, 
especially in the case of a largely idiosyncratic cause of failure, e.g., 
fraud. But there are four essential conditions that have to be met 
when using the bail-in process as a resolution substitute: timing, 
market confidence, the extent of restructuring required, and accurate 
determination of losses.
First, the issue of when to trigger the bail-in process, taking also into 
account the requirements of early intervention regimes (e.g., Art. 23 
et. seq. BRRD), is a matter of cardinal importance. Identification of 
the right time and conditions to trigger the bail-in tool in a process 
that extends conversion beyond specially designed bail-able debt will 
be one of the most important for any bank supervisor. The reasoning 
leading to supervisors’ decision will much resemble first and second 
order problems in mathematics and logic. If the supervisor triggers 
bail-in early, then the full measure of losses may not have been ful-
ly revealed, risking further rounds of bail-in. But if the supervisor 
determines to use the bail-in tool at a later stage, when the full scale 
of losses to be imposed on creditors is revealed, they risk a flight of 
bank creditors who do not hold ex ante specifically designed bail-
inable debt, defined hereinafter as D bail-inable debt.
Moreover, speed of resolution/recapitalization (albeit at the expense 
of flexibility) is one of the reasons for the popularity of bail-in among 
regulators (Sommer, 2014). Yet, we doubt whether the adoption of 
bail-in regimes would lead to earlier regulatory intervention than un-
der the bail-out regimes. The aforementioned paper by McAndrews, 
et al, reinforce our view that legal concerns about imposing poten-
tially large losses on private creditors could unduly delay resolution, 
perhaps until the last possible minute.  By then the liabilities needed 
to be written down could extend beyond HoldCo’s specially desig-
nated bail-inable debt.  Bail-out, being undertaken by the authority 
of the government, is, we would argue, somewhat less liable to legal 
suit than bail-in.  On the other hand, bail-in of bank liabilities that 
extends beyond D bail-inable debt affects a wider range of creditors; 
there are more parties to the negotiation, and hence that may be 
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more protracted. In our view, the more delayed will be the onset of 
Resolution, the more essential it will be to put more emphasis on an 
earlier Recovery phase. 
There are also other concerns. In the absence of a fiscal backstop 
for other parts of the financial system, if bail-in is triggered before 
measures have been taken to buttress the rest of the financial sys-
tem a creditor flight from other banks will be certain, spreading the 
tremors throughout the financial system, even if those banks retain 
sufficient amounts of D bail-in able debt. 
Secondly, market confidence in the bailed-in institution would have 
to be quickly restored in order to preserve franchise value and re-
pay official liquidity support (Sommer, 2014). As mentioned in sec-
tion B(1)(b) above this is mostly dependent on how fast the capital 
structure of the requisite bank (or the new bank in the event of a 
“closed” bank process) is rebuilt. If the institution has entered into a 
death spiral with customers, creditors and depositors fast disappear-
ing reversing the trend would doubtlessly prove a task of daunting 
proportions.
Thirdly, triggering the bail-in process will prove unsuccessful if bank 
losses are not properly identified in some finite form. The determina-
tion of bank losses including unrealized future losses must be accu-
rately determined in order to avoid successive rounds of bail-in losses 
accruing to bank creditors. This might in fact prove a challenging 
task. For example, bank losses in the recent crisis have consistently 
been underestimated.  
Normally bank failures occur when macro-economic conditions have 
worsened, and asset values are falling.  Bank failures during boom 
conditions, e.g. resulting from fraud, such as Barings, are easier to 
handle with less danger of contagion.  In the uncertain conditions 
of generalized asset value declines, the new (incoming) accountants, 
employed by the resolution agency, are likely to take a bad scenario 
(or even a worst case) as their base case for identifying losses, to be 
borne by the bailed-in creditors, partly also to minimize the above-
mentioned danger of underestimation leading to further calls on 
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creditors.  Previously the accountants of the failing bank itself will 
have been encouraged (by management) to take a more positive view 
of its (going concern) value.  Thus the transition to bail-in is likely to 
lead to a huge discontinuity, a massive drop, in published accounting 
valuations.  This could put into question amongst the general public 
the existing valuations of other banks, and lead, possibly rapidly, to a 
contagious crisis, on which we add more below.
Moreover, restructuring should extend to the underlying business 
model, which led the bank to bankruptcy in the first place, to avoid 
several bail-in rounds in the future. 
2. Who Meets the Burden?
(a) Overview
In general, banks have three types of creditors: 
banking creditors, including retail and wholesale depositors, needing 
to use the provision by the bank of payment and custody services; 
investment business creditors, including swap counterparties, trad-
ing counterparties, and those with similar claims from trading activ-
ity such as exchanges, clearing systems and other investment business 
counterparties (including repo counterparties);
financial creditors, comprising long term creditors of the bank, in-
cluding bondholders and other long-term unsecured finance provid-
ers (Clifford Chance, 2011). 
When banking groups are resolved, only the third type of creditors 
should be affected by bail-in, since banking creditors and investment 
business creditors will most likely hold claims against unaffected 
operating subsidiaries. This is, however, not the case where, under 
the EU approach, resolution is undertaken at the legal entity level. 
Under the BRRD business creditors may be exempted, through pre-
designed “carve-outs”. It is not inconceivable that this exemption 
may be utilized to shift disproportionately the burden of bail-in onto 
other classes of creditors such as bondholders and unprotected de-
positors.
Arguably, in contrast to bail-outs, where all the taxpayers are, in 
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some sense, domestic constituents, an advantage of bail-in is that 
some creditors may be foreign, but this is an elusive and possibly 
false advantage. The aim to penalise Russian creditors of Cypriot 
banks might have played a significant role in the way that “rescue” 
was structured. Similarly the treatment of the creditors of Icelandic 
banks was organised in such a way as to give preference to domes-
tic depositors over foreign bondholders10.  But the foreign investors 
would, of course, realise that they were in effect being targeted, so 
that they would both require a higher risk premium and flee more 
quickly at the first sign of potential trouble.  The result is likely to 
be that a larger proportion of bank bondholders will be other (non-
bank) financial intermediaries of the same country, providing a fur-
ther small ratchet to the balkanization and nationalisation of the 
banking system.  In any case, the BRRD disallows discrimination 
between creditors on the basis of their nationality or domicile, eradi-
cating this mis-conceived advantage of bail-ins over bailouts.
With a purely domestic bank, the effect of shifting from bail-out to 
bail-in will, therefore, primarily transfer the burden of loss from one 
set of domestic payers, the taxpayers, to another, the pensioners and 
savers. It is far from clear whether, and why, the latter have broader 
backs and are better placed to absorb bank rescue losses than the 
former.  One argument, however, is that savers, and/or their financial 
agents, have made an ex ante choice to purchase the claim on the 
bank, whereas the taxpayer had no such option, and that, having 
done so, they could/should have played a monitoring role.  While 
this is a valid point, the counter-argument is that charities, small 
or medium size pension funds, or individual savers, e.g., via pen-
sion funds, do not really have the expertise to act as effective bank 
monitors.  Thus, forcing them to pay the penalty of bank failure 
would hardly improve bank governance.  On the contrary it would 
only give rise to claims that they were “tricked” into buying bail-
in-able debt.11 Arguably, BRRD’s provisions (Art. 37(3)(c)(iii) and 
10 See S. Goodley, “Bondholders may take legal action against Iceland over failed 
banks Bondholders may take legal action against Iceland over failed banks”, The 
Guardian, 7 November 2010, available at http://www.theguardian.com/busi-
ness/2010/nov/07/iceland-banks-bondholders-legal-action 
11 Would such bail-in able debt be a suitable investment for pension funds, chari-
ties, local authorities and individuals?  The Pensions Regulator, the Department 
for Communities and Local Government, the Charities Commission and the FCA 
may need to consider whether further rules in this area would be necessary. 
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Recitals 48(a) and 78(a)) reflect these concerns by giving resolution 
authorities the power to exempt (in ‘‘exceptional circumstances”), 
from the application of the bail-in tool, liabilities held by individuals 
and SMEs beyond the level of insured deposits. The chief rationale 
for this discretionary exemption is avoidance of contagion, a very 
plausible concern. If it is applied in a wider context, this safe harbour 
could provide adequate protection to vulnerable segments of savers’ 
population. These are, in general, weak bank governance monitors 
and, at the same time, stable sources of cheap funding. Such wider 
(albeit ad hoc) protection would reinforce the confidence of these 
parts of society and economy in the banking system. 
3. Governance
The treatment of bailed-in creditors, especially where creditors will be 
issued new securities rather than having their claims written-down, is 
likely to be complex, time-consuming and litigation intensive.  Faced 
with such costs the original creditors are likely to sell out to those 
intermediaries that specialise in such situations, e.g. “vulture” hedge 
funds.  So, as already seen in the case of the Co-op Bank, ownership 
may fall into the hands of a group of such hedge funds12; the same 
would probably have happened had there been creditor bail-in in 
Iceland and Ireland.  In Cyprus creditor bail-in has given a large 
share of ownership to big Russian depositors.13 In theory, this prob-
lem could be resolved by placing caps on how much bail-inable debt 
different creditors could hold. In practice, however, such caps would 
encounter legal constraints, at least, under EU law. In addition, if 
caps are very strict, they would restrict the liquidity of the market for 
bail-inable debt and could lead to banks having to hold insufficient 
amounts of bail-inable debt, increasing the need for a public bail out. 
In spite of their numerous disadvantages, bail-outs do give govern-
ments the power to direct and specify who is to take over the running 
12 See M. Scuffham, “Co-op to cede control of bank to bondholders”, Reuters, 21 
Oct. 2013, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/10/21/uk-coop-bank-
bondholders-idUKBRE99K05O20131021 
13 A. Illmer,  ‘Russia’s rich dominate Cyprus’ largest bank’, Deutsche Welle, 18 
Oct. 2013, available at http://www.dw.de/russias-rich-dominate-cyprus-largest-
bank/a-17146540 
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of the rescued bank.  That is not the case with some versions of the 
bail-in approach. In the USA the role of the FDIC as ‘‘trustee” of 
the resulting bridge company should, however, deal with this point. 
But elsewhere the resulting governance structure could become unat-
tractive to the authorities and public.  While there is a safeguard that 
the new managers have to be approved by the regulatory authorities, 
nevertheless the ethos, incentives and culture of a bank, whose own-
ership is controlled by a group of hedge funds, for example, is likely 
to differ from that of a bank rescued by a bail-out.
4. Legal Costs
While there might be a few jurisdictions such as the UK where bail-
in regimes can be established by contract, elsewhere this route would 
lead to a stream of litigation  (Gleeson, 2012). As a result, in most 
jurisdictions, including the UK, bail-in regimes are given statutory 
force (e.g., Art. 50(2) of the BRRD). Yet this does not mean that liti-
gation will be avoided when the bail-in process is triggered. Bail-in 
regimes that extend beyond D bail-inable debt clearly encroach on 
rights of property, which remain entrenched in countries’ constitu-
tions and international treaties. Legal claims will be raised both by 
shareholders who will see their stakes wiped out and creditors who 
will see the value of their claims reduced or diminished14 and it is un-
likely that the “no creditor worse off” principle, which both Dodd-
Frank and the UK’s Banking Act and the BRRD (Art. 29(1)(f )) have 
adopted as a creditor safeguard under the bail-in process, will deter 
the expected stream of litigation. In fact, the principle could make 
litigation even more likely. Therefore, where the result of government 
action is that bailed-in creditors receive a demonstrably lower return 
than they would have done had the bank proceeded to disorderly 
liquidation, they should be compensated (Gleeson, 2012), but by 
whom and in what form? Would that be in the form of shares in the 
NewCo or of the recapitalized operating subsidiary? Even so, rapid 
restoration of public confidence is the only way to make creditors’ 
converted stakes valuable.
14 E.g., see ‘‘Russian depositors begin seizing property of Cypriot banks”, Rus-
sia Today, 12 April 2013, available at http://rt.com/business/laiki-cyprus-banks-
arrest-765/ 
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Moreover, a significant proportion of the costs of bank resolu-
tion could involve settling conflicts of interest among creditors 
(IMF, 2013).  This is particularly likely to be so in so far as bail-in 
will concentrate ownership amongst “vulture” hedge funds, whose 
métier is the use of legal means to extract large rents.  Shifting the 
burden of meeting the costs of recapitalisation from a small charge 
(on average) imposed on the generality of taxpayers to a major im-
post on a small group of creditors, easily capable of acting in uni-
son, is almost bound to multiply the legal costs of such an exercise 
manifold, however much the legal basis of this process is established 
beforehand.  
This is easily explainable. In the case of taxpayer-funded bail-outs, 
everyone’s tax liabilities go up a little, (and the relative burden has, 
in a sense, been democratically reviewed and decided); in the case of 
creditor bail-in, a few will lose a lot, and will, therefore, have stronger 
incentive to protest and litigate.  
5. Funding Costs 
There are two aspects to this, a static and a dynamic one.  There have 
been numerous quantitative studies of the “subsidy” provided by the 
implicit government bail-out guarantee to the larger banks which are 
too-big-to-fail (Santos, 2014;  Morgan and Stiroh, 2005; Ueda and 
Weder-Di Mauro, 2011; Li et al. 2011).  There is sufficient evidence 
to show that Too-Big-To-Fail banks are prone to take much riskier 
assets than other banks (Afonso et al. 2014; Brandao et al. 2013; 
Gadanetz et al. 2012, Gropp et al. 2011).  
Such a subsidy is also criticised as undesirable and unfair distor-
tion of competition. Taking advantage of lower funding costs, larg-
er banks cut margins aggressively to edge out smaller competitors 
(Hakenes and Schnabel, 2011).  Thus, the subsidy distorts the pat-
tern of intermediation towards larger banks and away from smaller 
banks and non-bank intermediation, including peer-to-peer chan-
nels.  But there is a counter-argument. Shifting intermediation to 
smaller banks or to other parts of the financial system will take it 
from safer, better regulated and more transparent banks (including 
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bigger banks) to riskier, less regulated, and less understood channels. 
In addition, dependent on the state of competition between banks, 
much of that subsidy will have gone to providing better terms, pri-
marily in the shape of lower interest rates, to bank borrowers. Con-
troversially, perhaps, size improves banks operating costs (Kovner et 
al. 2014).  
Funding costs may not be a major concern in the case of bail-inable 
debt but there might be an issue of adverse selection. First, another 
facet of the same, static question is by how much funding costs of 
(large) banks have to rise if they have to hold specifically bail-inable 
debt. There are a range of views about this. As in the case of equity 
(Miles et al., 2011, and Admati et al. 2011), if we compare one oth-
erwise identical equilibrium with another, when the sole difference is 
that some categories of bank debt become bail-inable, it is doubtful 
whether the overall cost of bank funding would rise by much, say 
10-30 bps.  Moreover, with a rising proportion of bank creditors at 
risk from bank failure, there should be a greater benefit, in terms of 
lower funding costs, from a patently safer overall portfolio structure. 
As explained in Section A above, one of the fundamental rationales 
of bail-in, is that creditors at risk will have an incentive to encourage 
bank managers to pursue prudent policies, a counter-weight to more 
risk-seeking shareholders.
Secondly, bail-inable debt may affect banks’ choice of assets. If in-
stitutions are required to issue a minimum amount of bail-inable 
liabilities expressed as a percentage of total liabilities (rather than 
as a percentage of risk weighted assets), critically, this will impose 
higher costs on institutions with large amounts of assets with a low 
risk weighting (such as mortgages). Such institutions typically hold 
relatively small amounts of capital as a proportion of their total li-
abilities. In addition, institutions will face constraints on their fund-
ing models and higher costs if they are required to hold bail-inable 
liabilities in specific locations within a group (for example at group 
level when their funding is currently undertaken by their subsidiar-
ies). 
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That bail-in regimes will provide some ex ante incentive to more 
prudent behaviour seems undisputable. Yet market discipline failed 
to operate effectively ahead of the current financial crisis and holders 
of bail-inable liabilities will face the same difficulties as other stake-
holders in assessing the health and soundness of bank balance sheets 
(See on complexity as a monitoring barrier Avgouleas and Cullen, 
2014a).
In addition, if bank(s) nevertheless run into trouble, then utilization 
of the bail-in process will give another twist to pro-cyclicality. With 
bail-in, the weaker that banks become the harder and more expen-
sive it will be for them to get funding.  In this respect high trigger 
Co-Cos would perform better than bail-in-able bonds.  While, in 
principle, increased creditor monitoring could translate into greater 
focus on prudence and caution for the individual banker, in the face 
of a generalised shock, a sizeable proportion of the banks in a given 
country will seem weaker.  Thus a shift away from bail-out towards 
bail-in is likely to reinforce procyclicality.  The ECB has been cau-
tious about bailing-in bank bondholders for such reasons.15
Of course, should the sovereign be in a weak fiscal condition, bail-
out costs will give another twist to the “doom loop” of bank and 
sovereign indebtedness.  But if the costs of recapitalising the banks 
in a given country are so large, does it help to shift them from the 
taxpayer to the pension funds, insurance companies and other large 
domestic investors, and also on the surviving banks?  No doubt the 
crisis would take a different shape, but would it be any less severe?  It 
could be (politically) worse if people began to fear that their pensions 
were being put at risk?
6. Liquidity Concerns
Once the bail-in process has been triggered, it is highly likely that 
the financial institution would only be able to continue conducting 
business with the ‘lifeline’ of emergency liquidity assistance. But the 
amount of liquidity support that could be provided by central banks 
15 Reuters, “Draghi asked EU to keep state aid rules for banks flexible”, Milan, 
19 Oct  2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/19/us-banks-
bondholders-draghi-idUSBRE99I03B20131019 
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and resolution funds (such as the Orderly Liquidation Fund in the 
US) may be constrained by a lack of sufficient high quality collateral, 
and by restrictions on any support that might result in losses fall-
ing on taxpayers. This would be accentuated if a number of major 
financial institutions had to be resolved at the same time. Critically, 
liquidity could be limited to supporting critical economic functions 
while other parts of the business are resolved.
Naturally, central banks and resolution funds will be reluctant to 
pre-commit to provide liquidity support in all circumstances. They 
will want to ensure that a “plan B” option is in place, including the 
immediate winding down of a failing financial institution through 
rapid sales and transfers, without liquidity support, which again 
would depend on a resolution plan drawn up in advance (KPMG, 
2012). However, implementation of such plans would negate one of 
the biggest advantages of (“open bank”) bail-in regimes, namely the 
continuation of the resolved entity or of operating subsidiaries as a 
going concern. 
7. Bank Creditors’ Flight and Contagion
A desideratum for a revenue raising mechanism is that the taxed can-
not easily flee.  It is difficult to avoid taxation, except by migration, 
which has many severe transitional costs.  In contrast it is easy to 
avoid being hit with the costs of creditor bail-in; you just withdraw 
or sell your claim.  Consequently, triggering the bail-in process is 
likely to generate a capital flight and a sharp rise in funding costs 
whenever the need for large-scale recapitalisations becomes appar-
ent. Creditors who sense in advance the possibility of a bail-in, or 
creditors of institutions that are similar in terms of nationality or 
business models will have a strong incentive to withdraw deposits, 
sell debt, or hedge their positions through the short-selling of equity 
or the purchase of credit protection at an ever higher premium dis-
rupting the relevant markets. Such actions could be damaging and 
disruptive, both to a single institution (Randell, 2011). and poten-
tially to wider market confidence, a point that is also highlighted 
by proponents of the bail-in tool (Micossi et al. 2014, p. 9). In our 
view, market propensity to resort to herding at times of shock means 
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that it is not realistic to believe that generalised adoption of bail-in 
mechanisms would not trigger contagious consequences that would 
have a destabilizing effect.
Where the ceiling of guaranteed deposits is set low a significant num-
ber of large depositors might migrate to other schemes such as Mon-
ey Market Funds or even Investment funds that offer higher interest 
rates, as in the example of contemporary Chinese shadow banks. It 
would certainly take a lot of explaining to justify why weakening the 
liquidity of the regulated banking sector and increasing its funding 
costs in order to boost liquidity levels and lower the funding costs 
of the unregulated shadow banking sector is a measure to strengthen 
financial stability. On the contrary, a lack of Lender of Last Resort 
type of liquidity support in the unregulated sector could make bank-
type runs inevitable, increasing the possibility of psychological spill-
overs into the regulated sector and generalized panic, (as occurred in 
the USA in 1907).
It is, of course, true that equity holders and bond holders cannot 
run in the same way that depositors can, but financial counterparties 
can easily do so and will do so if they do not immediately see a hefty 
capital cushion in the bailed-in bank (Sommer, 2014). If these flee 
then equity and bond holders would certainly follow and in their 
attempt to do so they would drive asset values sharply down to an 
extent that would make the option of raising new money, or rolling 
over existing maturing bonds, unattractive or virtually impossible. 
In such circumstances, bank credit extension would stop, amplify-
ing the downturn, lowering asset values yet further and putting the 
solvency of other banks at risk.  Excluding depositors of all brands 
from bail-in might reduce the danger of contagion but would not 
remove it. 
8. International Coordination 
The resolution of G-SIFIs with bail-in is examined in Appendix A. 
However, some thoughts are apposite here to provide a fuller evalu-
ation of bail-in advantages and disadvantages. In our view, the top-
down SPOE approach adopted by the US regulators is conceptually 
superior. Assets and liabilities at the operating subsidiary level are 
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not part of the painful debt restructuring bail-in exercise and may 
continue operations regardless. There are however four clear disad-
vantages in implementing this approach in the case of G-SIFIs. 
First, the (unaffected by resolution) operating subsidiary might, nev-
ertheless, suffer a flight due to reputational contagion, which trig-
gers an irrational but quite likely panic, regardless of parent’s ability 
to sufficiently recapitalize the operating parts of the group through 
conversion of bail-in-able liabilities. Secondly, apart from closely 
inter-related banking markets like the UK and the US, where the 
level of trust between national authorities is high, it is doubtful if 
any form of non-binding bilateral arrangements, including MOUs, 
would hold in the event of a cross-border banking crisis, involving a 
transfer of funds from one jurisdiction to another (Sommer, 2014). 
The gulf between regulators will become even deeper, if the major-
ity of a certain form of group level funding (e.g., tripartite repos) is 
booked with a specific subsidiary that is not based in the same place 
as the HoldCo being resolved (Skeel, 2014). Thirdly, it is arguable 
that when the subsidiary is ring-fenced the regulators may expect the 
subsidiary creditors, as well as shareholders like the HoldCo, to bear 
the cost of bail-in. Fourthly, the top-down approach could increase 
scope for arbitrage and regulatory forbearance. In most cases it will 
be the home country regulator that will have the final word as regards 
the level of D bail-inable debt to be held by the HoldCo. But D 
bail-inable debt could prove more expensive than other subordinated 
debt. Thus, a home regulator concerned about the health of banks in 
its domestic market would be much less keen on increasing the cost 
of funding of its banks, unless legally bound to do so through bilat-
eral or multilateral arrangements with host authorities. In fact, the 
absence of such arrangements could trigger multiple races to the bot-
tom meaning that many HoldCos might not have a sufficient level 
of D bail-able debt to recapitalize the group subsidiaries. In addition, 
there could also be circumstances where home resolution authorities 
are reluctant to use the bail-in tool because of its adverse impact on 
specific groups of creditors (KPMG, 2012).
A host resolution authority might be tempted to trigger its own 
resolution and bail-in powers if it was concerned that it might not 
receive sufficient support from the new bridge holding company to 
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meet losses at, and/or to preserve critical economic functions in, its 
local subsidiary. Art 87 of the BRRD explicitly extends this power 
beyond subsidiaries to branches of institutions from outside the EU. 
By means of this provision, EU member states can apply resolution 
tools, including bail-in, to such branches to protect local depositors 
and to preserve financial stability, independent of any third country 
resolution procedure, if the third country has failed to act. Similarly, 
subject to a number of conditions and on the basis of EU financial 
stability concerns, the BRRD (Art. 86) gives the right to European 
resolution authorities to refuse to enforce third country resolution 
proceedings over EU-based subsidiaries.  
Accordingly the kind of international cooperation required to allow 
a top-down approach to operate effectively is unprecedented and it 
might well form the most challenging aspect of cross-border imple-
mentation of bail-in recapitalisation in the case of G-SIFIs.
Conclusion
“As the emerging-market crises and the entire history of financial 
crises made clear, imposing haircuts on bank creditors during a sys-
temic panic is a sure way to accelerate the panic” 16
While we fully understand the revulsion from too-big-to-fail banks 
and the (political) cost of bailouts, we are worried that the develop-
ment of a bandwagon may conceal from its many proponents some 
of the disadvantages of the new bail-in regimes.  While bail-in may, 
indeed, be much superior in several contexts, notably in the case of 
idiosyncratic failure, the resort to bail-in may disappoint unless ev-
eryone involved is fully aware of the potential downsides of the new 
approach. 
A bail-in mechanism used for the recapitalisation of a bank as going 
concern has the following advantages, vis-à-vis a bail-out approach:-
• Lower levels of moral hazard
• Better creditor monitoring
• Protects taxpayers
16 Geithner, 2014, p. 214. 
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• Places the burden more fairly
• Should improve ex ante behaviour of bank management
• Mitigates the Sovereign/bank debt “doom-loop”
But the bail-in process may also have some important disadvantages 
over bailouts, as it could prove to be:-
• more contagious and procyclical
• more litigious
• slower and more expensive as a process
• requiring greater subsequent liquidity injections
• leading to deterioration of governance
• requiring higher funding costs to banks
• providing a worse outlook for bank borrowers
• worsening ex post outcomes
That the second list is longer than the first is no indication of which 
approach should be favoured. This paper is not intended to claim 
that the proposed reforms will make the process of dealing with fail-
ing banks necessarily worse.  Its purpose is, instead, to warn that 
the exercise may have costs and disadvantages, which, unless fully 
appreciated, could make the outcome less successful than hoped. 
The authorities will no doubt claim that they have already, and fully, 
appreciated all such points, as and where relevant. But we would 
contend that many advocates of moving to the latter do not mention 
such disadvantages at all, or only partially.  Perhaps the choice should 
depend on context. 
The bail-in process seems, in principle, a suitable substitute to resolu-
tion (whether liquidation of a gone concern, or some other form of 
resolution in a going concern bank) in the case of smaller domestic 
financial institutions. It could also be used successfully to recapital-
ize domestic SIFIs, but only if the institution has failed due to its 
own actions and omissions and not due to a generalized systemic 
crisis (Gleeson, 2012). Otherwise, a flight of creditors from other 
institutions, i.e., contagion, may be uncontainable. Even so, success-
ful bail-in recapitalization would require rapid restoration of market 
confidence (Sommer, 2014), accurate evaluation of losses, and suc-
cessful restructuring of the bailed in bank’s operations to give it a 
sound business model to avoid successive rounds of bail-in rescues. 
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It could, of course, prove very hard for regulators to secure all those 
pre-requisites of a successful bail-in recapitalisation in the event of a 
systemic crisis. 
Moreover, generic structural, governance, legal, and other risks and 
costs associated with a cross-border resolution of a G-SIFI make the 
use of the process highly uncertain in its outcome, unless failure was 
clearly idiosyncratic, for example, as a result of fraud. 
Given these shortcomings and costs of bail-in bank recapitalisation, 
orderly and timely resolution of a G-SIFI would still require fis-
cal commitments. These could be established by means of ex ante 
burden sharing agreements, concluded either independently or by 
means of commitments entrenched in G-SIFI living wills (Avgou-
leas, Goodhart, Schoenmaker, 2013). Moreover, over-reliance on 
bail-in could deepen the trend towards disintegration of the internal 
market in the EU (CEPS, 2014), while providing uncertain benefits. 
So, effective recapitalization of ailing banks may still require a cred-
ible fiscal backstop. In addition, a fiscal backstop may be essential 
to avert, in the case of deposits held in the same currency across 
a common currency area, a flight of deposits from member states 
with weaker sovereigns to the member sates with solvent sovereigns 
(Schoenmaker, 2014). This is more or less a Eurozone specific risk, 
unless the current strictures on the use of ESM funds are gradually 
loosened. EU policy-makers ought to continue their efforts to build 
on this instead of relying on the unproven thesis that the bail-in pro-
cess can resolve the recapitalization challenges facing the Eurozone 
banking sector. 
Finally, achieving the goal of making private institutions responsible 
for their actions would be the best policy in an ideal world where 
financial “polluters” would be held responsible for their actions. But, 
in practice, it might prove an unattainable goal. If this turns out to 
be the case then developed societies might have to accept that grant-
ing some form of public insurance is an inevitable tax for having a 
well functioning banking sector. At the same time, other forms of 
regulation like structural reform and cycle adjustable leverage ratios 
(plus more emphasis on the prior Recovery stage), if they prove to 
make banks more stable, should come to the forefront with renewed 
force. 
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Burden-sharing Under State Aid 
Rules: Evolution, State of Play 
and the Way Ahead
Clemens Kerle1 
1. Introduction
This article provides an overview of the burden-sharing rules of the 
Commission’s Banking Communication (“the Communication”)2 of 
10 July 2013. The Communication is the latest adaptation of the 
Commission’s State aid framework for aid to banks, which is based 
on the so-called “Crisis Communications”3. 
1 The views and expectations expressed in this article are those of the author and are not neces-
sarily those of the European Commission. 
2 Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 August 2013, of State 
aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis of 10 July 
2013, OJ C 2013 216/1. 
3 Communication on the application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to finan-
cial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis (‘(first) Banking Commu-
nication’) (OJ 2008 C 270/8); Communication on the recapitalisation of financial institutions 
in the current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards 
against undue distortions of competition (‘Recapitalisation Communication’) (OJ 2009/C 10/ 
2); Communication from the Commission on the treatment of impaired assets in the Commu-
nity financial sector (‘Impaired Assets Communication’) (OJ 2009 C 72/1); Communication 
on the return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the financial sector 
in the current crisis under the State aid rules (‘Restructuring Communication’) (OJ C 2009 
C 195/9); Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 January 2011, 
of State aid rules to support measures in favour of financial institutions in the context of the 
financial crisis (‘2010 Prolongation Communication’) (OJ 2010 C 329/7) and Communica-
tion from the Commission on the application, from 1 January 2012, of State aid rules to 
support measures in favour of financial institutions in the context of the financial crisis (‘2011 
Prolongation Communication’) (OJ 2011 C 356/79). 
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The Communication establishes the principle that should a Member 
State want to grant capital-enhancing aid to banks, i.e. recapitalisa-
tions or impaired asset measures, these will be authorised only once 
a restructuring or liquidation plan has been approved by the Com-
mission. Perhaps most importantly, the Communication also raises 
the minimum requirements for burden-sharing. Banks intending to 
resort to State aid should first undertake all possible capital raising 
measures by private means, based on a capital raising plan agreed 
with the supervisor and accepted by the Commission. If those mea-
sures are not sufficient, then shareholders, hybrid capital and subor-
dinated debt holders have to contribute to reduce the capital short-
fall to the maximum extent before State aid can be granted. Such 
contribution can take the form of either a conversion into CET1 or 
a write down of the principal of the instrument, depending on the 
capital position of the bank. 
This article will elaborate on these new burden-sharing requirements, 
after firstly providing some background on the evolution and ratio-
nale underlying the concept of burden-sharing. It will then attempt 
to sketch out what the near future may hold for burden-sharing and 
bail-in, in particular by explaining the likely interplay between the 
burden-sharing rules of the State aid framework and the Banking 
Union’s bail-in regime. 
2. The rationale and evolution of burden-sharing until August 
2013
Burden-sharing can in essence be understood as a contribution 
of the stakeholders of a bank to the cost of its restructuring along 
with public resources, in order to, on one hand, limit the aid to 
the minimum necessary, and on the other hand, address moral haz-
ard. In a wider sense, burden-sharing results from the Commission’s 
obligation to ensure that any aid it approves is necessary, appropri-
ate and proportionate. It is by no means a new concept - certain 
minimum burden-sharing requirements were part of the first Crisis 
Communication4. Throughout the crisis, during which 72 banks 
4 Communication on the application of State aid rules to measures taken in rela-
tion to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis 
(‘(first) Banking Communication’) (OJ 2008 C 270/8). 
101Clemens Kerle
representing approximately 25% of total banking assets in the EU 
have been restructuring in accordance with State aid rules, it formed 
one of the main pillars of the Commission’s assessment of aid to 
banks.
However, until 1 August 2013, bank restructuring in the EU has, 
with some exceptions, remained characterised by public bail-outs, 
including notably to the benefit of subordinated debt holders. Due 
to concerns relating to financial stability and jeopardising a bank’s 
access to the senior funding market, Member States accepted to bear 
the cost of bank restructuring instead of, inter alia, subordinated 
debt holders, at the expense of public finances. Notwithstanding 
this, the Commission introduced at the outset of the crisis – and 
gradually increased over the past years – minimum requirements for 
burden-sharing, so as to avoid that the bail-out of banks came as a 
free lunch for all stakeholders. 
The first step towards today’s burden-sharing regime was to request 
adequate remuneration for State interventions, for guarantees5 and 
recapitalisations.6 In 2011, the pricing requirements for State recapi-
talisation in the form of ordinary shares, and hence the degree to 
which existing owners have to be diluted when the State intervenes, 
was also clarified.7 The Commission also decided to prohibit recapi-
talisation in the form of hybrid instruments with coupons which can 
be waived.8
   
Related to this, the Commission increasingly restricted discretionary 
payments of a bank to its stakeholders, so as to ensure that State aid 
is kept in the bank to accompany the restructuring, rather than flow 
out to investors. First, as of October 2008 the Commission request-
ed dividend bans before approving capital enhancing aid9, and then, 
as of December 2008, that banks under restructuring are prohibited 
from paying coupons on hybrid capital instruments if they were not 
contractually obliged to do so.10 
5 Cf. Banking Communication and Prolongation Communications. 
6 Cf. Recapitalisation and 2011 Prolongation Communication. 
7 Cf. 2011 Prolongation Communication at point. 8 et seq. 
8 Cf. 2011 Prolongation Communication at point 13. 
9 Commission Decision of 13.10.2008 in case N 507/2008, OJ  2008 C 290/2. 
10 See for example Commission Decision of 18.12.2008 in case N 615/2008 OJ 
2009 C 80/5. 
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It then launched its policy of imposing some of the losses on stake-
holders: Banks under restructuring were banned from freeing up re-
serves to avoid that hybrid capital instruments have to participate 
in the coverage of losses,11 and could not exercise calls on hybrid 
capital instruments anymore.12 In the same vein, those banks were 
only allowed to perform buy-backs of hybrid capital instruments if 
this strengthened the capital position of the bank whilst imposing 
some of the losses on hybrid debt holders.13 
Whilst these gradually evolving burden-sharing requirements pre-
vented the use of State aid to shelter certain stakeholders from bear-
ing losses (and an “abuse” of public funds for that purpose), the 
quantitative impact of these burden-sharing requirements was lim-
ited and could not avoid large bail outs. 
The onset of the sovereign crisis began to change the perception of 
how the costs related to bank restructuring should be distributed. 
The previous bail-outs had in several cases begun to undermine 
the fiscal sustainability of States altogether, forcing the Eurogroup, 
through EFSF and ESM, to lend money to these weakened Mem-
ber States. The Communication describes this development (e.g. in 
the cases of Ireland and Spain)14 in point 18: “Some Member States 
had to go beyond minimum requirements under State aid rules and by 
introducing new legal frameworks enforce stricter […] burden-sharing 
requirements. […] Such differences in the approach to burden-sharing 
between Member States have led to divergent funding costs between 
banks depending on the perceived likelihood of a bail-in as a function of 
11 Commission Decision of 12.5. 2009 in case C 43/08, OJ 2009/L 345/1. 
12 See Buybacks of hybrid securities by banks under restructuring, Explanatory 
note by staff of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition of 
13 June 2012, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/recovery/buyback_con-
ditions_en.pdf. 
13 See Buybacks of hybrid securities by banks under restructuring, Explanatory 
note by staff of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition of 
13 June 2012, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/recovery/buyback_con-
ditions_en.pdf. 
14 See Commission Decision in case of SA.33433, second Restructuring of Bank of 
Ireland, OJ 2012/C 246, and Memorandum of Understanding on financial sector 
polity for Spain, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu/countries/
pdf/mou_en.pdf. 
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a Member State’s fiscal strength. They pose a threat to the integrity of the 
single market and risk undermining the level playing field which State 
aid control aims to protect.”
3. New burden-sharing requirements
In response to the observed divergence in the approaches that Mem-
ber States took to burden-sharing and the resulting divergent market 
pricing of the risk of bail in, the Communication aims at introducing 
a new, higher minimum standard for burden-sharing for all banks, 
its owners and certain creditors, so as to re-establish a level playing 
field, and to accompany the transition to the Banking Union. The 
three key requirements (capital raising measures, bail-in of subordi-
nated debt, measures to prevent the outflow of capital) which need 
to be complied with before State aid can be approved are described 
in turn:
a. Capital raising measures
 
The Communication provides in point 35 that the bank should 
identify all possible measures which would improve the capital base 
of the bank in a capital raising plan. It also provides a non-exhaustive 
list of such measures, including rights issues, liability management 
exercises (should be 100 % capital generating) and capital generating 
asset sales. 
During this capital-raising phase, the bank and its owners can try to 
convince holders of hybrid capital instruments to agree to being con-
verted into in equity, which would probably require the shareholders 
to offer a rather favourable conversion rate. Accordingly, point 35 b) 
allows for voluntary conversion of subordinated debt instruments 
into equity on the basis of a risk-related incentive. 
b. Bail-in of subordinated debt
If a bank does not manage to raise sufficient capital, the Commu-
nication establishes a sort of “burden-sharing waterfall”, obliging 
Member States to seek contributions from shareholders and junior 
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creditors first. As indicated above, this was not required systemically 
before, mainly due to financial stability concerns, which were greatly 
reduced by the experiences in Spain, Ireland and the Netherlands15 
demonstrating the feasibility and compatibility with financial stabil-
ity of imposing loss-participation on subordinated creditors. 
Points 41 thus reads “after losses are first absorbed by equity, […] [h]
ybrid capital and subordinated debt holders must contribute to reducing 
the capital shortfall to the maximum extent. Such contributions can take 
the form of either a conversion into Common Equity Tier 1 or a write-
down of the principal of the instruments.” Contrary to the Banking 
Union’s bail-in regime, this is where the “waterfall” stops, as point 
42 sets out that “[t]he Commission will not require contribution from 
senior debt holders (…) as a mandatory component of burden-sharing 
under State aid rules […].”
The Communication then specifies how burden-sharing should be 
applied in two sets of circumstances – one in which the bank in 
question has a capital ratio above the regulatory minimum, and one 
in which it is below: 
First, when the capital ratio of the bank remains above the EU regu-
latory minimum (situation 1) but below the threshold set by the 
competent supervisory authority or resolution authority (e.g. pillar 
2 requirements, for example in the context of a stress test), the bank 
should normally be able to restore its capital position on its own, 
through private capital raising measures. This is in essence the so-
called “precautionary recapitalisation” situation, for which also the 
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive16 (“BRRD”) provides a 
specific provision in Article 32 (4)(d)(iii). If there are no other pos-
sibilities, including any other supervisory action such as early inter-
vention measures or other remedial actions to overcome the shortfall 
15 Commission Decision 22.2.2013 in case SA.35382, SNS Reaal, OJ 2013 C 
104/3. 
16 Directive of the European Parliament and the Council establishing a frame-
work for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and 
amending Council Directives 77/91/EEC and 82/891/EC, Directives 2001/24/
EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC and 2011/35/EC and 
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, not yet published. 
105Clemens Kerle
defined, then hybrid capital and subordinated debt holders must be 
converted into equity before State aid is granted. Shareholders con-
tribute to burden sharing through dilution.
Second, when the bank no longer meets the minimum regulatory 
capital requirements (situation 2), equity, hybrid capital and subor-
dinated debt must fully contribute to offsetting the losses through 
write down and/or conversion before State aid is granted.
The above distinction is mainly a result of a legal concern, which 
alleges that bail-in, also of subordinate debt, might infringe funda-
mental property rights. In this context, it should first and foremost 
be recalled that even constitutionally enshrined property rights are 
not absolute. Given a sufficiently strong public interest, proportion-
ate interference with property rights can be justified, in particular 
when there is no economic disadvantage resulting from the interfer-
ence. In the Communication, property rights related considerations 
are taken account of by the so-called “no creditor worse-off prin-
ciple” (cf. point 46): “In the context of implementing points 43 and 
44 […] subordinated creditors should not receive less in economic 
terms than what their instrument would have been worth if no State 
aid were to be granted.” 
Whether or not burden-sharing could lead to an unjustifiable in-
fringement of property rights is thus predominately a question of 
the counterfactual, and it is for this reason that the Communication 
distinguishes between the above situations. 
In situation 2, it is assumed that the bank would not be able to cover 
the shortfall and the counterfactual of the failing bank would be 
insolvency; this is the classic “failing bank” scenario. In this coun-
terfactual, in the absence of a state intervention, the subordinated 
debt holders would most likely have lost their entire claims. A bail-in 
(here: conversion or write-down) of the junior debt should not put 
its holders in a situation that is worse than it would have been in the 
case of insolvency. 
For situation 1, the Communication does not foresee a write-
down (which is normally meant to cover a loss). To see what the 
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counterfactual in situation 1 could be, it is worth recalling the rea-
sons for which a supervisor would want to raise the capital ratio 
above the minimum regulatory requirements. One of them might be 
that the competent supervisor wants to ensure that the bank could 
also weather a prolonged phase of economic difficulties – the stress 
case. Against this background, two potential counterfactual situa-
tions can exist, and it can be assumed that the property rights of 
creditors are respected in each of them. First, if the stress conditions 
were to materialise, the additional capital would be necessary, and 
would offset the losses. In these cases, the converted creditors would 
be in the same situation than those under situation 2 and would thus 
need to face the same consequences. 
If however the stress does not materialise, the converted subordi-
nated debt holders will recoup the value of their investment in their 
capacity as shareholders. In this context it should be considered that 
for bank meeting regulatory requirements the capital contribution 
from a conversion of subordinated debt should be in some cases suf-
ficient to cover the shortfall, and the newly converted equity holders 
would own a part of the bank as a result of the conversion. 
It should also be recalled in this context, as indicated above, that the 
Commission can only approve aid that is necessary (and proportion-
ate). Regarding precautionary recaps, this means that the Commis-
sion could not approve such a measure unless it is clearly shown that 
in the absence of this measure the bank at hand could not continue 
to perform “business as usual”. In other words, the counterfactual 
of situation 1 would have to be rather disadvantageous for the bank 
and the circle of stakeholders potentially affected by burden-sharing 
for the Commission to be in a position to authorise a measure that 
would avert the materialisation of that counterfactual. 
Finally, the Communication also allows for exceptions, which the 
Commission will assess on a case by case basis. Point 45 explains that 
“[t]his exception could cover cases where the aid amount to be received 
is small in comparison to the bank’s risk weighted assets and the capi-
tal shortfall has been reduced significantly in particular through capital 
raising measures”. That is to say that bail-in might not be required 
107Clemens Kerle
where the aid amount required is small in proportion to the initial 
capital shortfall, and is meant to provide an incentive for banks to 
primarily rely on their own efforts to overcome capital shortfalls. 
As for the risks to financial stability, the cases of Spain and Slove-
nia in which such burden-sharing has taken place simultaneously in 
significant parts of the domestic banking sector show that adequate 
legislation can address the potential contagion channels so that no 
dangers to financial stability should arise. 
It thus should be noted that so far the conversion/ write down of 
retail holders of such instruments and the implementation of such 
measures to large parts of the banking sector of a Member State (Slo-
venia, Spain) at the same time have not been considered as justifying 
exceptions.
c. Preventing capital outflows 
In addition to the capital raising measures and bail-in described 
above banks at risk to require State aid are also obliged to preserve 
all capital in the bank for the restructuring, according to point 47 of 
the Communication: “from the time capital needs are known or should 
have been known to the bank, the Commission considers that the bank 
should take all measures necessary to retain its funds: […]”. The ratio-
nale of this provision is to ensure that the capacity to reduce a capital 
shortfall is not decreased by prior action of the bank. 
What exactly is required from such banks is illustrated by a list of 
non-exhaustive measures that reflect mostly the experience from pre-
vious case practice as mentioned above, such as coupon and dividend 
bans, and the prohibition of buy-backs. 
For cases of non-compliance, point 48 stipulates that “[…] at a point 
in time when its need for additional capital should have been evident to 
a well-run business, the Commission will, for the purpose of establishing 
the required measures to limit distortions of competition, add an amount 
equivalent to the outflow of funds to the aid amount.” This provision 
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reflects case practice17 and intends to incentivise banks in good faith 
to fill the capital shortfall by themselves but to be mindful to prevent 
behaviour that could increase the potential need for State aid. 
d. Application of the Communication so far and going forward
The Communication came into force in August 2013, and since 
then, Member States have notified no further classic bail-outs.18 The 
only new recapitalisations that the Commission assessed and ap-
proved from this date onwards were those regarding the Slovenian 
banking sector, which were however accompanied by the implemen-
tation of burden-sharing in line with the Communication. In spirit, 
the Communication was also applied in cases in which the Commis-
sion did not have to assess and authorise anything, because no State 
aid was necessary (and hence none notified): For example, Hellenic 
Bank filled a capital shortfall through the conversion of its subordi-
nated debts into contingent convertible bonds and a small capital 
raise. Similarly, the British Co-op bank filled a capital shortfall of 
GBP 1.5 billion through a conversion of debt in equity.19 In both 
cases, the historical shareholders were nearly fully diluted by the con-
verted subordinated debt. In other words, subordinated debt holders 
accepted to be converted only if they got a large shareholding in the 
banks and not merely shelter the existing shareholders. 
The importance of putting the necessary legal frameworks in place in 
all Member States has been politically recognised in the meanwhile. 
The ECOFIN Council has agreed on the need for Member States to 
equip themselves with the necessary tools to enable burden-sharing 
in line with State aid rules in the run up to the balance sheet assess-
ment by the SSM and next EBA stress test at the end of 2014.20
17 Commission Decision of 18.11.2009 in case C 10/2009,ING, OJ L 274/139. 
18 Decisions taken in the end of 2013, such as decision of 27.11.2013 in Case SA 
36175, MPS, not yet published, have been notified before 1 August 2013. 
19 Cf. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-25414153. 
20 ECOFIN statement on backstops at point 9, 15.11.2013, available at: http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/139613.
pdf.  
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5. The interplay of the new burden-sharing requirements with 
the BRRD
After the initial phases of the banking crisis, as the fiscal cost of re-
solving it made it evolve into a sovereign crisis, the necessity to limit 
the cost of bank restructuring for tax payers to the minimum has 
become increasingly apparent. The second main component of the 
Banking Union – BRRD and the Regulation establishing a Single 
Resolution Mechanism21 (“SRM) are based on the principle that 
banks, their owners and creditors shall in the future bear or at least 
participate in the cost of bank restructuring and resolution.
The BRRD will come into force on 1 January 2015. The question 
arises as to whether State aid rules for aid to banks will, and if so to 
what extent, still be relevant then. 
In that context, it should firstly be recalled that pursuant to Article 
32(4)(d)(iii) of the BRRD, certain (“precautionary”) recapitalisa-
tions do not automatically trigger resolution, this being an exception 
to the BRRD’s rule that any form of extraordinary public support 
would require the responsible resolution authority to resolve a bank. 
Whilst this provision should probably be read restrictively (cf. the 
numerous requirements that have to be met in order to qualify a 
measure as “precautionary” in the sense of the BRRD), it is clear that 
a certain margin remains for Member States to grant aid to banks 
in difficulty without triggering, and therefore “outside”, resolution. 
Such measures would then have to comply with the burden-sharing 
regime of State aid rules as described above. 
Second, as for the legal framework applicable in cases of resolution 
(which also entail public recapitalisation), the periods as of 1 January 
2015, and as of 1 January 2016, have to be distinguished. 
The BRRD comprises an Article 59, applicable as of 1 January 2015, 
which sets out a requirement to write down and convert capital 
21 Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council establishing uniform 
rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain 
investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single 
Bank Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council, not yet published. 
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instruments when the conditions for resolution have been met; i.e. 
when such a write down or conversion would restore the bank’s vi-
ability within a reasonable timeframe, or when a public support has 
been provided, other than in case of a precautionary recapitalisation 
as defined in article 32(4)(d)(iii).
This means that public recapitalisations in the context of resolution 
will also automatically trigger the write down and conversion of 
capital instruments under Article 59 of the BRRD. Article 59 does 
not foresee any exceptions. In such circumstances, both State aid 
rules and BRRD provisions apply, which means that after the Mem-
ber State has written down and/or converted capital instruments as 
required by the BRRD and if there is still a capital shortfall to be 
covered by State aid, subordinated debt instruments, which are not 
considered as a capital instrument under Article 59 BRRD, have to 
be written down and/or converted according to State aid rules. In 
such a case the possible exceptions to the burden-sharing require-
ments provided for in the Communication are no longer applicable 
for the capital instruments covered by Article 59, as these exceptions 
are not included in the BRRD. 
Going forward, the main change compared to the previous period 
(from 1 January 2015 until 31 December 2015) will be the entry 
into force of the provisions related to the bail-in tool. If the conver-
sion or write down of capital instruments under Article 59 BRRD 
is not sufficient to fill a capital shortfall, the other debt instruments 
up to and including uncovered depositors will be subject to bail-in. 
When and before any public resources are used, the absorption of 
losses by shareholders and creditors must amount to a minimum of 
8% of total assets (including own funds) of the institution under res-
olution. All liabilities are subject to bail-in with the exception of se-
cured, collateralised and guaranteed liabilities, covered deposits and 
some specific unsecured liabilities, as defined under Article 44 (2).
This means that as of 1 January 2016, the burden-sharing require-
ments of State aid rules will only be of substantial relevance for reso-
lution cases in the rare circumstances in which all capital instruments 
have been bailed-in (as per Article 59 BRRD) and the total bail-in 
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has reached 8% of total liabilities but certain subordinated debt in-
struments which are not considered as a capital instrument under 
Article 59 BRRD remain untouched. These would then also have to 
be converted or written-down, so as to comply with State aid rules 
as explained above. 
6. Conclusion
Before the full BRRD bail-in regime enters into force, it will be the 
burden-sharing rules of the Communication that define the mini-
mum level of bail-in in 2014, and, having regard to Article 59 of 
the BRRD, to a substantial degree in 2015. When the ECB will 
engage into its balance sheet review and EBA oversees another EU-
wide stress test towards the end of 2014, before the ECB assumes 
its role as SSM, the burden-sharing regime of the Communication 
hence determines the essential rules of the game for a bank and its 
stakeholders if this exercise reveals a capital shortfall. 
The above brief overview of the interplay between State aid rules 
and the BRRD has been based on an analysis of the former as they 
stand today. It remains to be seen if and how the State aid regime has 
to be adapted to the new regulatory landscape that has emerged - a 
review is foreseen in point 93 of the Communication. In any event, 
the State aid framework for bank restructuring will most probably 
remain a safeguard going forward to ensure that private contribu-
tions precede bail-outs, which even after the BRRD will have entered 
into force, will remain possible, at least under certain and narrowly 
defined circumstances.
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Bail-In Provisions in State Aid 
and Resolution Procedures: Are 
They Consistent with Systemic 
Stability?
Stefano Micossi, Ginevra Bruzzone and 
Miriam Cassella*
1. Introduction
In July 2013, the European Commission adopted a new Banking 
Communication – the seventh since the inception of the financial 
crisis – updating its criteria for the evaluation of state aid in the 
banking sector in response to the evolving economic and institu-
tional environment.1 Under this Communication, any credit institu-
tion in need of recapitalization or ‘impaired asset’ measures will be 
required to submit a plan for restructuring or orderly winding down 
of the bank before any further action can be taken. Moreover, when-
ever there is a capital shortfall, the Commission will require that, not 
only shareholders – as has been the case until now – but also junior 
* Stefano Micossi is Director General of Assonime, professor at the College of 
Europe and a member of CEPS Board of Directors; Ginevra Bruzzone is Depu-
ty Director General of Assonime; Miriam Cassella is Legal Officer in Assonime 
directorate for competition and regulation.
1 Communication from the Commission on the application from 1 August 2013, 
of State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the finan-
cial crisis (“Banking Communication”) (2013/C 216/01), 30 July 2013. 
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creditors, write down or convert into equity their claims on the bank 
before any public funds can be granted. This rule applies regardless 
of whether the bank is under resolution, so as to minimize the need 
for state aid.
Subsequently, the Council and the European Parliament have adopt-
ed a directive (BRRD2) and a regulation (SRR3) establishing uniform 
rules for the resolution of banks. For member states participating to 
the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), these rules will be applied 
within the SRM, which will be supported by a resolution fund (the 
SRF). Both the BRRD and the SRR contain rules for the bail-in of 
shareholders and creditors, either on a stand-alone basis or as a part 
of the resolution procedure. The adoption under the BRRD or the 
SRR of a resolution scheme entailing state aid or resort to the SRF 
is made conditional on the European Commission’s approval under 
state aid rules. 
The pre-conditions and the scope of burden-sharing by creditors un-
der state aid control and resolution procedures differ. Therefore, it 
is necessary to determine whether the two sets of rules can work 
together. In addition, questions have been raised as to whether the 
guidelines on state aid to banks take sufficient account of systemic 
stability considerations when imposing the conversion or write-
down of creditor claims. 
This issue is especially important because of the ongoing comprehen-
sive assessment of the quality of banks’ balance sheets and business 
models by the European Central Bank (ECB), in preparation for 
the start of the SSM. This may require substantial capital injections 
2 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 
2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institu-
tions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, Direc-
tives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC and 
2011/35/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 
648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
3 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolu-
tion of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single 
Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation 
(EU) No 1093/2010.  
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to meet the enhanced prudential requirements, and possibly public 
support in certain cases. As may be recalled, the publication of the 
new Banking Communication in July 2013 led to a lively exchange 
of letters between Commissioner Joaquin Almunia and ECB Presi-
dent Mario Draghi (the letters were leaked to the press but never offi-
cially published). Mr. Draghi reportedly feared that the Commission 
Communication could be read as an announcement that all banks in 
need of public support would be preventively subject to a bail-in of 
junior creditors, regardless of circumstances, potentially aggravating 
the funding difficulties of individual banks and the banking system 
as a whole. A similar issue of systemic stability may also arise in con-
nection with the new resolution framework when bail-in is applied 
before the start of resolution, as will be described. 
  
The following analysis concentrates on the mutual consistency of the 
two sets of rules,  how they are coordinated and how they address the 
question of systemic stability when creditor claims are bailed in. It 
does not address the broader issue of the potential impact of bail-in 
on investors’ confidence under distressed market conditions, which 
is a feature of the current transition to full banking union; on this 
issue, readers may usefully refer to Avgouleas & Goodhart (2014). 
Our conclusion is that by and large the two sets of rules are mutu-
ally consistent and that they already contain sufficient safeguards to 
address systemic stability concerns when confronted with a single 
bank’s crisis (i.e. barring systemic banking crises). However, the sen-
sitivity of investors to policy announcements in still-fragile finan-
cial conditions may require further efforts to clarify state aid policy 
regarding prudential bank recapitalizations in the transition to the 
SSM.
2. The role of state aid control in governing bank restructuring 
at EU level
Since 2008, the European Commission has adopted a number of 
decisions under Articles 107-109 TFEU on the compatibility of state 
aid measures for banks. Article 107 permits to consider compatible 
with the common market aid measures that appear necessary and 
proportionate in order to address market failures and thus leaves 
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the Commission sufficient flexibility to adapt the state aid policy 
in particular market conditions. When identifying the market fail-
ures resulting from the financial crisis of 2008, the Commission had 
to proceed by trial and error. As soon as the Commission began to 
recognize the systemic nature of the crisis, it resorted to article 107, 
paragraph 3, letter b, of the Treaty as a legal basis for the temporary 
adoption of exceptional measures. This part of the Treaty allows it to 
be to be considered compatible with the common market measures 
needed to “remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Mem-
ber State”. It was understood, however, that once the financial system 
returned to normal, the standard criteria for the control of state aid 
would once again be applicable.
 
Since 2008, the Commission has adopted seven Communications 
setting out the special criteria to be used in assessing the compatibility 
of state aid in the financial sector under Article 107, paragraph 3, 
letter b (the first Banking Communication of 2008 has been entirely 
replaced by the Communication of July 2013; the others have been 
partially updated).4 Initially, the emphasis was on state guarantees; 
it later shifted to recapitalization measures and the treatment of im-
paired assets. In the belief that the peak of the crisis was past, the 
three 2009 Communications focussed on restructuring aid and its 
three principles: that the aid recipient must be viable in the long 
term, with no need for further aid; that bank owners must contribute 
to restructuring costs (burden sharing); and that the possible effects 
on competition resulting from state aid must be minimized through 
4 Communication from the Commission — The application of State aid rules to 
measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current 
global financial crisis (2008/C 270/02); Communication from the Commission — 
The recapitalization of financial institutions in the current financial crisis: limitation 
of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of com-
petition (2009/C 10/03); Communication from the Commission on the treatment 
of impaired assets in the Community banking sector (2009/C 72/01); Commission 
communication on the return to viability and the assessment of restructuring mea-
sures in the financial sector in the current crisis under the State aid rules (2009/C 
195/04); Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 January 
2011, of State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the 
financial crisis (2010/C 329/07); Communication from the Commission on the 
application, from 1 January 2012, of State aid rules to support measures in favour 
of banks in the context of the financial crisis (2011/C 356/02); and, finally, the 
“Banking Communication” of July 2013. 
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adequate remedies (divestitures and behavioural measures such as the 
prohibition of aggressive commercial conduct). In 2010, as funding 
conditions normalised, the Commission tightened its requirements, 
notably by considering state aid for recapitalization and impaired 
assets as compatible with the internal market conditional on the 
recipient submitting a restructuring plan. 
In general, the criteria set out in the Guidelines were applied flexibly, 
always with due consideration of the specific features of each case. 
For example, whereas in HypoBank the Commission required a 
substantial dismissal of assets, in ABN Amro it only required the 
bank to abstain from aggressive commercial conduct, since the need 
for state aid was considered unrelated to the need for restructuring.
In 2011, financial conditions worsened again in the eurozone, with 
the emergence of a perverse ‘doom loop’ between the sovereign and 
bank crises; the Commission reacted by extending the application of 
the crisis communications. In its conclusions of 22 October 2011, 
the Ecofin Council  acknowledged that state aid control was the 
only coordination instrument available at the EU level to maintain 
financial stability and a level playing field in the internal market by 
encouraging distressed banks to restructure and return to viability.5 
 
In 2012, the European Council launched the banking union project, 
which was intended to break the vicious circle between sovereign and 
bank debt, overcome the fragmentation of financial markets, and 
eradicate moral hazard by bankers through strengthened supervision, 
a new banking resolution procedure at the EU level6 and beefed-up 
deposit insurance rules. The Commission argued that, while waiting 
for the banking union to be established, it still needed to play a tem-
porary role in order to ensure the orderly restructuring of the bank-
ing sector. In this context, its 2013 Communication can be seen as a 
transition, or a “bridge,” communication which will have to adapt to 
new changes in the banking regulatory framework. 
The Commission has always stressed that its primary goal in the con-
trol of state aid in the financial sector is that of ensuring financial 
5 See European Commission, Report on Competition Policy 2011. 
6 Micossi S., Bruzzone G., Carmassi J. (2013). 
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stability. This includes preventing spill-over effects that might result 
from the failure of a bank and ensuring that the banking system as 
a whole continues to provide adequate lending to the real economy, 
while minimizing state aid and distortions of competition. 
In order to foster financial stability and minimize reliance on taxpay-
ers’ resources in bank bailouts in the future, the latest Guidelines 
require timely and decisive restructuring plans to restore the bank to 
long-term viability or, alternatively, ensure its orderly wind-down. 
These restructuring plans will be reviewed in close cooperation with 
the competent supervisory authorities.  Moreover, state aid will be 
authorized only subject to burden-sharing involving junior creditors. 
Rescue aid before a restructuring plan is approved is only allowable 
when the competent supervisory authority confirms it is necessary to 
preserve financial stability. On the other hand, the main support for 
banks not experiencing a capital shortfall, should be guarantees on 
new liabilities.
Recapitalization or impaired assets measures will be deemed com-
patible only if the member state demonstrates that all attempts to 
minimize the need for state aid have been undertaken, notably by:
 
i) submitting a plan to raise capital before or as part of the restruc-
turing plan (including issues of new rights, voluntary conversion 
of subordinated debt, asset sales, earnings retention); 
ii) replacing management and adopting strict executive remunera-
tion policies until the end of the restructuring period; 
iii) preventing the outflow of own funds, by, among other things, 
restricting dividends, buy-backs of hybrid capital instruments, 
acquisitions, etc.; and
iv) ensuring adequate burden sharing: losses should be first ab-
sorbed by equity; hybrid capital and subordinated debt holders 
must then contribute to reducing the capital shortfall as much 
as possible through conversion or write-down of the principal of 
their instruments. 
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The Communication envisions two scenarios for burden-sharing: i) 
the bank does not meet the minimum regulatory capital require-
ments or, ii) the minimum capital requirements are met and a capi-
tal shortfall is still identified by a competent supervisory authority, 
e.g. as the result of a stress test (precautionary recapitalizations). In 
the first case, state aid can only be authorised after equity, hybrid 
capital and subordinated debt have fully contributed to covering the 
losses (through write-down or conversion). In the second case, the 
Commission requires that in the event that there are no alternative 
remedies for the shortfall, ‘in principle’ subordinated debt must be 
converted into equity before granting state aid. Writing-down debt is 
not taken into consideration. This strengthened burden-sharing, in-
volving junior creditors, is the primary new feature of the July 2013 
Communication. 
During the crisis, some member states have applied burden-sharing 
involving creditors (e.g. in cases involving Irish, Dutch and Dan-
ish banks). The Troika has imposed burden-sharing as a condition 
for gaining access to financial assistance programmes in Spain and 
Cyprus.7 After the adoption of the new Banking Communication, 
the Commission has also required it for the approval of state aid in 
the restructuring of the main Slovenian banks. 
In order to ensure compatibility with the protection of property 
rights, the Communication endorses the “no creditor worse off” 
principle (point 46): subordinated creditors should not receive less in 
economic terms than what their instrument would have been worth 
if no state aid were  granted.
For completeness, it may also be recalled that state aid policy also 
places some constraints on the Emergency Liquidity Assistance 
(ELA) procedures by national central banks (under ECB control): 
Point 62 of the 2013 Banking Communication specifies in this re-
gard that “dedicated support to a specific credit institution (com-
monly referred to as ELA) may constitute aid” unless certain condi-
7 For general background to bail in and a description of precedents see DG Internal 
Market (2011); Financial Stability Board (FSB) (2011); Dűbel (2013). 
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tions are met.8 In turn, ECB rules for ELA are fully consistent with 
state aid policy and, in addition, the ESCB Statute assigns the Gov-
erning Council the power to restrict such operations when they may 
“interfere with the objectives and tasks of the Eurosystem” (Article 
14.4). Since ELA normally does not constitute state aid, the applica-
tion of burden-sharing and bail-in cannot come into play.      
3. Write-down and conversion in the resolution framework
The objective of the BRRD and the SRR is to manage and resolve 
bank crises through common administrative procedures, the appli-
cation of which to member states participating in the SSM will be 
entrusted to a new EU authority, the Single Resolution Board (SRB). 
The resolution objectives are: to ensure the orderly unwinding of a 
failing bank  while preserving the continuity of critical functions 
(e.g. the payment system), protecting financial stability and deposi-
tors, as well as minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial 
support (Article 12 of the Regulation). This last provision is meant to 
bar any future public support of failing banks – from bail-out to bail-
in – thus severing one link between banking and sovereign risks.9   As 
may be seen, there is a significant overlap with the objectives of the 
2013 Banking Communication. 
Under the “General Principles” for bail-in in Article 13 of the SRR 
(and in Article 34 of the BRRD), the shareholders of the institution 
under resolution will bear first losses; creditors will bear losses after 
them, in accordance with the reverse order of their priority claims 
under national insolvency law; and no creditor shall incur greater 
losses than would have been incurred if the entity had been wound 
up under normal insolvency proceedings (the ‘no creditor worse off’ 
condition10). Thus, the list of creditor claims that may be called in 
8 The credit institution, albeit temporarily illiquid, must be solvent; the liquidity 
provisions occur in exceptional circumstances and are not part of a larger aid pack-
age; the facility is fully secured by collateral with appropriate haircuts; the national 
central bank charges a penal interest rate; and the measure is taken at the central 
bank’s own initiative, without any counter-guarantee of the state.     
9 There is another link that remains, stemming from banks’ exposure to sovereign 
securities held in their balance sheet. 
10 Article 34.1.g of the BRRD. 
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is broader than that under the 2013 Banking Communication, po-
tentially extending to senior uncovered bonds and, down the line, 
uninsured deposits (those above 100.000 euro, under the Deposit 
Insurance Directive).
The SRB has the power to write down and convert liabilities of the 
credit institution both on a stand-alone basis and within a resolution 
procedure, by activating the bail-in tool. Article 18 states that the 
write down and conversion of capital instruments shall be exercised 
by the Board when:
i) the entity will no longer be viable unless the capital instruments 
are written down or converted into equity; and 
ii) public aid is required by the entity or group, with the exceptions 
provided for by Article 16.3.d (described below). 
When the exercise of the write-down and conversion powers is suf-
ficient to recapitalise the bank, the Board may use them without 
placing the bank in resolution; otherwise, the write down and con-
version of capital instruments will take place within the resolution 
procedure, before any other resolution action is taken.
The conditions for initiating a resolution procedure, according to 
Article 16 of the Regulation, are that: 
i) the entity is failing or likely to fail;
ii) there is no reasonable prospect that an alternative action (in-
cluding the write-down or conversion under Article 18) would 
prevent its failure within a reasonable timeframe; and
iii) a resolution action is necessary and proportionate in the public 
interest (as defined in Article 12) to ensure the continuity of 
critical functions, maintain financial stability, minimize the 
burden on public resources, protect depositors and client funds 
and assets. 
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The entity is deemed to be failing or likely to fail when one or more 
of a set of circumstances listed in paragraph 3 of Article 1611 are met; 
among these is the receipt of extraordinary public financial support 
(i.e. state aid). The determination of the condition (i) above shall be 
made by the ECB, after consulting the SRB; the SRB will decide on 
the presence of conditions (ii) and (iii). In this case, the SRB will 
adopt a resolution scheme detailing the use of resolution tools and 
that of the Fund, and send it to the Commission. The resolution 
scheme will enter into force if no objections have been raised by the 
Council or the Commission (on the grounds of public interest listed 
in Article 16 paragraph 6) within 24 hours after transmission of the 
scheme by SRB.
 
As mentioned, an escape clause in Article 16.3.d provides that finan-
cial support to the bank by national authorities or the Fund does not 
imply that the institution is failing or is likely to fail, when it involves 
state guarantees to back liquidity facilities provided by central banks 
(Article 16.3.d.i), state guarantees of newly issued liabilities or re-
capitalizations (injections of a bank’s own funds, Article 16.3.d.ii), 
and purchase of capital instruments that do not confer an advantage 
upon the entity (Article 16.3.d.iii).12 The three exceptions will only 
apply to solvent entities and are, in all circumstances, conditional on 
the approval under state aid rules. In practice, these measures shall 
be acceptable when they are of a precautionary and temporary na-
ture and proportionate to remedy the consequences of a serious ex-
ogenous disturbance. The exception in Article 16.3.d.iii concerning 
recapitalizations is limited to capital shortfalls established following 
the stress tests, asset quality reviews or equivalent exercises.13
 
In sum, if the entity requires state aid (with the exception of state 
guarantees and aid for recapitalization at market prices, aimed at sol-
vent companies), it is deemed to be failing or likely to fail and the 
Board may use its powers to write down and convert its liabilities 
(bail-in) when this is deemed necessary to meet the public interest 
objectives of the new rules. If a broader resolution action is needed, 
these powers will be exercised within the resolution procedure and 
11 Paragraph 4 of Article 32 of the BRRD. 
12 See also Article 32.4.of the BRRD. 
13 See also Article 32.4 of the BRRD. 
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may be associated with the use of other instruments (e.g. sale of busi-
ness tool, bridge institution tool, and asset separation tool) and re-
sort to the resolution Fund, as described by the resolution scheme 
prepared by the Board. The resolution scheme will enter into force 
only if no objection has been raised by either the Council or the 
Commission within 24 hours from its transmission by the Board.
All of this is without prejudice to the application by the Commission 
of the state aid framework.14 More specifically, the SRR provides that 
when public aid (either state aid or aid from the Fund) is present, the 
Board shall act in conformity with the decision on that public aid 
taken by the Commission.15  
4. Coordination of resolution procedures with state aid control
Article 16a of the regulation coordinates the action of the Board re-
lating to the resolution procedure (Article 16) and that of the Com-
mission in the exercise of its powers for the control of state aid. The 
use of the Resolution Fund is treated as state aid and therefore is sub-
ject to prior control by the Commission under Article 107 TFEU, 
under the same procedures. Although the resources of the SRF will 
be collected with fees charged on banks, they result from a compul-
sory contribution established by the law and therefore are treated as 
if they were public resources. The rationale for this provision is to 
ensure equal treatment of those member states participating in the 
SSM and those that are not participating when their banks are sup-
ported with public funds.
Under Article 16a, when the resolution action involves the granting 
of public aid, the adoption by the Board of the resolution scheme 
“shall not take place until such time as the Commission has adopted 
a positive or conditional decision concerning the compatibility of 
the use of public aid with the internal market” under Article 107 
TFEU. This regulation recalls the principle of the BRRD (Article 
3.3) that states that institutions should ensure the operational inde-
pendence between their function in the resolution framework and 
14 Article 44.12 of the BRRD. 
15 Article 16.8 of the SRR. 
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their other functions. For the Commission, this entails that the per-
formance of the institutional tasks related to public aid control will 
have to be clearly separated, also from an organizational perspective, 
from the Commission tasks in vetting the SRB resolution proposal 
under Article 16 of the regulation. 
When the Board decides that resolution measures may constitute 
public aid, it will invite Member States to notify the Directorate 
General for Competition of the European Commission, and it will 
notify directly measures involving the use of the Fund. If the Com-
mission takes a negative decision on the compatibility of public aid, 
the Board shall have to reconsider its resolution scheme and revise it. 
It is also envisaged that the Commission may amend its initial deci-
sion, following a recommendation by the Board or on its own initia-
tive, if the implementation of resolution tools and actions departs 
from the criteria on which it has taken its original decision. This 
opens the way to the exercise of some flexibility, in case of unforeseen 
developments related to financial stability.
It is also important to recall that the Commission’s decisions on 
public aid will always be based on the resolution scheme prepared 
by the Board (which includes information on the exercise of bail-
in powers). Therefore, its decisions, which will be taken under the 
state aid perspective, will not need to be extended to the design of 
burden-sharing arrangements which will be applied to sharehold-
ers and creditors. The Commission will only have to assess whether 
the proposal made by the Board under the resolution rules satisfies 
the requirement of a sufficient burden-sharing under state aid rules. 
While this may entail some room for discussion between the compe-
tition and resolution authorities, there does not seem to be an inher-
ent contradiction. 
5. In conclusion: how to improve the public communication of 
competition policy goals
Our analysis shows that the new resolution framework is fully con-
sistent with state aid policy. Indeed, coordination of the two sets of 
provisions is explicitly provided for by the SRR, since all decisions 
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entailing public aid will be preliminary vetted by the Commission 
under state aid rules, and the relationship between the two proce-
dures is well designed. Once the SSM and the SRM will be in full 
force, the task of limiting moral hazard and the use of public funds 
through appropriate bail-in measures will clearly fall to the SRB, al-
though the Commission may express its view in the exercise of its 
competences in the control of state aid.
As for the relationship between bail-in under the two procedures and 
concerns of financial stability – meaning that the expectation or fear 
of bail-in may engender a run on a bank or the banking system by 
(uncovered) depositors and investors – the following conclusions ap-
ply. First, when a bank is failing or likely to fail and therefore likely 
to be placed under resolution, the essential requirement to preserve 
financial stability is speed of the decision, which under normal cir-
cumstances should take place within a weekend following the ECB 
communication that the relevant circumstances have been met. Here 
bail-in is just one  component of the general process and does not 
involve specific consequences or raise special concerns. As has been 
described, it is also possible for the resolution authorities to write 
down and convert unsecured liabilities into equity on a stand-alone 
basis. But again, this may only happen when the bank is no longer 
viable and therefore already under special care by the resolution au-
thorities. Therefore, a separate adverse impact of bail-in on inves-
tors’ expectations is not likely. Moreover, under the BRRD and SRR, 
bail-in is excluded for viable entities when public support is of a 
temporary and precautionary nature and is proportionate to remedy 
the consequence of a serious exogenous disturbance.
Thus, the possible destabilizing effects deriving from the fear of bail-
in seem mainly to arise for solvent institutions in need of public sup-
port to raise capital, and thus mainly from the application of state aid 
rules. In this regard, the Banking Communication already contains 
a number of safeguards and exceptions that may help dispel these 
fears. These  notably include the following: 
i) the provision that an exception can be made when implement-
ing the Communication would endanger financial stability or 
lead to disproportionate results (point 45); 
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ii) the provisions specifying that when applying state aid rules to 
individual cases, the Commission shall take account of the mac-
roeconomic environment; the specificities of each credit institu-
tion and each member state; the fact that the need for state aid 
has not been the result of excessive risk-taking; the need for a 
coordinated approach when recapitalization measures involve a 
large portion of the financial system, taking into consideration 
the aggregate effects of restructuring on individual institutions 
at the sector level  and on the economy as a whole; and the fea-
sibility of burden-sharing measures and their impact on market 
structure (points 9-11); and
iii) the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle, whereby subordinated cred-
itors should not receive less in economic terms than what their 
instrument would have been worth if no state aid were to be 
granted (point 46). 
On the basis of these criteria, it is reasonable to expect that the pru-
dential recapitalization of a solvent bank, following a stress test, 
would not entail the risk of losses for junior creditors even when, 
due to general market conditions, there is need for some temporary 
public support. 
However, this reassuring balance of the elements underpinning the 
Commission’s decisions on individual cases may not be clear to bank 
creditors and potential investors in financial markets. The impres-
sion of an unneeded rigidity on this very sensitive issue has been 
heightened by various official statements that over-emphasize that 
each case under competition rules will be assessed individually, thus 
feeding the impression that the systemic dimension of the issue is 
being underestimated. 
Therefore, some further clarification by the Commission may be 
needed on how the various criteria will be applied during the ongo-
ing transition to banking union.  This may be achieved  through a 
new communication completing the state aid framework for banks 
in view of the adoption of the new resolution rules, without calling 
into question that public aid has to be kept at a minimum, both for 
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distressed banks and for banks that are fundamentally sound, and 
that the availability of public aid should not give rise to moral hazard 
and distortions of competition. 
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Banking Union – Challenges and 
Consequences
Huw Pill1 
For Britons of a certain age, bonfire night is redolent of Guy Fawkes, 
the Gunpowder Plot, baked potatoes and, above all, fireworks. 
This year, bonfire night – the fifth of November – may be memorable 
for other reasons. It marks the first day of Europe’s banking union, 
when the ECB becomes the single supervisor of the Euro area bank-
ing sector (and assumes direct responsibility for supervising the larg-
est European banks).
 
Will this be an occasion for fireworks, as some predict? Or will it 
prove to be a damp squib?
Challenges – Improving stability, overcoming segmentation, 
exiting crisis
 
It has become conventional wisdom to identify the segmentation 
of Euro financial and banking markets as central to the Euro area’s 
persistent economic weakness and disinflationary dynamics.2 With 
1 This note was prepared for the conference ‘Bearing the losses from bank and sover-
eign default in the Eurozone’ which took place at the European University Institute 
on 24 April 2014. The opinions expressed are those of the author and should do not 
necessarily reflect the position of Goldman Sachs. 
2 See Giannone et al. (2011) for a discussion. 
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market fragmentation, the accommodative monetary policy stance 
established by the ECB – with risk-free, short-term market rates an-
chored close to zero – is not transmitted uniformly to all parts of the 
Euro area. Indeed, the impact of segmentation is perverse: fi nan-
cial conditions facing the private sector are tighter in the periphery 
(where monetary stimulus is most needed) than in the core (where 
– arguably – the German economy is starting to overheat).
As illustrated in Chart 1, such segmentation has a particular impact 
on borrowing by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the 
periphery. ECB data demonstrate that bank lending rates on loans 
to SMEs show considerable cross-country heterogeneity within the 
Euro area, even across the big-4 economies.3 Since the intensifi cation 
of the European fi nancial crisis in 2011, rates in Italy and Spain have 
stubbornly remained around 200bp higher than equivalent rates 
in Germany and France, even as sovereign spreads have narrowed. 
Given the importance of the SME sector as a source of growth, the 
European periphery’s recovery has been hamstrung by fi nancial frag-
mentation.
Chart 1 – Heterogeneity of bank lending rates to small and medium-sized 
enterprises
Source:  ECB
3 See Pill (2013) for a richer discussion of the behavior of bank lending spreads 
within the Euro area and an attempt to construct a synthetic indicator of develop-
ments in such spreads. 
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Of course, such analysis faces a ‘chicken-and-egg’ problem: higher 
lending rates in the periphery may refl ect higher corporate credit risk 
in a diffi  cult macroeconomic environment, rather than being a cause 
of the economic weakness underlying that environment. In practice, 
causality will operate in both directions. 
To distinguish the eff ect of fragmentation from the macroeconomic 
situation, we attempt to identify credit supply and credit demand 
shocks in a simple structural VAR model using sign restrictions.4
Such techniques are not defi nitive. But reassuringly the results we 
obtain – summarised by the time series of smoothed credit supply 
shocks shown in Chart 2 – are corroborated by the independent per-
spective provided by responses to the ECB’s bank lending survey.
Chart 2 shows two periods of negative credit supply shocks: (1) 
following the failure of Lehman Bros. in 2008-09, when the Euro 
money market threatened to seize up; and (2) following the intensifi -
cation of the European sovereign crisis in 2011-12, when peripheral 
banks faced severe funding problems and (in some cases) wholesale 
deposit fl ight. 
Chart 2 – Identiﬁ cation of area-wide credit supply shocks
Source:  ECB, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
4 Th e methods used are essentially those proposed by Uhlig (2005). Th e details of 
the approach together we further results are described in Pill and Wan (2013). 
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Chart 3 – which shows the contribution of credit supply and credit 
demand shocks to developments in the spread of bank lending rates 
over policy rates – offers a cross-country perspective on this issue. In 
the post-Lehman phase of the crisis, negative credit supply shocks 
appear symmetric across Euro area countries: German banks are 
equally as adversely affected as Italian banks. By contrast, during the 
later sovereign phase of the crisis in 2011-12, Italian banks are sig-
nificantly affected, whereas German banks are largely immune (and 
at the margin may have benefited from a flight-to-safety effect).
These empirical results help us to describe the challenges faced by the 
European policy authorities. 
Three stand out.
Challenge 1:
Improving stability and resilience of the European financial 
sector as a whole.  
The symmetric post-Lehman impact of adverse credit shocks across 
Euro area countries (and indeed also across other jurisdictions, in-
cluding the US and UK) demonstrates the vulnerability of the global 
financial sector as a whole to the excessive leverage, complexity and 
credit risks that built-up in the financial system during the first de-
cade of the millennium. By acting to align incentives and manage 
systemic risks, better regulation and governance can improve the sta-
bility and resilience of the entire global financial system, obviously 
including its European component.
Challenge 2:
Overcoming intra-Euro area cross-country heterogeneity. 
 
While improving financial resilience is a problem facing many juris-
dictions, experience of market segmentation within a single currency 
zone is unique to the Euro area. A common explanation for such seg-
mentation is the emergence of the Teufelskreis (or “diabolical loop”) 
between sovereign and bank balance sheets: banking problems weak-
en sovereign balance sheets given the (often implicit) government 
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guarantees provided to the financial sector, while banks typically 
hold a significant portfolio of domestic sovereign debt, such that a 
weakening of the sovereign balance sheet may raise concerns about 
the solvency of banks. Breaking this link and thereby establishing a 
‘level playing field’ for Euro area banks independent of their domi-
cile and links to specific sovereigns is seen as an essential support for 
financial stability, better integrated markets and effective monetary 
policy transmission.
Challenge 3:   
Exiting the crisis by dealing with legacy balance sheet problems. 
 
In addition to improving the incentives and environment facing Eu-
ropean financial institutions in an attempt to avoid future calami-
ties, measures are needed to strengthen existing balance sheets that 
suffered damage in the financial crisis and its macroeconomic after-
math. Legacy problems cannot simply be wished away. Ensuring that 
the bank sector has sufficient capital, liquidity and risk-taking capac-
ity to restore the supply of credit to SMEs (and the wider economy) 
remains a central conjunctural concern, independent of the design of 
any new steady-state regime intended to govern the financial system 
in the future.
To illustrate the potential benefits of banking union, consider the 
possible implications of the SSM for the Euro area banking sector. 
Unifying responsibility for bank supervision at the ECB offers scope 
both: (1) to raise the average quality of supervision (e.g., by spreading 
best practice and/or breaking the capture of regulators by ‘national 
champions’); and (2) to ensure common application of standards 
and rules across Euro area countries (e.g., by imposing common 
definitions of non-performing loans). Moreover, the on-going ECB/
European Banking Authority (EBA) “comprehensive assessment” of 
Euro area bank balance sheets (consisting of an asset quality review 
and stress test exercise) is intended to clarify the extent of legacy 
programs and allow them to be dealt with ahead of the SSM coming 
into operation.
These three challenges are themselves significant. But the situation 
is further complicated by trade-offs that emerge in pursuing them.
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Chart 3 – Cross-country heterogeneity in impact of adverse credit shocks
Source:  Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
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Trade-off 1:   
Improving the quality of the playing field vs. ensuring the play-
ing field is level. 
 
In the European context, the danger always exists that attempts 
to establish a level playing field deteriorate in the direction of 
accepting the ‘lowest common denominator’ across participating 
countries, rather than ensuring uniform adoption of best practice 
across jurisdictions. Politically and practically, harmonising on the 
basis of what has already been achieved is easier than upgrading 
national practices to best in class. As a result, potential for a trade-off 
exists: establishing a level playing field may come at the cost of the 
average quality of the regime established. At a minimum, improving 
the overall quality of the financial institutional environment is likely 
to be more complicated in the European context relative to more 
unitary jurisdictions (such as the US).
Trade-off 2:   
Dealing with time consistency issues. 
 
Trade-offs are also likely to emerge between measures intended: (1) 
to establish the new ‘steady-state’ regime for the financial sector, 
with better alignment of private incentives with social demands for 
systemic stability and appropriate risk taking; and (2) to support 
escape from the current crisis and overcome existing legacy problems 
in the banking system. In other words, tensions may exist between 
exit (from the recent crisis) and prevention (of a future crisis). 
For example, requiring higher levels of capital in the banking system 
is desirable in the new steady-state since it provides more loss absorb-
ing capacity and encourages bank stakeholders to demand better risk 
management. But in the short term where banks are weak following 
the crisis, demands to reduce leverage ratios may lead to aggressive 
deleveraging that weakens that macroeconomic environment, and 
threatens a vicious cycle of non-performing loans and tighter credit 
supply conditions.
In short, a time consistency problem may emerge. The authorities 
seek to design a new financial regime that will be more stable than 
136 Banking Union – Challenges and Consequences
that which preceded (and ultimately triggered) the recent crisis. But 
the rules that govern this new regime may be ‘too strict’ to allow 
banks to recover from the travails they currently face as a consequence 
of the crisis. In this context, a ‘one-off’ relaxation may be desirable 
for banks to escape legacy problems. But of course markets and the 
banks themselves understand that the authorities will face incentives 
to repeat this supposedly ‘one-off’ relaxation if a new crisis emerges 
in the future. Thus the credibility of the new regime’s stricter rules 
will be weak – and their desired impact on private incentives (which 
is intended to reduce the likelihood of a future crisis) will be undone.
From the literature on monetary policy and the ‘expectations-
augmented’ Phillips curve, central bankers have a good appreciation 
of how to address such time consistency problems. Building insti-
tutions that bolster the credibility of commitments to the stricter 
regime even in the face of short-run incentives to deviate from those 
incentives is crucial. This is one aspect of what banking union is 
intended to achieve.
Market responses to the announcement and introduction of 
banking union
Reflecting the trade-offs described above, much commentary on the 
emerging European banking union has been sceptical: the transition 
to a new common bank resolution fund is too slow; the proposed 
size of the fund is too small to deal with systemic problems; the 
transitional arrangements (which have to respect national fiscal sov-
ereignty, as the common fund will only be established over time) are 
too complex and time-consuming to function well in a crisis, etc.
These practical concerns are probably well judged. But there is a 
danger that focusing on such commentary ‘misses the wood for the 
trees’. Because the reaction of market pricing and financing to the 
banking union has been very positive. Funding access and costs for 
peripheral banks have improved significantly, as has their ability to 
raise private capital. 
What are the sources of this positive market sentiment, even in the 
face of scepticism about the details?
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First, one has to recognise the broader market environment. In 
a world where advanced economy central banks have established a 
flat risk-free yield curve anchored very close to zero at the short-end 
and where equity prices are at or close to all-time highs in many 
jurisdictions, the ‘search-for-yield’ will inevitably push many inves-
tors into riskier assets that offer positive returns or seem under-priced 
on a valuation basis. Peripheral banks’ funding and equity liabilities 
fit the bill.
Second, market participants have famously short investment 
horizons. The critical events of the past few years seem like a ‘once-
in-a-(working)-lifetime’ event. From this standpoint, another crisis is 
a long way off. To quote published research by my colleagues work-
ing on the European financial sector: “From an investor perspective, 
… it is important to recognize (pragmatically) that banks do not face the 
level of turmoil experienced in the 2007-13 very frequently. … Invest-
able banks are on very stable footing.”
Third, market participants have focused on the opportunities of-
fered by the creation of banking union. ECB President Draghi and 
his colleagues have repeatedly emphasised that the creation of Eu-
ropean banking union involve the abolition of any intra- Euro area 
barriers to the flow of bank liquidity and capital. To quote: “With a 
European supervisor, borders will not matter. Issues such as protecting 
national champions or supervisory ring-fencing of liquidity will not be 
relevant”.
Again drawing on the work of my colleagues, three consequences 
emerge: 
• in the short run, the fungibility of bank liquidity and 
capital will permit a rationalisation of bank balance sheets. 
In simple terms, following banking union higher yielding 
corporate loans in the periphery (see Chart 1) can be funded 
using cheap liquidity in the core. This will expand bank in-
terest margins, sustaining bank profitability, bolstering bank 
capital and supporting bank funding and equity prices.
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• in the medium term, the profits deriving from wider interest 
margins will prompt greater competition, influencing loan 
and deposit pricing in the Euro area.
• at longer horizons, market structure will evolve to the 
new regime, as bank business models respond to the new 
environment. Consolidation – involving M&A activity in 
pursuit of broader cross-border banks – is a likely result.
With particular emphasis placed on the first of these implications 
given the short horizon of market participants, banking union has 
received a positive market response.
The authorities have every incentive to acquiesce in this market be-
haviour. At the turn of the year, significant concern surrounded the 
soundness of the Italian banking sector (in particular, the regional 
banks that were central to the financing of the SMEs in northern 
Italy central to the country’s corporate performance). With the fiscal 
capacity of the Italian state to address solvency issues revealed by the 
ECB/EBA comprehensive assessment in question (e.g., the Italian 
authorities had expressed scepticism about launching a ‘bad bank’ 
to warehouse non-performing assets), negative surprises were feared. 
But now that markets are supportive of bank funding and equity 
issuance in the current favourable environment, these concerns have 
abated.
Nevertheless, there is a strong case that, at least to some extent, mar-
ket pricing has become detached from underlying fundamentals. 
Moreover, the search-for-yield dynamic threatens to embody a self-
sustaining momentum (e.g., as investors underweight in peripheral 
assets underperform their benchmarks and are ‘stopped in’ to pur-
chases of peripheral debt by the fear of redemptions). 
All this has led to concerns that a “bubble” may be emerging in pe-
ripheral assets. Certainly the gap between market pricing and funda-
mentals and the self-sustaining nature of market momentum are two 
common features of bubble-like phenomena. But all is not necessar-
ily lost. Two interpretations of recent events are possible.
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On the one hand, a positive interpretation is that favourable market 
conditions have created the “breathing space” in which necessary, 
but difficult, reforms to the financial sector can be implemented. 
Going further, one might argue that the improved conditions for 
bank funding and capital raising allow the authorities to “boot strap” 
the Euro area banking system into a better, more sustainable posi-
tion. Improved financial conditions resulting from easier bank credit 
supply will support the macroeconomic recovery that improves credit 
performance and thus validates the bank’s less risk averse attitude to 
credit expansion. Either way, fundamentals will improve over time 
to validate current market pricing, which anticipates those improve-
ments. Moreover, this approach offers a neat way out of the time 
consistency problem described above: it is market (over)optimism, 
rather than a relaxation of new rules, that is allowing banks to work 
their way out of legacy problems.
On the other hand, a negative interpretation would suggest that 
ultimately market prices will correct to levels more consistent with 
fundamentals. And if the institutional framework in which the fi-
nancial sector operates has not been made more resilient and robust 
through reform, the danger exists that such a correction could over-
shoot and/or trigger the vicious downward spirals that underlay the 
crisis of 2007-12. Adding to this pessimism, one could argue that 
the benign market environment induces complacency on the part of 
both the authorities and the banking system, such that necessary but 
painful changes to fundamentals are neglected. Moral hazard may 
emerge. In this context, market prices will correct towards stagnant 
or deteriorating underlying fundamental levels.
Concluding remarks – No slackening of reforms and a caution-
ary tale from the 1990s
It is premature to come to a definitive view in which of the two 
preceding descriptions is more appropriate.
Current market behaviour appears to be driven by the expectation 
that ultimately banking union will be made to work at the Euro 
area level: today’s pricing follows by backward induction of this 
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view. Such an assumption contrasts with the view – common at the 
peak of the European sovereign crisis – that the Euro area would 
fragment. Convertibility and other attendant risk premia have been 
largely eliminated.  
A common narrative supporting this positive interpretation is as 
follows. If the banking sector behaves in a manner that assumes full 
fungibility of bank capital and liquidity within the Euro area, in 
the event of a future crisis the cross-border entanglements among 
banks will be so extensive that only a unified approach to crisis 
management and resolution would be possible. Therefore, whatever 
the state of banking union’s institutional development, in the end 
the authorities would have to deliver. Implicitly, the assumption is 
that the lessons of 2007-12 have been learnt. In the context, one 
should not worry about complexity of transitional arrangement or 
incompleteness in the final regime. 
The self-referential nature of this equilibrium is immediately 
apparent. And, as is typical when such self-referential behaviour 
emerges, other equilibria exist. Not least, one can easily envisage a 
situation where, in the event of crisis, markets re-fragment once it 
becomes apparent that there is no functional common area-wide 
backstop or resolution regime in place. After all, this is what hap-
pened during 2007-12. In the context of such multiplicity, the shift 
from one equilibrium to the other can induce large and rapid shifts 
in market pricing and behaviour.
Even the positive interpretation is open to substantial risks. In this 
respect, history offers a cautionary tale. Following the ERM crises 
of 1992-93, few believed that a single currency was feasible by the 
end of the decade. But the reaffirmation of political commitment to 
monetary union at the Madrid European Council in 1995 spurred a 
reversal of market sentiment. It was the ‘convergence play’ of the lat-
ter part of the decade that narrowed sovereign spreads and made the 
introduction of the Euro possible in 1999. But support from the be-
nign market environment of that period resulted in a complacency on 
the part of the authorities: fiscal consolidation and structural reform 
at the national level were insufficient, and – admittedly with the 
141Huw Pill
considerable benefit of hindsight – area-wide governance and 
integration were not pursued with sufficient purpose. In the end, 
EMU took flight – but in a form that was not robust enough to man-
age the rigours of the financial crisis a decade later.
Parallels can be drawn with banking union. Are the European 
authorities now relying on a ‘convergence play’ in bank funding 
markets? Is that breeding complacency and slowing necessary reform 
and institution building? 
History will be the judge. At this stage, we need to see progress in 
building a concrete, rather than just a virtual, banking union in 
Europe. As the central bankers now becoming responsible for area-
wide supervision know well from their experience with monetary 
policy, it is through building credible institutions that the time 
consistency problems inherent in current and future policy chal-
lenges can be managed.
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Restructuring a Euro Area 
Sovereign Guarantee
Lee C. Buchheit and G.Mitu Gulati* 
As of this writing, in May 2014, market sentiment appears to be 
that the Euro area sovereign debt crisis is over. Spreads are converg-
ing to pre crisis levels and even countries like Greece are finding 
their bond issues oversubscribed. One of the techniques used by a 
number of sovereigns to extract themselves from the crisis, however, 
has produced a problem that may yet need to be dealt with. Specifi-
cally, in the course of trying to support their banking sectors during 
the crisis years, sovereigns turned to the issuance of large numbers of 
sovereign guarantee bonds. One advantage of issuing these types of 
bonds for a sovereign trying to escape a crisis is that they typically do 
not show up on the country’s already bloated balance sheet. The dis-
advantage is that if the crisis hits again, these bonds can be difficult 
to restructure.
In every situation where a sovereign lends its credit support to fa-
cilitate a borrowing by a third party, the sovereign will have had a 
choice. The alternative to guaranteeing the debt of the third party 
is for the sovereign to borrow the money in its own name and on-
* Partner, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton (N.Y.) and Professor, Duke Law School, 
respectively. A version of this piece appeared in SOVEREIGN DEBT MANAGE-
MENT (Rosa Lastra & Lee C. Buchheit eds. 2014); see also FINANCIAL CRI-
SIS CONTAINMENT AND GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES (J. LaBrosse, R. 
Olivares-Caminal, & D. Singh eds., 2013).
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lend the proceeds to that entity. The difference is that a direct liabil-
ity appears on a sovereign’s own balance sheet; a contingent liability 
probably will not. In the last five years, as the need to finance Great 
Recession stimulus measures has swollen the debt-to-GDP ratios of 
many developed countries, sovereigns have sought to camouflage the 
true extent of their liabilities by resorting to the issue of contingent, 
rather than direct, obligations.1 
I. Sovereign Comfort
A benignant sovereign may bestow its credit support to a third party 
in a variety of ways.
(a) Explicit sovereign guarantees
At one end of the spectrum will be an explicit contractual guarantee 
by the sovereign expressed in words like these:
The Republic hereby unconditionally and irrevocably 
guarantees (as primary obligor and not merely as surety) the 
punctual payment when due, whether at stated maturity, by 
acceleration or otherwise, of all obligations of the Obligor 
now or hereafter existing under this Agreement….
Such an explicit guarantee will sometimes come with all the trap-
pings of an independent, separately enforceable, legal obligation on 
the part of the sovereign guarantor -- representations, covenants, 
waiver of sovereign immunity, choice of foreign governing law, 
1 See, e.g., A Note of Caution in Greek Banks’ Seeming Recovery, Landon Thomas Jr., 
N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2014; State Debt Guarantees That are Hidden Add to Worries 
in Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2013; Christopher Spink, Contingent Sovereign 
Liabilities a ‘Landmine’, INT’L FINANCING REV., May 26, 2012; David Reilly, 
Time to End the Fiction of ‘Frannie’, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 2012. Mr. Reilly, in his 
piece, writes: 
That [a new requirement that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac pay all of their 
profit to the U.S. Government as a dividend] bolsters the argument that 
Fannie and Freddie should be included on the government’s balance sheet. 
Of course, that is politically unpalatable: The inclusion of their combined 
$5.3 trillion in liabilities would balloon the nearly $16 trillion in total fed-
eral debt outstanding and breach the debt ceiling. 
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submission to foreign court jurisdiction and appointment of an 
agent for service of process abroad.
Explicit sovereign guarantees may also be extended by operation of 
law. Some (but only some) deposit insurance schemes benefit from 
the full faith and credit of the host sovereign. In some countries, cer-
tain state-owned enterprises will by law carry the full faith and credit 
of their sovereign in their borrowing activities.
(b) Implicit sovereign assurances
The other side of the spectrum of sovereign credit support consists 
of nothing more than a background shadow; a figurative -- perhaps 
even a literal -- wink, nod and reassuring smile to the prospective 
investor. These are normally situations in which the primary obligor 
is so closely associated with the sovereign in the mind of the market 
(such as a political sub-division or an important state-owned enter-
prise) that lenders to the primary obligor are passively encouraged in 
the belief that the sovereign could never tolerate a circumstance in 
which the primary obligor tarnishes the reputation of the sovereign 
by defaulting on its debts. Nothing is ever said openly about sover-
eign credit support in these situations, but the perceptive investor is 
expected to see the warm arm of the sovereign wrapped in a reassur-
ing manner around the shoulder of the debtor.
(c) In between
Between these two extremes of unambiguously explicit sovereign 
guarantees and gauzily implicit sovereign reassurances are many gra-
dations. These include:
• partial guarantees -- the sovereign agrees to cover only a por-
tion of the amount payable by the primary obligor;
• indemnities -- the sovereign agrees to indemnify the creditor 
for any residual loss but only after all efforts to recover the 
debt from the primary obligor have been exhausted;
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• keepwells -- the sovereign’s promise to the lender is limited 
to an undertaking that the primary obligor will at all times 
have a positive net worth (often expressed as a nominal 
amount), but the sovereign is free to achieve this objective of 
solvency in any way it wishes (by recapitalizing the primary 
obligor, assuming or paying some of its debts, lending mon-
ey to the primary obligor, etc.); and
• comfort letters -- an aptly-named instrument, the comfort 
letter, in its most innocuous form, merely assures the lender 
that the sovereign is aware that the primary obligor is bor-
rowing the money, that the sovereign does not object to the 
transaction and that the obligor continues to enjoy the af-
fections of the sovereign.
The remainder of this paper will deal only with explicit sovereign 
guarantees. For obvious reasons, it is impossible to identify or quan-
tify implicit guarantees because they exist only in the eye of the 
beholder.2 
II. Contingent Charms
The principal charm (for the guarantor) of a contingent obligation 
lies precisely in its contingent nature; no one can be sure, at the time 
the debt is incurred, whether it will be paid by the primary obligor 
without recourse to the guarantor. This feature allows guarantors, 
with the blessing of the accounting profession, to treat the resulting 
liabilities as off balance sheet unless and until something happens in 
the future that makes it probable that the guarantee will in fact be 
called. For sovereigns already struggling under dangerously bloated 
debt-to-GDP ratios, this accounting treatment allows the sovereign 
2 This vagueness about whether a particular loan does or does not enjoy the credit 
support of the sovereign carries its own risks. In a distressed debt context, a lender 
that thinks itself the beneficiary of an implicit sovereign guarantee is apt to protest 
if the sovereign orphans the primary obligor and allows the loan to go into default. 
The United Arab Emirates, burnt by just this reaction during the Dubai financial 
crisis of 2009, subsequently changed its policy to ensure that there would be no 
future misunderstandings about which loans to state-linked enterprises did, and 
which did not, enjoy government support. See Camilla Hall, Abu Dhabi Tightens 
Rules for Debt Issued to State-Linked Businesses, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2012 at 15. 
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to continue to raise capital on the strength of the sovereign’s credit 
standing while not visibly increasing the size of the sovereign’s own 
stock of debt. The only catch is that the loans must be directed in 
the first instance to a third party (the primary obligor) under the 
cover of the sovereign guarantee. That third party may be related to 
the sovereign (a state-owned enterprise for example), or it may be a 
private sector entity whose activities the sovereign wishes to encour-
age. A construction project undertaken by a private sector entity in 
the tourism industry is a good example.
Accounting standards differ somewhat in how they describe the cir-
cumstances which allow a guarantor to keep a contingent liability off 
of its own balance sheet. For corporate borrowers, the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IAS 37) directs that if a present obli-
gation “may, but probably will not, require an outflow of resources” 
from the guarantor, it need not be “recognized” on the balance sheet 
of the guarantor, but should be disclosed in financial statements as a 
contingent liability.3 Where the likelihood of an outflow of resources 
from the guarantor is “remote”, even the need for financial disclosure 
is omitted.4 
 
The general principle established by Eurostat (the statistical office 
of the European Union) for presenting the accounts of EU member 
states is broadly similar. As long as a state guarantee is not called by 
beneficiary, the liability is recorded only on the balance sheet of the 
primary obligor, not the sovereign.5 Eurostat recognizes a “special 
case” exception to this general principle in situations where the need 
for the government to make debt service payments on the loan is 
open and notorious from the outset. The Eurostat Manual describes 
the circumstances in these terms:
Even though the liability is issued by the enterprise itself, it may 
be right away considered with certainty as an actual government 
liability if the following conditions are fulfilled:
3 IASB Guidance on implementing IAS 37, Tables, Provisions and Contingent 
Liabilities. 
4 IAS 37, para. 28 
5 Eurostat, ESA95 Manual for Government Deficit and Debt (2002 ed.), 
II.4.3.2(1). 
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— the law authorizing issuance of the debt specifies the govern-
ment’s obligation of repayment.
— the budget of the State specifies each year the amount of 
repayment.
— this debt, issued by the enterprise, is systematically repaid by 
the State (interest and principal).
The liability must then be recorded directly -- as soon as at issu-
ance -- in the government financial account and balance sheet, 
and not in the enterprise’s. Its amount must be taken into ac-
count in the government debt.6 
6 Id., II.4.3.2(2) 
7 We also examined the bonds available from Bloomberg, a fourth data source. 
However, there were no bonds there that we had not already accessed from one of 
the other databases. 
A Note on the Database
The statistical information in this paper is based on our sur-
vey of sovereign guaranteed bonds issued between January 
1, 1965 and July 1, 2013, as those bonds appear on three 
publicly-available databases (Dealogic, Perfect Information, 
Thomson One Banker).7 The prospectuses and offering cir-
culars for a total of 885 sovereign guaranteed bonds appear-
ing on these databases were reviewed.
This is not the total universe of sovereign guaranteed bonds. 
The databases we use are commercial and therefore usually 
include only those bonds that the database operators believe 
will be of interest to paying customers. Our information 
suggests that those customers tend to be foreign rather than 
local investors (domestic investors are often less concerned 
with legal terms, having other mechanisms to police and 
monitor the behavior of their sovereign). In other words, 
what we report on is probably both a small and biased (to-
wards the interests of foreign investors) subset of the uni-
verse of sovereign guaranteed bonds, the exact size of which 
is entirely a matter of speculation.
We nevertheless believe that our results reveal the general 
trends in the issuance of these instruments over time, par-
ticularly in the areas of greatest relevance to the subject of 
this paper -- number of issuances (relative to direct sovereign 
bonds), governing law, submission to court jurisdiction and 
waiver of sovereign immunity.
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III. Th e Explosion of 2008 - 2012
Th e data we have reviewed suggests that there was literally an ex-
plosion in the number of sovereign guaranteed bonds issued after 
the onset of the fi nancial crisis in 2008, particularly in Europe. Us-
ing publicly-available information (see box -- “A Note on the Data 
Base”), the results are shown on Figure 1: 
Figure 1: Number of Bonds with Sovereign Guarantees
Jan, 1 1965 - July 1, 2013 (n=885)
Figure 2 reports a diff erent, but equally striking, perspective -- it fo-
cuses on the bonds and guarantees for the six euro area nations that 
were generally perceived to be at the heart of the crisis starting in late 
2009 – Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Belgium. Th ese 
are also the six early entrants to the European Monetary Union who 
have not traditionally been AAA rated (in contrast to, for example, 
Germany and France). For these six nations, Figure 2 reports both 
the numbers of sovereign bonds and guaranteed bonds issued dur-
ing the quarter century between January 1, 1988 and July 1, 2013. 
As the European crisis worsens during the 2009-2012 period, the 
issuance of guaranteed bonds, particularly in comparison to regular 
sovereign bonds, mushrooms.
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Figure 2: Numbers of Bonds versus guaranteed Bonds for Six Non-AAA 
Early Euro Area Entrants (Jan 1, 1988 - July 1, 2013)
An excellent study released by Houlihan Lokey in May 20128 con-
cluded that sovereign loan/bond guarantees in Europe as of end-
2010 (a category that did not include other forms of sovereign con-
tingent exposure such as umbrella guarantees or deposit insurance 
schemes) represented, on a GDP-weighted average, 13.1% of Euro-
pean GDP. In some countries, contingent exposure approached 30 
percent of GDP. Th e trend noted in the Houlihan study was upward; 
the aggregate size of guarantees outstanding in 2013 is undoubtedly 
signifi cantly larger than it was in 2010.
Th ere are two explanations for this dramatic rise in the popularity 
of contingent sovereign obligations. Th e fi rst, as discussed above, is 
the desire of over-indebted developed countries to minimize further 
strains on their debt-to-GDP ratios. Th e off  balance sheet account-
ing treatment of contingent obligations permits this. Th e second 
explanation relates to the methods by which the European Central 
Bank has been prepared to provide liquidity assistance to banks in 
the Eurozone. A bank in need of liquidity may either borrow money 
8 Houlihan Lokey, Th e Increasing Risks Posed by Contingent Liabilities: How to Mea-
sure and Manage Th em, Presentation at the 2012 Meeting of the Private Sector with 
the Paris Club and with Representatives of Non Paris Club Bilateral Creditors, avail-
able at http://www.iif.com/emp/dr/ 
151Lee C. Buchheit and G.Mitu Gulati
directly from the ECB’s discount window by posting eligible col-
lateral for the loan, or the bank may borrow the funds from its own 
central bank through the Emergency Lending Assistance (“ELA”) 
program. ELA funds, however, are ultimately also sourced from the 
ECB and the Eurosystem and require the posting of eligible collat-
eral by the borrowing bank.
Peripheral European banks that had exhausted their store of eligible 
collateral for these programs came up with an ingenious solution -- 
they manufactured eligible collateral.9 The bank issues a debt instru-
ment to itself (there is no third party purchaser of the instrument), 
takes the instrument to its local ministry of finance and obtains a 
government guarantee, and then uses the instrument as collateral for 
a new borrowing from ECB’s discount window or the ELA.10
In July 2012, the ECB is reported to have grown alarmed at the size 
of the manufactured collateral that it was accepting at its discount 
window. The ECB accordingly capped the amount of “specially tai-
lored bonds” that could be used for this purpose by Eurozone banks 
at the level each bank had outstanding at the time the new policy 
was announced.11
IV. Precedents
One of the remorseless laws of sovereign debt management is that 
size brings risk. If a component of a sovereign’s debt stock is of neg-
9 The Cypriot Ministry of Finance charmingly refers to instruments issued for the 
sole purpose of ECB/ELA discounting as “collateral for liquidity extraction from 
the European Central Bank.” Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Finance, Public Debt 
Management Annual Report 2011 (March 2012) at 35. 
10 See Sonia Sirletti & Elisa Martinuzzi, Italy Banks said to Use State-Backed Bonds 
for ECB Loans, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 21, 2011, available at http://www.bloom-
berg.com/news/2011-12-20/italian-banks-are-said-to-use-state-guaranteed-bonds-
to-receive-ecb-loans.html 
11 See Marc Jones, ECB Caps Use of State-Backed Bonds as Collateral, REUTERS, July 3, 
2012, available at http://uk.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=UKBRE8620V920120703; 
Joseph Cotterill, ECB Collateral Shift Du Jour, FT ALPHAVILLE, July 3, 2012, 
available at http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2012/07/03/1070271/ecb-collateral-shift-du-
jour/. As of early 2014, however, the practice of banks appears to be continuing at 
least in some Euro area countries.  See Christopher Spink, Greek Banks Confront 
Liquidity Issues, INT’L. FINANCING REV., June 13, 2014. 
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ligible size, that component can sometimes escape a debt restructur-
ing. For example, with only a couple of exceptions, sovereign bonds 
were not restructured in the 1980s debt crisis. The reason? Emerging 
market sovereign bond issues were rare in the period before the crisis 
began in 1982 and the cost/benefit analysis weighed heavily in favor 
of exempting those few bonds from the restructurings that engulfed 
commercial bank loans and bilateral credits in that decade. But by 
the late 1990s, bonds had replaced bank loans as the main compo-
nent of the debt stocks of many emerging market countries. Bond 
restructurings therefore became inevitable in countries with insup-
portable debt loads.
If this remorseless law is indeed remorseless, it suggests that any 
country carrying a significant stock of contingent sovereign obliga-
tions will eventually need to address those liabilities if a generalized 
restructuring of the country’s debt becomes necessary. Unfortunate-
ly, there are few historical precedents to guide such an exercise.
In the sovereign debt restructurings of the 1980s, the aggregate num-
ber of sovereign guarantees was small. This allowed them to be ig-
nored in the debt workouts of that era. The normal approach was 
to include a contingent liability in the restructuring only if the ben-
eficiary called on the guarantee before the restructuring closed. But 
no pressure was placed on beneficiaries to call on their guarantees. 
This set a precedent that has been followed in most sovereign debt 
restructurings of the last thirty years.12
One notable exception was Grenada’s restructuring in 2005 where 
the government’s contingent exposure equaled about 10% of its di-
rect liabilities. Grenada warned in the disclosure document for its 
restructuring that any contingent obligation called by a beneficiary 
after the restructuring closed would be settled by the delivery of con-
sideration having a net present value equal to what the lender would 
have received had the guarantee been called in time to be included in 
the main restructuring.13 
12 See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, The Treatment of Contingent Liabilities in 
a Sovereign Debt Restructuring, in FINANCIAL CRISIS CONTAINMENT AND 
GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES (J. LaBrosse, R. Olivares-Caminal, & D. Singh 
eds., 2013). 
13 See Lee C. Buchheit & Elizabeth Karpenski, Grenada’s Innovations, 2006 J. 
INT’L BANKING AND REG., at 227, 231. 
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The most recent precedent, Greece in 2012, is mixed. Although the 
Hellenic Republic had hundreds of outstanding state guarantees at 
the time it announced its debt restructuring in February of 2012, 
only 36 of those instruments were made eligible for inclusion in the 
workout.14 The distinguishing characteristic of the included instru-
ments was that they fell within Eurostat’s “special cases” exception to 
the general rule of off balance sheet treatment.15 In effect, Eurostat 
had already concluded that the liabilities were central government 
debt and had to be shown as such for Eurostat reporting purposes. 
Accordingly, they were also made eligible for the restructuring of the 
central government’s direct debt.
Interestingly, although the main Greek debt restructuring was facili-
tated by Greek legislation which retrofit a collective action mecha-
nism on that portion of the debt stock governed by Greek law (93% 
of the total), this legislation did not attempt to sweep in the Greek 
Government guarantees of the guaranteed bonds that were declared 
eligible for the restructuring, nor did the Greek legislature attempt 
to pass separate legislation dealing with the Government’s local law 
guarantees. The Greek authorities therefore avoided the legal and 
operational complications (described below in Part VI of this paper) 
that would have attended an attempt to restructure sovereign guar-
antees in a more coercive way.
V. The Restructurer’s Dilemma
If a country that is forced to restructure its outstanding (direct) in-
debtedness also has a significant amount of contingent obligations 
coming due during the period covered by that restructuring, there 
are a limited number of options:
(i) hope that the primary obligor will have the resources to pay 
the debt without a call on the guarantee;
(ii) hope that the beneficiary of the guarantee will voluntarily 
roll over the debt at maturity;
14 Twenty series of these guaranteed bonds (totaling €4.88 billion) were governed 
by Greek law; the other sixteen series (totaling €4.97 billion) were governed by for-
eign law. 
15 See text accompanying note 5 above. 
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(iii) honor the guarantee if it is called by paying the debt in full; 
and
(iv) dishonor the guarantee and attempt to restructure the liabil-
ity when it matures.
Option (i) is, of course, the sovereign’s preferred choice. But a natural 
selection process is always at work in guarantees. Had the primary 
obligor been perceived as fully creditworthy on its own, it would not 
have needed sovereign credit support in order to raise capital at a 
tolerably low interest rate. The very presence of a sovereign guaran-
tee is thus a sign that the primary obligor might not be good for the 
money when it comes due.
Option (ii), a voluntary rollover, is the sovereign’s second best choice. 
Naturally, this requires the cooperation of either an indulgent, or a 
captive, beneficiary. The “liquidity extraction bonds” (see footnote 
9 below) that have been issued by European banks for the purpose 
of accessing the ECB’s discount window or the ELA program pre-
sumably fall into the category of “captive beneficiary”. Demanding 
repayment of the loan to the discounting bank on its maturity date 
would, in most of these situations, be pointless. Demanding pay-
ment from the sovereign guarantor of the guaranteed bonds pledged 
to secure the loan would be inconsistent with the official sector’s 
bailout program for the country. The result is a captive beneficiary 
that has little choice but to roll over the loan and the accompanying 
collateral for the loan.
Option (iii), pay up, can have several problems. The first, of course, 
is money, a commodity that is rarely in abundant supply when a 
sovereign is compelled to restructure its debts. Even if the cash is 
available, paying in full the beneficiary of a state guarantee while all 
of the sovereign’s direct creditors have been forced to take losses will 
naturally delight the former and enrage the latter. Finally, it is unlike-
ly that the financial predicates underlying the restructuring will have 
assumed payment in full of maturing contingent liabilities during 
the adjustment period. If those contingent liabilities are of a signifi-
cant size, a policy of paying them may torpedo the entire program.
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Option (iv), attempt an ad hoc restructuring of a contingent liability 
when it matures, raises the predicable issues of feasibility, cost and 
intercreditor equity. It would also inevitably prolong the perception 
that the country remains mired in a debt crisis.
The restructuring of a contingent obligation is more complicated 
than the same exercise for direct sovereign debt. For one thing, un-
til the guarantee is called by the beneficiary, it remains contingent; 
the guarantor is rarely in a position to force such a call. This gives 
the beneficiary the option of attempting to ride out the sovereign’s 
restructuring of its direct obligations in the hope that after that main 
restructuring closes, the sovereign will be reluctant to plunge back 
into another debt crisis by dishonoring a call on the guarantee.
Moreover, even if beneficiaries can be persuaded to call upon their 
guarantees, they are in a fundamentally different position from the 
sovereign’s direct creditors. By definition, the holder of a sovereign 
guaranteed bond benefits from the credit of both the primary obligor 
and that of the sovereign guarantor; in the jargon, the creditor is 
holding “two-name paper”. Giving such a creditor the same deal as 
that offered to direct creditors of the sovereign would effectively at-
tribute no value to the credit of the primary obligor. But any attempt 
to sweeten the terms of the restructuring for contingent sovereign 
creditors in order to compensate those holders for the surrender of 
their claim against the primary obligor requires someone to put a 
monetary value on that second credit risk. This could be a delicate 
and politically sensitive task when the primary obligor is a state-
owned or controlled enterprise.
In short, the restructurer’s dilemma is that contingent liabilities, if 
they are of any material size, cannot safely be left out of a sovereign 
debt restructuring, nor can they easily be included in a sovereign 
debt restructuring. This problem wasn’t a problem for so long as con-
tingent liabilities represented only a small part of the debt stocks of 
affected countries. But for many countries, that period ended with 
the commencement of the financial crisis in 2008. The problem will 
therefore be unavoidable in at least some of the sovereign debt re-
structurings yet to come.
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In the bankruptcy of a corporate borrower in the United States (let’s 
call it Acme Corporation), the value of any contingent claims against 
Acme that are not expected to be crystalized before the bankruptcy 
proceeding ends may be estimated for purposes of allowing the ben-
eficiary’s claim to be filed in the insolvency proceeding. (See U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code § 502(c)(1).) This is done to avoid unduly pro-
longing the administration of Acme’s estate or forcing the adminis-
trator to establish a reserve against the claim. If it appears that the 
primary obligor will be able to pay the debt out of its own resources 
(without requiring a call on Acme’s guarantee), then the beneficiary’s 
claim in Acme’s bankruptcy may be estimated at zero or close to it.
VI. Restructuring Sovereign Contingent Obligations
How hard would it be to cast the net of a sovereign debt restructur-
ing wide enough to catch the sovereign’s contingent obligations?
(a) Voluntary offers
If the debt restructuring is conducted as a purely voluntary exchange 
(that is, no use of CACs, embedded or retrofit), and involves delivery 
of new debt instruments of the sovereign in exchange for outstand-
ing sovereign guaranteed bonds, the holders of contingent sovereign 
paper can be expected to ask for a sweeter deal than that offered to 
the direct creditors. The justification will be that this additional con-
sideration is needed to compensate for the creditors’ surrender of a 
claim against the first name (the primary obligor) of their two-name 
paper. Apart from the politically delicate job of deciding whether the 
incremental credit risk of a parastatal on a debt instrument is worth a 
nickel or a dime or something more, different values would logically 
need to be assigned for each of the primary obligors, a tedious and 
possibly controversial task.
The alternative would involve restructuring each guaranteed bond 
in a manner that maintains the primary obligor as the first name on 
the paper. This could be done either by exchanging each old guar-
anteed bond for a new guaranteed bond with the same parties, or 
else attempting to modify the terms of that old bond within its four 
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corners (no exchange). This approach would address the concern 
about the loss of the creditor’s claim against the primary obligor, but 
it could significantly complicate the mechanics of the restructuring. 
For one thing, it would be tantamount to a separate restructuring 
for each guaranteed bond. Because the primary obligors would con-
tinue as a credit risk on the restructured debt instruments, the secu-
rities laws in many jurisdictions would require separate disclosure 
for each of those primary obligors in the exchange offer. Instead of 
issuing a single series of sovereign bonds for exchange with existing 
debtholders, the restructuring would involve the issuance, listing and 
administration of multiple series of bonds, each corresponding to an 
underlying guaranteed debt instrument.
(b) Less-than-voluntary offers
A debt restructuring that does not rely exclusively on persuasion to 
bring creditors into the deal will face its own set of problems with 
contingent sovereign obligations.
Collective action clauses (CACs). One immediate question will be 
whether the terms of the guarantee will need to be amended sepa-
rately from, or in parallel with, a modification of the terms of the 
underlying debt instrument. If the underlying instrument does not 
include a collective action clause of some kind, its amendment -- 
and the corresponding amendment of the related guarantee -- would 
presumably require the unanimous consent of each debtholder. Even 
where the underlying debt instrument contains a CAC, however, the 
related sovereign guarantee almost certainly will not. Our research 
suggests that CACs are almost never incorporated in sovereign 
guarantees.
Somewhat more common, but still quite rare, is for the CAC appear-
ing in the underlying bond to permit changes to the accompanying 
sovereign guarantee. As Figure 2 shows, of the guaranteed bonds with 
CACs in our database, fewer than 10% permitted modifications by a 
supermajority vote of creditors to both the underlying bond and the 
accompanying guarantee.
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Figure 3: Number of Sovereign Guarantees with CACS mentioning 
Guarantee Modiﬁ cation
(Jan 1, 1965-2013 - July 1, 2013)
Why should contract drafters who were cautious enough to put 
CACs in their bonds have felt it unnecessary to incorporate a similar 
feature in the accompanying guarantees? Th e most plausible expla-
nation is that the drafters simply didn’t see the need to do so. Th e 
guarantee promises payment of the bond on the dates and in the 
amounts due. If the creditors agree to amend the terms of the bond, 
this argument goes, the terms of the guarantee will automatically 
wrap around those modifi ed terms.
Th is assumption may be a bit too facile. For one thing, the wording 
of the guarantee could be crucial. For example, a Republic of Turkey 
sovereign guarantee in our database recites that:
Th e intention and purpose of this Guarantee is to ensure 
that the Bondholders . . . shall receive the amounts pay-
able as interest and principal as and when due and payable 
according to the Issue Terms . . . 16
No mention is made of a possible modifi cation to the original Issue 
Terms. It is therefore not clear whether an amendment to the terms of 
16 Th e Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, DM200,000,000 7% Deutsche 
Mark Bearer Bonds of 1987/1992, irrevocably and unconditionally guaranteed by the 
Republic of Turkey, (emphasis added). 
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the underlying bond would automatically result in a corresponding 
amendment to the accompanying guarantee. More importantly, the 
amendment of a sovereign guaranteed bond through the use of a col-
lective action clause is still an unusual event and would raise novel 
legal issues.
If a supermajority of bondholders can alter the terms of an underly-
ing bond through a collective action clause, but no similar contrac-
tual flexibility exits to modify the terms of the related sovereign guar-
antee, can a disaffected minority of bondholders insist on payment 
by the guarantor of the amounts originally due under the bond? The 
argument against permitting such a claim focuses on the words of 
the guarantee promising payment “when due” of the primary obli-
gor’s obligations under the bond. If those obligations are extended or 
reduced in a manner permitted by the terms of the bond (through 
the exercise of the CAC), the argument goes, the guarantee should 
automatically wrap around the amended terms. 
 
The argument in favor of allowing those disgruntled creditors to in-
sist on strict performance of the guarantee has several components. 
First, these guarantees are often deliberately set up to be free stand-
ing, separately enforceable instruments; the guarantor is frequently 
described as being liable as a “primary obligor and not merely as 
surety” of the underlying obligation. If a supermajority of bondhold-
ers wish to modify the terms of the underlying obligation, the pres-
ence of a CAC may allow them to sweep along a disaffected minority 
at that level. But absent a CAC in the guarantee, the consent of each 
beneficiary of the guarantee would appear to be required to effect a 
parallel amendment of that instrument. Second, had the drafter of 
the guarantee wanted to permit its terms to be modified with less 
than the unanimous consent of the beneficiaries, this would have 
been easy to do. Under normal principles of contract interpretation a 
court would not read such a modification clause into the document. 
Finally, many guarantees contain language similar to the following:
The liability of the Guarantor hereunder shall be absolute 
and unconditional irrespective of any change in the time, 
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manner or place of payment, or any other term of, the [un-
derlying obligation].17 
This situation (a conflict between a “collective action” amendment 
of an underlying obligation and the modification of an accompa-
nying guarantee) is not well developed in U.S. law for the simple 
reason that collective action modification clauses fell out of favor in 
corporate debt instruments in the United States in the 1930s, and 
have only recently (since 2003) begun to appear in sovereign debt 
instruments governed by the law of a U.S. jurisdiction. In a tradi-
tional U.S. amendment clause requiring the unanimous consent of 
all creditors for a change to payment terms, the issue does not arise; 
by definition, every holder will have consented to the change.
Governing law. A sovereign fortunate enough to have its guarantees 
governed by its own law may (subject to constitutional constraints) 
be able to encourage holders of its contingent obligations to accept a 
restructuring by threatening to pass domestic legislation containing 
a sentence along these lines:
All guarantees issued by the Republic of Ruritania in re-
spect of debt obligations of third parties that are eligible 
to participate in the [Ruritanian restructuring] shall, if 
called by the beneficiary at any time after the closing of the 
[Ruritanian restructuring], be satisfied and discharged in 
full by delivery to the creditor of consideration equivalent 
to that offered in the [Ruritanian restructuring].
The effect of such a provision would be to remove any incentive on 
the part of the beneficiary of a state guarantee to refrain from calling 
17 This language is included in a guarantee to ensure that the guarantor is not 
released if the lender agrees to vary the terms of the underlying obligation. See 
Raymer McQuiston, Drafting an Enforceable Guaranty in an International Financing 
Transaction: A Lender’s Perspective, 10 INT’L TAX AND BUS. LAWYER 138, 156 
(1993) (“Common law courts have ruled consistently that a variation or change in 
the terms of the underlying loan agreement without the guarantor’s consent … justi-
fies a release of the guarantor from its obligations.”) That said, a bondholder might 
argue that the language could equally be seen as preserving a bondholder’s claim 
against the guarantor to perform the unamended terms of the underlying instru-
ment unless that lender has also agreed to amend the guarantee. 
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on the guarantee at the time of the main restructuring. It is thus a 
statutory expression of the warning that Grenada gave in 2005 to the 
holders of its contingent obligations (see text accompanying foot-
note 13 above). In a debt restructuring, a local law guarantee thus 
provides the sovereign with considerable leverage.18
One of the most startling conclusions of our empirical research has 
been the split between the law chosen to govern underlying debt in-
struments and the governing law of the related sovereign guarantee. 
Figure 3 suggests that until 2010, a signifi cant number of sovereign 
guarantees were governed by local law (the law of the sovereign’s ju-
risdiction), even where the underlying bond was governed by foreign 
law.
Figure 4: Number of Sovereign Guarantees by Law of Guarantee
(Jan 1, 1965 - July 1, 2013)
Th is practice shifted abruptly starting in 2010, probably because the 
Greek crisis highlighted the added risks for the holders of debt in-
struments governed by local law. Post Greece, bondholders were no 
longer as willing to allow their guarantees to be governed by the 
18 At least one attempt to use the local law advantage to strip a sovereign guar-
anteed bond of the guarantee has already begun. See Christopher Spink, Plan to 
Remove Guarantees from Hypo Alpe-Adria’s Bonds Ruﬄ  es Market, INT’L. FINANC-
ING REV., July 4, 2014. 
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sovereign’s own law.19 Th is is, we believe, a particularly vivid example 
of documentation practices in cross-border debt instruments re-
sponding almost immediately to the market’s perception of a new 
-- or in this case, an overlooked – legal risk.
Waiver of immunity. All creditors of sovereigns face the daunting 
challenge of enforcing their claims against a recalcitrant debtor, but 
most benefi t from an express waiver by the sovereign of any entitle-
ment that the sovereign (or its property) may enjoy based on sover-
eign immunity. Figure 5 suggests, however, that such express waivers 
of immunity are far less common in sovereign guarantees than one 
might have thought.
Figure 5: Number of Guaranteed Bonds with Waivers of Sovereign Immunity
(Jan 1, 1965 - July 1, 2013)
Th e absence of an express waiver of immunity does not make it im-
possible to enforce a guarantee against a defaulting sovereign, but 
it will make the enforcement process more diffi  cult. Sovereigns can 
be expected to remind the benefi ciaries of their guarantees of this 
19 Th e Greek Parliament retrofi t a collective action mechanism on its local law debt 
stock in early 2012 in order to facilitate a restructuring of those obligations. See 
Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Christoph Trebesch & Mitu Gulati, Th e Greek Debt Exchange: 
An Autopsy, Duke Law School Working Paper (Sept. 11, 2012 draft), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2144932 
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likely difficulty as a means of encouraging those beneficiaries to join 
a general restructuring.
VII. Conclusion
Our conclusions are -- 
• In a number of important countries, sovereign guarantees have 
become so prevalent that they cannot be ignored in any future 
debt workouts that may be needed for those countries.
• Exactly how the contingent portion of a sovereign’s debt stock is 
to be addressed in such a restructuring remains a mystery. There 
are very few precedents and no good precedents.
• For a while at least (until existing bonds mature and are replaced 
by new issues with more pro-creditor provisions), some sover-
eigns will benefit in a debt restructuring from the prelapsarian 
innocence shown in the contract drafting patterns that prevailed 
before 2010 in areas such as governing law and waiver of im-
munities.
• One thing seems certain: the presence of a significant number 
of contingent liabilities in a sovereign’s debt stock will present 
major complications for the architects of a debt restructuring 
for that country. Not the least of these will be psychological. The 
need to address contingent liabilities will force everyone -- credi-
tors, official sector sponsors and citizens -- to watch with alarm 
as heretofore off balance sheet liabilities come rushing on to the 
sovereign’s balance sheet, just in time to be restructured.
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The Diabolic Loop: Precedents 
and Legacies
Kris James Mitchener 
I. Background
Commentators have used a variety of terms, including the “diabolic 
loop,” the “doom loop,” and the “vicious cycle,” to describe how 
distress in the banking sector and sovereign bond markets fed off 
each other during the recent European crisis, exacerbating macroeco-
nomic problems and fueling political unrest. Strained banks suffer-
ing from “toxic” assets and declining property values placed pressure 
on states to assist them and ward off failure. Sovereigns responded 
with publicly-funded bailouts, which then weakened their fiscal po-
sition at a time when declining aggregate demand and falling tax 
revenues were already straining states’ balance sheets. Debt markets 
reacted by “punishing” sovereigns, selling bonds, driving up risk pre-
miums, and making it difficult for states to obtain rollover funding. 
Financial institutions had been tacitly encouraged to hold sovereign 
bonds since regulatory standards in Europe effectively gave them a 
risk weight of zero. Hence, banks’ balance sheets in turn worsened as 
sovereign bonds were downgraded by rating agencies and/or prices of 
debt fell in the secondary market. These balance sheet effects raised 
further doubts about bank solvency, in turn driving up their rates 
for borrowing as well, and raising the specter of the need for more 
public-sector assistance. 
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Two prominent examples of this vicious cycle are Greece and Ire-
land. Greek banks faced insolvency due to the virtual default of the 
sovereign, whose bonds they were holding. Ireland, which despite a 
relatively low debt-GDP ratio prior to the crisis, experienced a with-
drawal of funding as debt markets become concerned about a pos-
sible government-funded bailout of banks. The prospect of further 
bailouts of banks by sovereigns acted as a lethal embrace between 
“conjoined twins” (in the words of George Soros) that dragged both 
down and has prevented economic activity from restarting in Europe. 
II. Historical Precedent?
A. Frequencies
A better understanding of how common diabolic loops have been 
throughout history as well as what factors have induced them are 
likely to be useful for formulating appropriate policies and institu-
tions aimed at combating future crises, including determining who 
bears the burden of the losses during such crises – foreign creditors, 
domestic creditors, taxpayers, etc. Many of the characteristics of this 
crisis, including funding bonanzas, credit booms, balance-sheet ef-
fects, and implicit and explicit government guarantees are features 
of past crises (Bordo and Eichengreen, 2002; Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2009; Eichengreen and Mitchener, 2002). In this essay, we focus 
on whether vicious cycles between sovereigns and banking systems 
emerged in earlier eras, and what their experience might help us un-
derstand about the recent European crisis.
 
It is no secret that sovereigns and banks have maintained very close 
relationships for a very long time. Banks receive their charters from 
sovereigns, often lend back to them, and sometimes even act as their 
fiscal agents. States monitor bank note issuance closely since they 
have an incentive to control or extract the rents from seigniorage. 
There is also a long history of mutual aid in times of crisis. During 
wars, banks aid sovereigns by absorbing new domestic debt issues. 
In turn, banks often receive emergency funding (e.g., liquidity sup-
port by a central bank) or direct capital infusions from states when 
in need. As a result, balance sheets of sovereigns and banks often 
become comingled.
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 Of course, the support of banks has not prevented sovereigns from 
defaulting; they have repeatedly done so at least since the time of 
Phillip II of Spain. Moreover, large banks (in modern parlance, 
SIFIs) and/or lots of banks have failed regularly throughout history, 
wreaking havoc on both developing and developed economies. It is 
certainly possible, then, that these two crises have worked in con-
junction to worsen recessions of the past. To examine whether there 
is evidence of diabolic loops, a database of crises of different sorts 
(banking crises, sovereign debt crises, stock market crashes, hyperin-
flations, and exchange-rate crises) was assembled for two periods of 
history that most closely resemble the conditions of the recent Eu-
ropean crisis.1 Pressure from external creditors is a feature of the dia-
bolic loop seen in Europe, so examining eras when there were active 
secondary markets for sovereign debt (in order to gauge prices and 
yields in crisis periods) seems like a necessary condition for compari-
son. Moreover, the fact that Eurozone countries were the ones ex-
periencing the diabolic loop suggests that hard pegs likely constrain 
policy choices, and made the diabolic loop particularly pernicious. 
Hence, focusing on eras when hard pegs were widely employed also 
seems like a relevant starting point for comparison. The analysis thus 
focuses on 1870-1913 and 1920-35, periods when (1) large numbers 
of countries issued sovereign bonds and their issues actively traded 
on international capital markets and (2) countries adhered to hard 
pegs (the classical and interwar gold standards). There are other peri-
ods when governments borrowed heavily and defaulted, but in some 
cases lending was done by banks (the Latin American debt crisis of 
the 1980s) or the defaults occurred when banks were of little con-
sequence due to the country’s level of development (the new Latin 
American republics of the early 19th century). Focusing on these 
two periods of high capital mobility will give us a fair assessment of 
conditional probabilities (the likelihood of the dual loop in the event 
1 For comparability, we employ the same crisis definitions as in Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009). For example, banking crises occur when a large numbers of banks face runs 
or significant banks (in terms of size measured in assets) fail. Sovereign defaults oc-
cur when a payment on principal or interest is missed. The database on crisis dates 
and frequencies, however, utilizes additional sources to obtain a complete record for 
our sample period. These include the Annual Reports of the Corporation of Foreign 
Bondholders, the Annual Reports of the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, 
Mitchener and Weidenmier (2008, 2010), and Bordo et. al. (2001). 
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of a crisis), but, of course, may lead to an undercount of the total 
number of episodes.
Crises were fairly common in these two periods of high capital mo-
bility. 52 countries or colonies experienced some sort of macroeco-
nomic crisis (infl ation, exchange-rate, sovereign debt, or banking) 
in the fi rst era, and 59 occurred in the shorter, tumultuous interwar 
period. Table 1 shows that 27 countries defaulted on their sovereign 
debt during the fi rst era of globalization (1870-1913) while 23 did 
so during the interwar period (1920-35). Banking crises were slightly 
more common than external debt crises, with 29 in the classical gold 
standard era and 26 in the 1920s and 1930s. More than 50 percent 
of countries experiencing any sort of crisis during these two eras had 
a banking crisis. 
Table 1. Frequencies of Sovereign Debt and Banking Crises, 
1870-1913 & 1920-35
Th e defi nition of a diabolic loop implies a coincidence in the timing 
of the two types of crises within a country, so how frequently did 
this happen? We fi rst identifi ed windows during which both events 
occurred relatively near to each other. As seen in the recent crisis, 
banking problems can manifest themselves before or after a formal or 
virtual default on debt, so we consider both possibilities. Moreover, 
since crises take time to unfold, we defi ned a coincidence in timing 
liberally to provide a better estimate of an upper bound, and used 
three-year and fi ve-year windows as the periods of overlap. Windows 
much longer than this would begin to call into question whether the 
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two crises are causally connected, although we acknowledge it is a 
possibility. It turns out that using either the three-year or five-year 
windows makes little difference in frequencies. If a country defaulted 
on its sovereign debt, the chances of having a banking crisis three 
to five years after the default was 30 percent during the first era of 
globalization and 35 percent during the interwar period. If a coun-
try first had a banking crisis, then the chance of it defaulting on its 
external debt in the subsequent three to five years was 28 percent for 
the classical gold standard era and 31 percent for the interwar period. 
In both the first era of globalization and during the interwar years, 
there were eight countries that experienced banking crises and sov-
ereign debt crises within three or five years of each other.2 Perhaps it 
is not surprising, but most of these coincidental crises were concen-
trated in periods of widespread distress – the 1870s, the 1890s, and, 
especially, the 1930s. From 1870-1913, 6 percent of countries with 
any kind of crisis had a twin sovereign-banking crisis. From 1920-
35, 16 percent of countries with any kind of crisis experienced a twin 
sovereign-banking crisis. 
B. Doom Loops from Earlier Eras
We used contemporaneous newspapers and annual reports of sover-
eign creditors to gain additional perspective on the 16 historical twin 
crises. The narrative evidence suggests that six of them have features 
that broadly resemble recent diabolic loops.3 Of these six, two oc-
curred in the first historical era, one in Peru and the other in Argen-
tina. In the eyes of international creditors, Peru had a well-diversified 
export base in the 1870s, which made it an attractive recipient of 
new lending. Its guano deposits, sugar, cotton and nitrate produc-
tion allowed it to contract two huge foreign loans in 1870 and 1872 
for the purpose of constructing railroads and improving internal 
2 For the first period, and with the start date located in parentheses, these are: Ar-
gentina (1890), Austria (1868), Brazil (1897), Mexico (1883), Parguay (1890), Peru 
(1872), and Uruguay (1891). For the interwar period, they are:  Austria (1931), Bra-
zil (1929), China (1919), Greece (1931), Mexico (1929), Poland (1931), Romania 
(1931), and Turkey (1931). 
3 The main primary sources consulted were the Economist, and the annual reports 
of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (British organization), and the annual 
reports of the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council (American organization). 
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transportation networks for the movement of goods and people. The 
income obtained from guano exports was directed primarily for the 
payment of interest, but exports of guano began a decline and fis-
cal deficits grew in the early 1870s. Fiscal demands were initially 
met by a growing international demand for Peru’s exports of nitrates, 
but debt- servicing costs continued to grow. Eventually, it made 
a deal with Dreyfus Fréres of Paris, which promised to cover the 
debt service in exchange for the guano monopoly; however, the firm 
warned Peruvian officials in July 1875 that it would not pay interest 
on the debt if guano sales remained depressed.4 
On August 1, 1875, Banco Nacional del Peru, a private institution 
with close ties to the government, became insolvent. To prevent a 
widespread banking panic, the government allowed other banks of 
issue to increase their note issuance if they in turn lent these paper 
notes to the government (primarily to meet internal debt obliga-
tions). Further, the government intended to employ these banks 
as local consignees of nitrate production in its drive to nationalize 
the nitrate industry and then to use the revenues from nationaliza-
tion to pay off external debt claims. The nitrate producers balked at 
the government’s nationalization program, which included land for 
government-bond swaps. Figure 1 shows Peruvian yields began to 
rise in late 1875. Facing insufficient revenues, the country suspended 
its interest payments on its external debt on January 1876. Foreign 
bondholders were informed that due to differences among the guano 
contractors and the Peruvian authorities no further payments would 
be forthcoming. The country did not resume payments on its exter-
nal debt for more than a decade.
 
4 See Marichal (1989, 2014) and Vizcarra (2009). 
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Figure 1: Peruvian Sovereign Bond Yields, 1871-1880 (1870 6% issue)
Argentina’s problems of the 1890s are perhaps more widely known 
than Peru’s earlier diffi  culties. Europeans began fi nancing an Argen-
tine land and construction boom in the 1880s. Th e country bor-
rowed from abroad to fi nance investment projects with long-term 
maturities, such as railways and land improvements. Domestic credit 
expanded rapidly during this decade. An important institutional 
change occurred in 1887 when a banking law authorized commer-
cial banks to issue paper notes (a new government liability) backed 
by gold bonds. Loans were then fl oated in Europe to purchase gold 
bonds. From 1884-1890, the monetary base grew at an annual aver-
age rate of 18 percent (driven by the issuance of paper currency emis-
sions), infl ation averaged 17 percent, and the paper peso depreciated 
at an average rate of 19 percent per year. By 1890, the country’s 
economic fortune depended on export earnings and foreign borrow-
ing to fi nance consumption (60 percent of imports) and debt service 
(40 percent of foreign borrowing). If foreign borrowing ceased, it 
would likely result in a default, a serious contraction in imports, or 
both. 
Signs of trouble became apparent when the government broke its 
legal obligation and paid off  some gold liabilities with the massively 
depreciated domestic currency. Th e investment house of Baring then 
failed to fl oat a 25 million gold peso loan in London, and runs on 
the banks of issue, Banco Nacional and the Banco de la Provincia de 
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Buenos Aires, began in 1890. Panicky depositors feared a “sudden 
stop” in the supply of foreign capital, a situation that would put the 
government and banks (tacitly linked to the government) at risk. 
Banks were making loans to the government in exchange for short- 
and medium-term government bills, but these were not readily trad-
able in the stock market. Banks had put these on their balance sheets, 
in part, because they believed a public bail out would take place if the 
bills became illiquid.5
Fearing widespread panic, the government intervened when the 
fi rst bank runs occurred, and authorized new paper notes to meet 
deposit withdrawals. Since no capital controls were simultaneously 
implemented, these actions were inherently incompatible with long-
term maintenance of an exchange rate pegged to gold. Argentina’s 
fi scal position continued to worsen and its yields on sovereign bonds 
spiked (Figure 2). It then defaulted on its external obligations, and 
the country eventually agreed to a debt-restructuring plan in January 
1891, the provisions of which included the cessation of monetary 
emissions and no lifelines to banks of issue. Banks of issue were al-
lowed to fail, and Argentina departed the gold standard, abandoning 
its commitment to a hard peg.
Figure 2: Argentine Soverreign Bond Yields, 1885-1906 (5% 1884 issue)
5 See della Paolera and Taylor (2001). 
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Four countries experienced crises in the 1930s that also bear a broad 
resemblance to modern diabolic loops: Austria, Greece, Romania, 
and Poland. In Austria, short-term indebtedness was large for a 
country of its size, with much of it taking the form of liquid deposits 
of Viennese banks. By May of 1931, the Credit Anstalt, an impor-
tant Austrian bank holding 55 percent of the assets of the six other 
largest Viennese banks, had realized large losses on its loan portfo-
lio. Its liabilities were greater in size than the Austrian government’s 
budget. Having agreed to absorb a troubled bank in 1929 at the 
government’s behest, it viewed its position as one in which it could 
receive a bail out from the government. Policymakers responded to 
the SIFI’s distress with a plan to recapitalize the bank. In order to 
purchase the shares of the Credit Anstalt and provide support to 
other distressed banks, the central bank increased note circulation by 
25 percent. Moreover, the government eff ectively pledged an unlim-
ited state guarantee to the troubled bank, but this was not enough 
to stop deposit withdrawals. Central bank emissions placed pressure 
on the exchange rate, and policymakers eventually responded by im-
posing capital controls. Yields on Austrian sovereigns rose (Figure 3) 
and Austria suspended its payments on its external debt. With the 
crisis subsiding by 1933, Austria was able to resume payments on its 
long-term obligations.
Figure 3: Austrian Sovereign Bond Yields, 1926-35 (Percent)
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Greece also appears to have experienced a doom loop in the 1930s. 
Due to the legacy of World War I and the Greco-Turkish war, the 
country was running high inflation rates and had accumulated an 
enormous amount of government debt relative to GDP in the early 
1920s. Greek officials wanted to borrow abroad to fund public in-
vestment projects, but the country lacked the macroeconomic cred-
ibility to do so. It thus created a central bank and joined the gold 
standard in 1928 to bolster its image, but like many countries, it 
adopted a peg at its pre-war rate vis-à-vis the UK – a rate that made 
its exports uncompetitive in global markets. These institutions were 
meant to convey price stability and credible policymaking, but un-
like the country’s experience shortly after it entered the Eurozone, 
bond markets appear to have thought otherwise. Greek sovereigns 
still traded at 215 basis points over the UK consol. 
When England abandoned gold in May 1931, Greece did not im-
mediately follow. The government continued to pursue what it called 
a “strong drachma policy” for the rest of that year, maintaining its 
peg to gold. Despite a small budget surplus in 1931, even the left-
wing party was encouraging the government to pursue austerity and 
cut public consumption further. Street protests followed as did bank 
runs. The central bank provided liquidity to cash-starved firms, but 
did so by opening new branches rather than aiding banks direct-
ly.6  Foreign exchange reserves continued to decline (with the liquid-
ity injections encouraging capital flight) and sovereign yields rose 
(Figure 4). Greece appealed to England and the League of Nations 
for debt assistance on it foreign obligations, proposing a five-year 
moratorium on debt service and a new 12.5 million (pound ster-
ling) loan to finance infrastructure projects and enhance growth. 
The League, however rejected this proposal. Greece exited the gold 
standard in April 1932 and defaulted on its external debt.  Foreign 
bondholders eventually accepted a 70% haircut, but Greece’s po-
litical problems persisted for the rest of the decade (four national 
elections and four coup d’etat) further undermining the state’s fiscal 
position. Only when Greece joined the Sterling Area in 1937-38 did 
its rates on sovereign debt begin to decline.
6 See Christodoulakis (2012). 
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Figure 4: Greek Sovereign Bond Yields, 1926-35 (Percent)
Th e failure of the Credit Anstalt in Austria triggered panicky deposi-
tors to pull their funds out of fi nancial institutions in in other parts 
of Europe, not unlike what happened in East Asia during its crisis of 
the late 1990s. Romania was one such country to experience massive 
banking withdrawals and capital fl ight shortly after the collapse of 
the Credit Anstalt. Th e central bank (the National Bank of Roma-
nia) responded by nearly doubling its discounts to distressed banks 
between May and November of 1931. Banknotes in circulation rose 
by 26 percent. Meanwhile, Romania had gone to capital markets to 
borrow for a “development loan,” a new sovereign bond issued in 
France at a rate of 7.5 percent. Much of the borrowing was not used 
for its stated purpose, but instead for covering a budget defi cit, for 
supporting ailing banks, and for maintaining convertibility of the 
currency. It turned out to be an insuffi  cient measure to stop a full-
blown crisis. Th ree major banks defaulted: Banca Generală a Ţ ă rii 
Româ neş ti (in June 1931), Banca Berkovits (in July 1931) and Banca 
Marmorosch Blank (October 1931).7 Th ese failed even in spite of 
direct bail out assistance from the government. By December, the 
gold cover ratio had fallen dangerously close to its legal limit of 35 
percent, and in May 1932, Romania eff ectively ended convertibility 
of its currency by imposing capital controls. Lacking suffi  cient ex-
change, it eventually suspended payments on its external sovereign 
7 See Blejan et. al. (2009). 
176 The Diabolic Loop: Precedents and Legacies
debt in August 1933, and commenced debt negotiations with for-
eign creditors.
Poland is a final case that deserves consideration for inclusion in 
the list of countries experiencing doom loops during the 1930s, al-
though the timing of the default and banking crisis are five years 
apart, putting it at the far end of our window of coincidence. As in 
Romania, banks faced runs subsequent to the failure of the Credit 
Anstalt. In particular, the Warsaw Discount Bank experienced severe 
depositor withdrawals in June 1931. Overall, commercial bank de-
posits fell by more than 30%. Assistance in Poland took a different 
form from central bank support. The Polish government, which had 
begun to nationalize the banking system as early as 1925 (during an 
agricultural crisis), responded to the 1931 runs by taking over more 
banks. By 1934, commercial banks held only 20% of Polish depos-
its and investments. Poland defaulted on its sovereign debt in July 
1936, five years after the banking crisis. A workout was achieved by 
December 1937.
 
III. What about the future?
We set out with the task of gaining a long-term perspective on the 
incidence of doom loops, and identified at least six historical epi-
sodes that broadly resemble the recent crisis. It is more than likely 
the case that we have undercounted the incidence of diabolic loops, 
at least if we consider the modern period as a benchmark, since the 
definition employed excludes cases where default did not occur but 
where bond prices nevertheless spiked. As noted in the introduction, 
such episodes would more closely resemble the modern Irish rather 
than the Greek experience. Deciding on a sensible methodology for 
including historically similar cases to the Irish case is a logical next 
step for extending the analysis presented here. Having offered some 
preliminary evidence on the likelihood of a country experiencing a 
diabolic loop, we close with some thoughts on how the past may 
have differed from recent experience and perhaps made it less prone 
to diabolic loops, acknowledging that these conjectures are specula-
tive and therefore represent avenues for future research.
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First, in contrast to the past, the European diabolic loops occurred 
when the political commitment to maintaining a fixed exchange rate 
transcends a single country experiencing the vicious cycle. European 
policymakers are concerned with potentially large political and eco-
nomic externalities associated with exits from the Eurozone. By con-
trast, when the going got tough in the past, countries simply aban-
doned their pegs. This was especially true for developing countries 
in the 19th century (Mitchener and Weidenmier, 2009) as well as 
for the interwar period (Eichengreen and Sachs, 1985). Briefly con-
sider the Swedish interwar experience to make this point clearer. The 
country faced a banking crisis in 1932 after Skandinaviska Kredita-
ktiebolaget failed, a bank that had close ties to the government. But 
by this point in time, Sweden had already left the gold standard and 
was able to provide liquidity to other banks and limit the domestic 
fall out. This approach was commonplace in earlier eras. By contrast, 
other countries within the Eurozone thought “Grexit” would set a 
dangerous precedent within the Eurozone and that its exit from the 
Euro area was worth avoiding at significant domestic political and 
economic costs to the crisis country. 
A second factor that may influence an economy’s susceptibility to a 
diabolic loop is the likelihood that governments will react by rescu-
ing banks. In the 19th century, banks failed often and governments 
chose not to intervene. Indeed, in many countries, they lacked in-
stitutions (i.e., central banks) that might help banks. By contrast, 
modern central banking encourages emergency lending to banks in 
need of liquidity and explicit guarantees (like deposit insurance) as 
well as implicit guarantees (such as “too big to fail” doctrines) suggest 
markets will even rescue insolvent banks. As we have seen during the 
European debt crisis, markets respond vigorously and quickly, driv-
ing up sovereign bond yields on the expectation that government 
bailouts and explicit/implicit commitments to banking systems will 
take place. To examine whether markets punished sovereigns simi-
larly in the past, we analyzed our sovereign debt series for structural 
breaks around the time at which banking crisis occurred. Bai-Perron 
tests suggest that structural breaks in bond yields came six to 12 
months after banking crises began in Argentina, Peru, and Austria. 
Only in Greece did yields move significantly around the time of the 
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banking crisis – just two months after runs started. This suggests that 
markets may react more strongly today and that the link between 
sovereigns and banks is more diabolical.
The flip side of the sovereign-bank relationship reveals a third pos-
sible way circumstances may have changed. Today, European banks 
are holding significant amounts of sovereign bonds in their portfo-
lios, in part encouraged by the zero-risk weighting they have received 
by regulators. Historical accounts of debt workouts from these earlier 
eras suggest that external debt was held by foreign creditors. Reports 
do not mention domestic banks as a major player in negotiations of 
sovereign debt settlements. As a result, the feedback between sover-
eigns and banks operating through balance sheet effects we have seen 
recently may have operated more weakly in the past, thus reducing 
the incidence or severity of doom loops. 
Finally, it is possible that rollover risk was smaller in the past. Most 
sovereign bonds of the 19th century had long-term maturities, and 
countries aspired to terms similar to the British consol, which was 
issued as a perpetuity. Longer maturities may help countries avoid 
having to dip into financial markets at inopportune times and face 
the shock of higher refunding as Ireland did. It may be the case that 
repeated defaults by sovereigns have, over time, changed creditors’ 
preferences for the maturities of sovereign bond issues.
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A Perspective on Renegotiating 
Sovereign Debt in Unchartered 
Legal Territory1
Tolek Petch 
“In the light of eternity, we have allowed a financial system to develop 
for sovereigns that assumes a more or less perpetual state of benignity 
– in the debtor country, in the region, in the global economic and 
political environment, and even in the natural world. A disturbance 
in any of these areas, if it frightens investors sufficiently, risks inter-
rupting the expectation of refinancing that defines sovereign credit-
worthiness. Many sovereign borrowers would last only a few month, 
some only a few weeks, if shut off from the ability to refinance their 
debts. Denied continued market access, they would burn through 
their reserves with frightening speed. The last step is, for the fortunate 
borrowers, an official sector bailout and for the unfortunate, a debt 
restructuring”.
Lee Buchheit2
1 Tolek Petch, Solicitor, Slaughter and May. All views are personal and do not reflect 
the opinions of Slaughter and May or its partners. 
2 Sovereign Debt in the Light of Eternity in RM Lastra and L Buchheit, Sovereign 
Debt Management, Oxford UP, 2014, ch. 28 para 28.18. 
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Introduction
This paper considers sovereign debt enforcement once a sovereign 
has been forced to restructure its existing body of debt. It is therefore 
concerned with the second of the situations referred to by Lee Buch-
heit, although it should be noted that even in the case of a sovereign 
bailout debt restructuring may be necessary as a condition of IMF 
or other official sector assistance where the borrower’s debt is on a 
non sustainable trajectory. The question of debt sustainability itself is 
outside the scope of this paper and readers are referred to the relevant 
materials published by the IMF and ESM.
The first part of this paper considers the legal nature of sovereign 
debt as well as the differences from other commercial debt. The sec-
ond part analyses the mechanics for restructuring sovereign debt fo-
cussing on the use of a tender offer. The third part considers specific 
strategies that may be adopted for minimising holdout creditors. The 
fourth part looks at strategies holdout creditors have developed to 
resist restructuring focussing on the interpretation of the pari passu 
clause invariably found in foreign law governed bonds. Finally the 
conclusion draws together some potential lessons for the future.
Sovereign Debt and Sovereign Immunity
Looked at purely in terms of drafting, sovereign debt issued under 
foreign law resembles other forms of commercial debt. The full faith 
and credit of the issuer will be pledged for the repayment of the 
debt. There will be provision for the payment of interest and the 
repayment of principal at maturity. Moreover, in the modern era, 
the contract will be legally enforceable, although this was not always 
the case as sovereign immunity would have previously precluded en-
forcement in many cases. 
Today most developed countries have adopted the restrictive theory 
of sovereign immunity under which it is confined to acta jurii imperii. 
English law reached this position in a trilogy of cases in the 1970s 
and 1980s.3 The matter is now regulated by statute. 
3 The Philippine Admiral [1977] A.C. 373; Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of 
Nigeria [1977] Q.B. 529 and Playa Larga (Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board) 
v. I Congreso del Partido (Owners) [1983] 1 A.C. 244. 
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The State Immunity Act 1978 applies to proceedings in respect of 
matters that occurred on or after November 22, 1978. The Act ap-
plies to any foreign or Commonwealth state other than the United 
Kingdom. According to section 2(2) of the State Immunity Act 
1978, “[a] State may submit after the dispute giving rise to the pro-
ceedings has arisen or by a prior written agreement; but a provision 
in any agreement that it is to be governed by the law of the United 
Kingdom is not to be regarded as a submission”. It follows that if the 
bonds contain a waiver of sovereign immunity then the issuer will 
not be immune.
The scope of this was recently considered by the Supreme Court in 
NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina4. Argentina declared a mora-
torium in December 2001 and subsequently restructured most of 
its sovereign debt. However, a portion of the debt was acquired by 
vulture funds which sought to recover the full nominal amount out-
standing together with interest. The bonds were governed by New 
York law and the claimant had obtained a judgment against Argen-
tina in New York which it sought to enforce in England. The relevant 
bonds contained the following submission to jurisdiction:
“To the extent that the republic … shall be entitled, in any juris-
diction … in which any … other court is located in which any 
suit, action or proceeding may at any time be brought solely for 
the purpose of enforcing or executing any related judgment, to 
any immunity from suit, from the jurisdiction of any such court 
… from execution of a judgment or from any other legal or ju-
dicial process or remedy, and to the extent that in any such juris-
diction there shall be attributed such an immunity, the republic 
has hereby irrevocably agreed not to claim and has irrevocably 
waived such immunity to the fullest extent permitted by the 
laws of such jurisdiction … solely for the purpose of enabling 
the fiscal agent or a holder of securities of this series to enforce 
or execute a related judgment”.
The Supreme Court unanimously held that this amounted to a sub-
mission to the jurisdiction of the English courts in order to enforce 
the US judgment.
4 [2011] 2 A.C. 495. 
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Section 3(1) of the State Immunity Act 1978 may also be relevant. 
This section provides:
“A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to (a) 
a commercial transaction entered into by the State; or (b) an 
obligation of the State which by virtue of a contract (whether a 
commercial transaction or not) falls to be performed wholly or 
partly in the United Kingdom”.
Section 3(3) provides that a ‘commercial transaction’ means (a) any 
contract for the supply of goods or services; (b) any loan or other 
transaction for the provision of finance and any guarantee or indem-
nity in respect of any such transaction or of any other financial obli-
gation; and (c) any other transaction or activity (whether of a com-
mercial, industrial, financial, professional or other similar character) 
into which a state enters or in which it engages otherwise than in 
the exercise of sovereign authority. The reference to ‘any loan’ would 
provide an exception to sovereign immunity in respect of bonds is-
sued on the capital markets. However, given that not all states accept 
the restrictive approach to sovereign immunity5 it is customary for 
sovereign bonds to include an express waiver of immunity.
The State Immunity Act 1978 therefore creates two avenues for cred-
itors to enforce sovereign debt: either they may rely on an effective 
waiver of sovereign immunity or may claim that that the debt is a 
commercial transaction. Both lead to the result that the contract will 
be enforceable. What the State Immunity Act 1978 does not do is to 
confer in personam jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign. 
The rules on jurisdiction differ depending on whether Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 44/20016 (the ‘Brussels Regulation’) applies, 
5 We understand that Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland apply the restrictive theory. 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Romania are understood to follow the 
absolute theory, although the Czech Republic, and Romania have signed the UN 
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property which, when 
it enters into force, will apply the restrictive approach. The Convention will enter 
into force once 30 states have ratified it. At the time of writing there are 16 ratifica-
tions and 28 signatories.  
6 [2001] O.J. L12/1 16.1.2001. 
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although for the reasons that follow this is unlikely to matter much 
in practice7. The Brussels Regulation applies to claims in respect of a 
‘civil or commercial matter’. The Lugano Convention applies similar 
rules in respect of EFTA states. The meaning of this concept has been 
explored in a series of judgments by the European Court of Justice8. 
However, there is no prior decision determining whether a claim 
against an EU member state for non-payment under a sovereign 
bond is a ‘civil or commercial matter’. Case law9 has drawn a dis-
tinction between claims arising out of the exercise of public powers 
(which are outside the scope of the Brussels Regulation10) and other 
civil law claims. Borrowing money is a civil or commercial matter, 
and in litigation regarding interest rate swaps it was not disputed 
that the liability of a local authority to make restitution in respect of 
ultra vires derivatives transactions was a civil or commercial matter11. 
However, it may be argued by a sovereign defendant that the charac-
ter of sovereign borrowing should be distinguished from other com-
mercial debts, as it is incurred for public purposes and repayment is 
dependent on refinancing, the proceeds of future taxation or the sale 
of public assets. In our view such an argument should fail as while 
taxation is a governmental act, repaying a loan voluntarily contracted 
does not involve any exercise of public power.
If the Brussels Regulation applies then the following bases of juris-
diction may be available against a sovereign defendant:
7 When it comes to establishing jurisdiction. However, if leave of the court is 
required to serve the defendant out of jurisdiction then the court has discretion 
whether or not to permit service of proceedings: Practice Direction 6B, para. 3.1. In 
deciding whether or not to give leave the court will consider whether England is the 
natural forum: Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp. v. Kuwait Insurance Co. [1984] A.C. 50 
and Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd [1987] A.C. 460. 
8 See e.g. Case 29/76 Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH and Co. KG v. Eurocontrol 
[1976] E.C.R. 1541; Case 814/79 Netherlands State v. Reinhard Rüffer [1980] E.C.R. 
3807; Case C-172/91 Volker Sonntag v. Hans Waidmann, Elisabeth Waidmann and 
Stefan Waidmann [1993] E.C.R. I-1963; Case C-271/00 Gemeente Steenbergen v. 
Luc Baten [2002] E.C.R. I-10489; Case C-433/01 Freistaat Bayern v. Blijdenstein 
[2004] E.C.R. I-981; Case C-265/02 Frahuil S.A. v. Assitalia SpA [2004] E.C.R. 
I-1543.  
9 See n. 8 supra.  
10 See e.g. Case C-292/05 Irini Lechouritou and others v. Dimosio tis Omospondiakis 
Dimokratias tis Germanias [2007] E.C.R. I-1519 (state liability for the actions of 
armed forces in wartime is not a civil or commercial matter).  
11 Case C-346/93 Kleinwort Benson Ltd v. City of Glasgow District Council [1995] 
E.C.R. I-615.  
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(a) Article 23 – if the bonds contain an exclusive or non-exclu-
sive jurisdiction clause in favour of the courts of the United 
Kingdom provided that one of the parties is domiciled in an 
EU member state;
(b) Article 5(1)(a) – if the claim relates to a contract12 and the 
place of performance of the obligation in question (i.e. pay-
ment under the bond) is in the United Kingdom;
(c) Article 5(3) – if the claim is in tort13 and the place where the 
harmful event occurred14 is within the United Kingdom; or
(d) Article 24 – if the sovereign enters an appearance (i.e. does 
not object to proceedings being brought in the United King-
dom).
Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 will be replaced from January 10 2015 
by Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012. The substantive rules will be 
the same except for the elimination of the requirement that a party 
be domiciled in the EU before reliance can be made on an exclusive 
or non-exclusive jurisdiction clause. 
If the Brussels Regulation does not apply, then leave of the court 
would be required to serve the defendant state outside the jurisdic-
tion. This is now governed by Part 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules 
together with Practice Direction 6B. The grounds on which a court 
12 An autonomous meaning applies: Case 34/82 Martin Peters Bauunternehmung 
GmbH v. Zuid Nederlandse AV [1983] E.C.R. 987; Case 9/87 SPRL Arcado v. Havi-
land S.A. [1988] E.C.R. 1539; Case C-26/91 Jakob Handte & Co. GmbH v. Traite-
ments Mécano-chimiques de Surfaces S.A. [1992] E.C.R. I-3967.  
13 Again, an autonomous meaning applies: Case 189/87 Athanasios Kalfelis v. 
Bankhaus Schröder, Münchmeyer, Hengst & Co. [1988] E.C.R. 5565; Case C-364/93 
Antonio Marinari v. Lloyds Bank plc and Zubaidi Trading Company [1995] E.C.R. 
I-2719; Case C-167/00 Verein für Konsumenteninformation v. Karl Heinz Henkel 
[2002] E.C.R. I-8111. 
14 Case law holds that the expression is to be understood as permitting a claimant to 
choose to sue in the courts of the place where the damage occurred or in the courts 
of the place of the event giving rise to that damage: Case 21/76 Handelskwekerij GJ 
Bier B.V. v. Mines de Potasse d’Alsace S.A. [1976] E.C.R. 1735.  
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may permit service out of the jurisdiction are essentially the same as 
those referred to in connection with the Brussels Regulation15.
It follows that establishing jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign that 
has submitted to the jurisdiction will be relatively easy. However, this 
is where the problems facing creditors start. It is one thing to obtain 
a judgment. It is another thing to get paid, and even if the judgment 
is enforceable in other jurisdictions (as the judgment obtained by 
NML was held to be enforceable in the United Kingdom) that will 
not assist unless there are realizable assets that the judgment can be 
enforced against.
If enforcement proceedings are brought in England, the State Im-
munity Act 1978 places limitations on the assets that can be subject 
to those proceedings16. Subject to the exceptions below:
(a) relief shall not be given against a state by way of injunction 
or order for specific performance or for the recovery of land 
or other property; and
(b) the property of a state shall not be subject to any process for 
the enforcement of a judgment or arbitration award or, in an 
action in rem17, for its arrest, detention or sale18.
However, section 13(2) of the State Immunity Act 1978 does not 
prevent the giving of any relief or the issue of any process with the 
written consent of the state concerned; and any such consent (which 
may be contained in a prior agreement) may be expressed so as to 
15 Section 12 State Immunity Act 1978 contains special rules on the service of 
process which must be transmitted through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
to the ministry of foreign affairs of the state concerned. However, this requirement 
“shall not be construed as affecting any rules of court whereby leave is required for the 
service of process outside the jurisdiction”: section 12(7).  
16 In Case C-292/05 Irini Lechouritou and others v. Dimosio tis Omospondiakis Di-
mokratias tis Germanias [2007] E.C.R. I-1519, 1539, Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer AG 
considered that “the issue of State immunity from legal proceedings must be settled 
before considering the Brussels Convention since, if proceedings cannot be brought, 
the determination of which court can hear the action is immaterial”. The Court did 
not rule on this point.  
17 E.g. over a ship. 
18 Section 13(2) State Immunity Act 1978.  
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apply to a limited extent or generally. Written consent will usually be 
given in the terms and conditions of the bonds.
Section 13(4) of the State Immunity Act 1978 does not prevent the 
issue of any process in respect of property which is in use or intended 
for use for commercial purposes. Commercial purposes are defined 
in section 3(3) as meaning: …
(b) any loan or other transaction for the provision of finance and 
any guarantee or indemnity in respect of any such transaction 
or of any other financial obligation; and
(c) any other transaction or activity (whether of a commercial, 
industrial, financial, professional or other similar character) 
into which a State enters or in which it engages otherwise 
than in the exercise of sovereign authority.
The question of when a debt was property in use for commercial 
purposes was the subject of the decision of the Supreme Court in 
SerVaas Incorporated v. Rafidain Bank19. Following a debt cancella-
tion agreement under the auspices of the Paris Club (as to which 
see below), Iraq proceeded to negotiate the restructuring of its com-
mercial creditors as well as the creditors of specified Iraqi entities 
including the defendant bank. In 2005 Iraq issued an invitation to 
creditors to tender claims for cash. Afterwards, Iraq took assignments 
of certain debts owed to the defendant’s creditors. Rafidain bank was 
placed into liquidation in the United Kingdom and subsequently 
the court sanctioned a scheme of arrangement to distribute its assets 
to its creditors including Iraq. SerVaas, which was a creditor of Iraq, 
sought to attach Iraq’s right to receive a distribution from Rafidain 
under the scheme of arrangement. It argued that as Rafidain was a 
commercial bank its assets arose from commercial transactions and 
were therefore liable to attachment under section 13(4) of the State 
Immunity Act 1978. The UK Supreme Court disagreed. The expres-
sion “in use for commercial purposes” should be given its ordinary 
and natural meaning having regard to its context. It would not be an 
ordinary use of language to say that a debt arising from a transaction 
is ‘in use’ for that transaction. The UK Parliament did not intend 
19 [2013] 1 A.C.595 
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a retrospective analysis of all the circumstances which gave rise to 
property, but an assessment of the use to which the state had chosen 
to put the property20. It was not sufficient that the property related to 
or was connected with a commercial transaction21. SerVaas had failed 
to show that Iraq’s claims against Rafidain were property in use for a 
commercial purpose. 
The practical problem with the exceptions to state immunity is that 
sovereigns do not as a general rule accumulate assets abroad. This ap-
plies a fortiori in the case of sovereigns that are contemplating default 
or have a history of prior defaults. It follows that a creditor may have 
a perfectly valid claim and right of enforcement but no assets against 
which to levy judgment. It may be objected that the state is likely to 
have other assets, such as the assets of the central bank or of publicly 
owned companies. However, such entities are treated as separate legal 
entities and are not liable for the obligations of the state (as opposed 
to for their own obligations). Indeed Section 14(4) provides that the 
property of a state’s central bank or monetary authority shall not be 
regarded as in use for commercial purposes and where such a bank is 
a separate legal entity from the state (which will usually be the case) 
the central bank will be immune from enforcement. A state may also 
seek to place its reserves beyond the reach of its creditors as Argen-
tina did through depositing assets with the Bank for International 
Settlements in Switzerland22.
Differences between Sovereign Insolvency and Corporate 
Insolvency23 
Sovereign immunity is not the only difference between sovereigns 
and corporates when it comes to insolvency. All modern countries 
have well developed regimes specifying the procedures that are fol-
lowed when a company gets into financial difficulties. Generally, the 
trend is to favour the survival of (part of ) the undertaking as a going 
20 Ibid., 607 para. 16.  
21 Ibid., 607 para. 17.  
22 See D Devos Special Immunities: Bank for International Settlements in RM Lastra 
and L Buchheit Sovereign Debt Management, Oxford UP, 2014, ch. 10. 
23 PR Wood, Corporate Bankruptcy Law and State Insolvencies in RM Lastra and 
L Buchheit, Sovereign Debt Management, Oxford UP, ch. 24. 
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concern where this is possible. In other cases, the assets of the insol-
vent company will be realized and distributed to the creditors of the 
company in accordance with their entitlements. Generally there will 
be some procedure for the involvement of creditors such as creditors’ 
committees. 
In England the main insolvency proceedings are administration and 
liquidation. The objective of administration is to ensure the survival 
of the undertaking as a going concern where possible and where not 
a more advantageous realization of the assets than would be pos-
sible in a winding up. A liquidation results in the dissolution of the 
company after its assets have been got in and distributed to creditors. 
Both procedures take place under the supervision of the court which 
has the power to give directions and to remove an administrator or 
liquidator for cause. Detailed statutory provisions exist to adjust pri-
or transactions that are detrimental to creditors (preferences, trans-
actions at an undervalue, transactions in fraud of creditors, etc.). As 
an alternative to administration or liquidation the creditors of an in-
solvent company may also agree a creditors’ voluntary arrangement. 
This is in essence a statutorily enforced contract and will depend on 
the terms that can be agreed between the company and its creditors. 
Generally, the objective will be to ensure the survival of the company 
in the interests of the creditors and members, although the interests 
of the former will predominate. 
The contrast with sovereign default could not be clearer. There is no 
legal framework for sovereign insolvency and no bankruptcy court 
with jurisdiction over sovereigns. The proposal made by the IMF for 
a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (“SDRM”) came to noth-
ing for a variety of reasons including opposition from the United 
States (which has a blocking vote on amendments to the IMF’s Ar-
ticles of Agreement), concerns of a potential conflict of interest in 
locating the SDRM within the IMF and a fear on the part of certain 
sovereigns that the SDRM would drive up borrowing costs. Sover-
eigns that default are required to negotiate with their creditors with a 
view to agreeing a mutually acceptable outcome. The history of sov-
ereign defaults has demonstrated the difficulty of reconciling creditor 
and debtor interests in the absence of a neutral arbiter. Moreover, 
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since the end of gunboat diplomacy there has been no coercive way 
of enforcing claims for repayment as a state cannot be dismantled 
and its population divided up amongst creditors. 
Unlike corporate insolvency there is no also moratorium on the pay-
ment of interest or principal or a cut-off date for the payment of 
interest. Instead, the debt can (subject to questions of limitation) 
continue to compound interest onto principal for years or decades 
resulting in the ultimate amount owing constituting a multiple of 
the original amount originally owed24. In a corporate context the 
making of the winding-up order generally constitutes a cut-off point 
with post-winding-up interest payable only to the extent that there 
are available funds after all creditors have been paid.
Once a state defaults there is no control over the state’s financing ab-
sent conditionality under an IMF or other international bail-out. In 
effect, the state is free (subject to questions of pari passu considered 
below) to decide which payments to prioritize and which to leave 
outstanding. States that default on their external debt may remain 
current on their internal debt, and are likely to continue to meet 
their obligations to international financial institutions where their 
support is being sought as part of an international bail-out. 
Although creditors may seek to organize themselves there is no 
equivalent to the mechanism for creditors’ committees under corpo-
rate insolvency law. This exacerbates collective action problems, par-
ticularly where the creditors are widely dispersed. This is most likely 
to be a problem with bonds as bondholders often have great practi-
cal difficulties identifying one and another organising a response to 
the default. In the case of loans it is less difficult as committees of 
lead lenders may be formed – such as the London Club, considered 
further below – to negotiate with the sovereign. Where the sovereign 
seeks official debt forgiveness from developed countries there is an 
existing forum through the Paris Club to facilitate negotiations. 
Assuming the negotiations succeed, there will be no formal discharge 
of the debtor. Unless the terms of the bonds include collective ac-
tion clauses (CACs – which are considered below) there are in fact 
24 Donegal International Limited v. Republic of Zambia [2007] EWHC 197 
(Comm). 
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no means of imposing a settlement no matter how beneficial to the 
general body of creditors or the size of the majority accepting the 
restructuring. Instead, dissenting creditors will be able to hold out 
(‘holdouts’) and seek repayment in full. This creates obvious collec-
tive action problems where a negotiated settlement is in the objective 
interests of all the parties but where certain creditors may opportu-
nistically hold out for payment in full at the expense of those credi-
tors agreeing to negotiate a haircut.
Sovereign Debt Restructuring in a Legal Void
Given the above difficulties it may be wondered how sovereigns are 
able to restructure their debt. Yet sovereigns are and in recent years 
many sovereigns have been able to negotiate significant reductions in 
the net present value of their obligations culminating in the February 
2012 Greek default under which Greece was able to secure a 74.5% 
reduction in the net present value of its private debt. 
Sovereigns are able to restructure their debt in a legal vacuum be-
cause they usually have significant leverage over creditors. We have 
seen how, under the modern approach to sovereign immunity, credi-
tors can relatively easily obtain money judgments against defaulting 
sovereigns. However, unless there are assets readily available outside 
of the jurisdiction of the sovereign, such money judgments will pro-
vide scant comfort for creditors seeking repayment. Creditors are in 
practice generally forced to negotiate if they wish to recover some of 
the value of their investment. In certain cases this has been abused 
by sovereigns to become serial debtors. For example, Argentina and 
Greece have been in default for nearly half of their modern history. 
In such cases the only effective sanction might be for bond market 
investors to refuse to lend further sums. Argentina has been frozen 
out of international lending markets since defaulting in December 
2001. However, Greece was able within two and a half years of the 
largest sovereign default in history to sell new 5 year bonds at a yield 
of 4.95%. 
How is sovereign debt restructured? This depends on the nature of 
the debt. Official loans owed to developed countries have historically 
193Tolek Petch
been restructured through the Paris Club. The Paris Club is an infor-
mal group of official creditors whose role is to find solutions to pay-
ment difficulties experienced by debtor countries, usually through 
debt rescheduling or cancellation25. The Paris Club operates on the 
basis of five key principles:
(a) decisions are made on a case-by-case basis having regard to 
the debtor country’s individual situation;
(b) decisions are reached by consensus among the participating 
creditor countries;
(c) debt restructurings will only be agreed with countries that 
need debt relief, have implemented and are committed to im-
plementing reforms to restore their economic and financial 
situations and have a demonstrated track record of imple-
menting reforms under an IMF programme;
(d) members of the Paris Club agree to act as a group in their 
dealings with a given debtor; and
(e) a debtor country that reaches an agreement with Paris Club 
creditors should not accept less favourable terms than those 
agreed with the Paris Club from non-Paris Club creditors. 
In many cases this has taken the form of the Bank Advisory 
Committee (the London Club) process26. 
Loans have historically been restructured through a lead committee 
of lenders negotiating the terms of new lending. The London Club 
is an informal group of commercial banks that join together to ne-
gotiate their claims against a sovereign debtor. The debtor initiates a 
process in which a London Club “Advisory Committee” is formed. 
The Committee is chaired by a leading financial firm and includes 
representatives from other exposed firms. Upon signing of a restruc-
turing agreement, the Committee is dissolved.
25 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland 
the United Kingdom and the United States are permanent members of the Paris 
Club. , 
26 L Rieffel, The Bank Advisory Committee (London Club) Process in Restructuring 
Sovereign Debt: The Case for Ad Hoc Machinery, Brookings Institution Press, 2003. 
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As has been mentioned, the process of restructuring of bonds is dif-
ferent as these tend to be widely dispersed making organised ne-
gotiations of the form carried out by the Paris and London Clubs 
impractical. The procedure therefore takes the form of a tender offer 
under which holders are invited to tender their bonds for new bonds. 
In order to provide debt relief the terms of the new bonds will inevi-
tably be less advantageous than the original bonds. Possible changes 
include longer maturities, lower interest rates, the postponement of 
payment of interest, a lower principal amount, etc. The intention is 
to reprofile the debt so as to be sustainable while ensuring the pres-
ervation of some value for the original bondholders.
In principle the exchange will benefit both parties. The state will 
face a debt burden that it is capable of sustaining, while holders will 
receive payments that the state is able to make. Whether this is in 
fact the case depends on the terms of the exchange, and given the 
asymmetries in information between states and bondholders, as well 
as the collective action problems the latter face in organising them-
selves into a group capable of negotiating with the state, achieving 
a fair balance may in some cases be elusive. The one strength that 
bondholders have (absent CACs) is that they can always refuse to 
participate in the debt exchange and hold out for payment on the 
original terms. This poses problems for the sovereign as well as for 
bondholders tempted to accept the tender as they risk taking a hair-
cut while holdouts refuse to do so and seek by litigation to enforce 
their original contractual rights. We return to this strategy later in 
this paper.
The previous paragraph raises a threshold question. Why would 
bondholders ever agree to a tender offer? After all they have a legally 
enforceable contract. Part of the answer is that faced with a sovereign 
prepared to default they have few good options. It is therefore always 
possible to frighten bondholders by actually defaulting or threaten-
ing to do so. In the former case the default will usually be a precursor 
to a subsequent tender offer. An example may be provided by the 
Argentine default in 2001. In 2005 Argentina announced a ‘take it 
or leave it offer’ of a 70% haircut on Argentina’s existing obligations. 
At the same time Argentina announced that it would pass legislation 
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(the ‘Lock law’) precluding the state from reopening the tender offer. 
The risk factors in the offering document stated27:
“Eligible Securities that are not tendered may remain in default 
indefinitely. Eligible Securities not exchanged pursuant to the 
offer will remain outstanding. Argentina has announced that it 
has no intention of resuming payments on any Eligible Secu-
rities that remain outstanding following the expiration of the 
Offer. Consequently, if you elect not to tender your Eligible Se-
curities pursuant to the Offer there can be no assurance that 
you will receive any future payments in respect of your Eligible 
Securities”.
Threats are not the only means of persuading bondholders to tender 
their bonds. Lee Buchheit28 has identified a number of “carrots” that 
can be used to make the terms of the tender offer more attractive to 
bondholders. These include:
(a) offering a menu of restructuring options catering to the pref-
erences of individual classes of creditors. This was used exten-
sively in the Brady restructurings29.
(b) structural documentation improvements30. For example, fol-
lowing the Greek default, bonds issued under local law were 
substituted by new bonds issued under English law to prevent 
the Greek legislature from being able to modify the terms of 
the new bonds in the future. The new Greek bonds were also 
linked to a co-financing agreement with the EFSF meaning 
that any default under the new bonds would be accompa-
nied by a default to the EFSF – something, it was taken, that 
Greece would be keen to avoid. 
27 Cited by L Buchheit, Minimizing Holdout Creditors: Sticks in RM Lastra and L 
Buchheit, Sovereign Debt Management, Oxford UP, 2014, ch 2, para 2.12. 
28 L Buchheit, Minimizing Holdout Creditors: Carrots in RM Lastra and L Buchheit, 
Sovereign Debt Management, Oxford UP, 2014, ch 1. 
29 Ibid. para 1.14. 
30 Ibid. para 1.15. 
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(c) Loss reinstatement features31. This is a technique used by sov-
ereigns where there is a fear that one debt restructuring may 
be succeeded by another. Essentially, creditors are promised 
that should there be a second restructuring the amount of the 
creditors’ claim will balloon back up to more or less the status 
quo.
(d) Value recovery rights32. The intention is to provide the cred-
itor with a stake in the recovery of the borrower and was 
used by countries issuing Brady bonds. In the case of Greece, 
bondholders were offered GDP warrants that would be trig-
gered if the Greek economy recovered faster than expected.
Minimizing Holdouts
It has been seen that an option commonly open to bondholders who 
do not like the terms on offer is to refuse to tender their bonds and to 
‘hold out’ from the debt restructuring. While it can be a perfectly le-
gitimate commercial strategy, holdouts tend to stir strong emotions. 
Often they will have bought distressed debt in the secondary market 
and will be seeking to recover payment in full while the majority of 
creditors take a haircut. Understandably, techniques have been devel-
oped to attempt to deter holdout activity. We have already seen one 
such method: threaten not to pay them. However, this carries with 
it its own set of problems, particularly if the number of holdouts is 
small, as a refusal to pay will trigger litigation and may frustrate the 
ability of the borrower to access the capital markets in the future. 
Argentina has still been unable to restore market access since its 2001 
default and defaulted again in August 2014 following its refusal to 
satisfy a judgment debt in favour of holdout creditors. Two estab-
lished techniques are exit consents and collective action clauses. 
Exit Consents
Basically, an exit consent is a method that seeks to take advantage of 
standard amendment language in bond issues to encourage bond-
31 Ibid. paras 1.23- 1.24. 
32 Ibid. para 1.28. 
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holders to agree to an exchange offer by modifying the terms of the 
bonds by making them less advantageous to holdouts33. Sovereign 
bonds governed by English law will usually permit all provisions of 
the bonds to be modified by a specified majority (e.g. two thirds or 
three quarters). In the United States bonds will typically prohibit an 
amendment that reduces the amount of the principal or interest, but 
will permit other amendments. Once a sovereign has agreed a debt 
restructuring or forgiveness with a sufficient majority of its creditors 
it can propose to bondholders an amendment to the terms of the 
bonds that will reduce the value of the bonds to holders that refuse 
to participate in an exchange offer for new sovereign bonds reflecting 
the terms of the negotiated workout. The technique works owing to 
the inability of holdouts to organise themselves as well as the risk of 
being “frozen out” if they are left holding bonds that are worth less 
than the restructured bonds. 
Case law in the United States has generally upheld the validity 
of exit consents provided that there is no fraud on the minority 
bondholders34. Holders that tender their bonds commit irrevocably 
to voting at the bondholders’ meeting to support the amendments to 
the terms of the bonds. For example, in Greylock Master Opportunity 
Master Fund Ltd. v. Province of Mendoza35 the amendment involved 
the abrogation of the Province of Mendoza’s waiver of sovereign im-
munity which made it impossible in practice for holdouts to pursue 
the province under the original bonds.
The validity of exit consents under English law has recently been 
tested in a non-sovereign context in Assénagon Asset Management S.A. 
v. Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Ltd.36. The case arose out of the 
collapse of Anglo-Irish Bank. Anglo-Irish had issued subordinated 
floating rate notes which contained provisions enabling modifica-
33 LC Buchheit and GM Gulati, Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges (2000) 
48 UCLA Law Review 59.  
34 Katz v. Oak Industries Inc. (1986) 508 A.2d 873; Greylock Master Opportunity 
Master Fund Ltd. v. Province of Mendoza (2005) No. 04 Civ. 7643 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8 
2005); cf. Strategic Income Fund v. Mechala Group Jamaica Ltd. No. 99 Civ. 10517 
HB, 1999 WL 993648, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 6 90,707 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 
1999). 
35 (2005) No. 04 Civ. 7643 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8 2005). 
36 [2012] EWHC 2090 (Ch) [2013] All E.R. 495.  
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tion of the terms of the notes or the sanctioning of any compromise 
or arrangement between the issuer and noteholders if approved by 
a 75% majority. In January 2009 Anglo-Irish was nationalised and 
received substantial financial support from the Irish state as it was 
deemed to be systemically important. In 2010 the Irish government 
decided to proceed with a reorganization of Anglo-Irish that would 
involve losses to the subordinated creditors of the bank. This would 
be achieved through a voluntary restructuring of the debt completed, 
if necessary, by legislation that would be capable of enforcement in 
England under the Credit Institutions Winding-up Directive37.
In October 2010 Anglo-Irish announced an exchange offer which 
would replace the subordinated notes with new senior notes at an ex-
change ratio of 0.2 (i.e. holders would receive new senior notes with 
a principal amount of 20% of the notes tendered). The terms of the 
existing notes would be amended to reduce their value to €0.01 per 
€1000. The issuer would then be entitled to redeem the existing old 
notes. The 20% exchange ratio broadly reflected the price at which 
the subordinated notes were trading in the secondary market. The 
amendment enabling Anglo-Irish to redeem notes held by holdouts 
at 0.001% of their face value was deliberately expropriatory. Over 
92% of the holders accepted the exchange offer, following which the 
bank purported to exercise its right to redeem the outstanding notes.
Briggs J. held that the provision of the trust deed enabling “Reduc-
tion or cancellation of the principal payable on the Notes … or the 
minimum rate of interest payable thereon” was sufficiently broad to 
permit a majority to bind the minority to a cancellation of both the 
principal and interest payable under the notes38. However, he held 
that the notes offered and accepted for exchange were as a result 
held for the benefit of the bank. As the contract was liable to be 
specifically enforced on well settled principles, the bank held a ben-
eficial interest in the notes39. The votes of all noteholders that had 
37 Directive (EC) 2001/24 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 
April 2001 on the Reorganisation and Winding-up of Credit Institutions [2001] 
O.J. L 125/15 5.5.2001 implemented in the United Kingdom through The Credit 
Institutions (Reorganisation and Winding up) Regulations 2004 SI 2004/1045.  
38 Assénagon Asset Management S.A. v Irish Bank Resolution Corpn Ltd (formerly 
Anglo Irish Bank Corpn Ltd) [2013] Bus L.R. 266 paras. 54-55.  
39 Ibid., paras. 64-65. 
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tendered their notes therefore fell to be disregarded in accordance 
with a provision of the trust deed stipulating that “Neither the Issuer 
nor any Subsidiary shall be entitled to vote at any meeting in respect 
of Notes beneficially held by it or for its account”. The purpose of 
the prohibition was aimed at avoiding the voting of notes in the 
bank’s own interest rather than in the interests of the noteholders as 
a class. The bank’s beneficial interest in the notes, in the judge’s view, 
fell squarely within the contemplation of the prohibition40 with the 
result that the modifications did not bind the holdouts.
This was sufficient to determine the case in favour of the holdouts. 
However, Briggs J. additionally held that the exit consent was unlaw-
ful constituting an abuse of power. The judge considered that the 
correct question was whether it was lawful for the majority to lend its 
aid to the coercion of a minority by voting for a resolution which ex-
propriates the minority’s rights under the notes, which he answered 
in the negative. Briggs J. accepted that the bank did not positively 
wish to obtain the securities by coercion, and would have preferred 
for the holdouts to have accepted the exchange offer. However “[t]he 
exit consent is, quite simply, a coercive threat which the issuer invites 
the majority to levy against the minority, nothing more or less. Its 
only function is the intimidation of a potential minority, based upon 
the fear of any individual member of the class that, by rejecting the 
exchange and voting against the resolution, he (or it) will be left out 
in the cold”41. It followed that the exit consent involved a form of 
coercion entirely at variance with the purposes for which majorities 
are given power to bind minorities42.
Would the result have been different had the exit consent not ex-
propriated the rights of the holders? United States case law suggests 
that there are many changes that can be made to sovereign bonds 
without triggering public policy concerns, such as removing a waiver 
of sovereign immunity. However, the approach of Briggs J. focusing 
on the exit consent as a means by which a majority may not impose 
more adverse terms on the minority, raises doubts as to whether this 
would be held to be the case in England.
40 Ibid., para. 68  
41 Ibid., para. 84.  
42 Ibid., para. 85. 
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Collective Action Clauses
The second technique developed to minimize holdout activity is the 
CAC. In essence a CAC is a legal technique under which a super-
majority of creditors can bind all creditors in respect of modifica-
tions to the terms of bonds. Collective action clauses can take many 
forms and were developed by the market as a response to the failure 
of the IMF-led SDRM initiative in the 2000s. The intention is to ad-
dress the problem of holdouts provided that sufficient creditors can 
be persuaded to accept an exchange offer. CACs have been common 
in corporate debt since the late nineteenth century, but only became 
a feature of sovereign bonds from the 2000s (which resulted in a 
common understanding that foreign jurisdiction EU bonds would 
contain CACs). In 2002 the G10 countries formed a working group 
to elaborate a set of model CACs for use in bond documentation. 
Parallel work was undertaken by trade associations. Different ap-
proaches have been adopted between the US and Europe with the 
US requiring a specified majority of the aggregate principal of all 
bonds while European jurisdictions have tended to set the threshold 
by reference to the outstanding amount of bonds held by those pres-
ent at a bondholders’ meeting.
CACs generally distinguish between certain “reserved” matters where 
a higher threshold is required to approve changes and other matters. 
In 2011 the Eurozone agreed that uniform collective action clauses 
would be included in sovereign debt from January 1, 2013. These 
require, for reserved matters, either 75% of the principal amount 
of the outstanding bonds for resolutions passed at a bondholders’ 
meeting or 66 2/3% for a written resolution of bondholders. For 
non-reserved matters a simple majority is required.
A problem with most CACs is that they operate only on an issue-
specific basis. This means that the CACs will only be triggered if the 
requisite super-majority is realised on any series of bonds. For any 
series of bonds where the super-majority is not reached the CACs 
will not bite and the issuer will be left with the alternative of either 
defaulting on that series of bonds (which is not an attractive option) 
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or continuing to pay in full the amount outstanding. This creates op-
portunities for investors to buy up blocking majorities in particular 
series of bonds in the expectation that if the restructuring is overall 
a success the issuer will continue to make payments in full on those 
issues where the CACs were not triggered. 
One solution to this problem is aggregation. Where the CACs in-
clude an aggregation feature then it may be possible to trigger the 
CACs on particular series of bonds even though the requisite major-
ity has not been reached. This is the case with the Eurozone CACs 
which provide for 75% at a meeting or 66 2/3% for a written resolu-
tion to trigger the CACs on an aggregate basis. However, in this case 
the trigger for individual series of bonds is lowered to 66 2/3 % (if a 
meeting is held) or 50% in the case of a written resolution. It should 
be noted that while this makes it easier to trigger CACs it does not 
prevent the purchase of a blocking majority, although it may make 
it more expensive.
A more radical approach was taken by Greece when it restructured 
its debt in 2012. As most of this debt had been issued under Greek 
law it was possible by legislation to amend the terms of the debt to 
retro-fit aggregative CACs to all Greek law governed debt. Basically, 
the terms of Greek law governed bonds (representing about 90% of 
the total debt eligible for exchange) were retrospectively amended 
to introduce CACs. Under the CACs, provided that holders of at 
least 50% of the principal tendered their bonds in the exchange, 
and two-thirds of those participating voted in favour, the debt ex-
change would become binding on all bondholders. No distinction 
was drawn in the operation of the CACs between individual series of 
bonds. To encourage acceptance of the offer, Greece made it clear in 
the tender offer memorandum that if the exchange failed there was 
a significant risk of default. In the event investors holding 85.8% 
of Greek law bonds eligible for exchange agreed to the tender offer. 
Greece then announced that it would activate the CACs, resulting in 
a 95.7% participation rate.
However, this was not a panacea as shown by the fate of the for-
eign law governed bonds. These already included CACs, but without 
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an aggregation feature. Holdouts were scattered across 25 sovereign 
or sovereign guaranteed bonds, of which 24 were foreign law titles: 
seven bonds for which no amendment was attempted, one inquorate 
bond, and 16 bonds for which the amendment was rejected by the 
bondholders43. So far, Greece has continued to pay holdout creditors. 
Holdouts and the Pari Passu Clause
The most fruitful approach for holdouts in respect years has been 
based not on purchasing blocking stakes in bonds subject to CACs, 
but in litigation in the United States based on the pari passu clause 
that is invariably included in all foreign law sovereign debt instru-
ments. This obscure provision has recently come to life in a much 
awaited – and criticized – judgment of the US Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit concerning Argentine sovereign bonds. Argen-
tina’s refusal to satisfy United States judgments obtained by holdouts 
has resulted in the latest twist in the litigation in which they have 
sought injunctive and other relief against both Argentina and finan-
cial intermediaries involved in processing payments on the 2005 and 
2010 excahnge bonds by seeking to prevent Argentina from paying 
on the restructured bonds unless it also paid in full the holdouts. 
This litigation has potentially significant consequences for eurozone 
member states that seek to restructure their debts in the future if a 
similar approach were taken. 
It must be recognised that there are different formulations of the pari 
passu clause. Originally, the clause referred to the ranking of sover-
eign debt. However, starting in the 1980s and 1990s the clause was 
expanded to confer a promise to maintain the ranking of sovereign 
bonds44. The clause at issue in NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina45 
did both:
“The Securities will constitute (except as provided in Section 11 
43 J Zettlemeyer, C Trebesch and M Gulati, The Greek Debt Exchange: an Autopsy 
p. 9. 
44 M Weidemaier, Sovereign Debt After NML v. Argentina, 8 Capital Markets Law 
Journal 123; M Weidemaier, R Scott and GM Gulati, Origin Myths, Contracts, and 
the Hunt for Pari Passu, UNC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1633439, March 
2011, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1633439. 
45 (2012) 699 F.3d 246; 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 22281.  
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below) direct, unconditional, unsecured and unsubordinated 
obligations of the Republic and shall at all times rank pari passu 
and without any preference among themselves. The payment ob-
ligations of the Republic under the Securities shall at all times 
rank at least equally with all its other present and future unse-
cured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness (as defined in 
this Agreement)”.
Other versions of the pari passu clause include a promise that the 
bonds “will rank at least pari passu in priority of payment”. Clearly, 
the interpretation of the clause will depend on its drafting and it 
cannot be assumed that all versions of the clause will have the same 
legal effect.
The question before the United States District Court and, on appeal, 
the Court of Appeals was what the second sentence meant. Accord-
ing to Argentina, the clause was intended to provide protection from 
legal subordination or other discriminatory legal ranking by prevent-
ing the creation of legal priorities by the sovereign in favour of credi-
tors holding particular classes of debt46. On this view, Argentina had 
done nothing to affect the legal ranking of the defaulted bonds which 
was unaffected by its statutory moratorium on payment. The bond-
holders argued that Argentina had ‘de facto’ subordinated the bonds 
by reducing the ranking of the bonds to permanent non-performing 
status by passing legislation barring payments on them while con-
tinuing to pay on the restructured debt and repeatedly asserting that 
it had no intention of making payments on the bonds47. 
The Court of Appeals held that the second sentence of the clause 
manifested an intention to protect bondholders from more than 
just formal subordination. The latter “prohibits Argentina, as bond 
payor, from paying on other bonds without paying on the [default-
ed] Bonds. Thus, the two sentences of the pari passu clause protect 
against different forms of discrimination: the issuance of other supe-
rior debt (first sentence) and the giving of priority to other payment 
obligations (second sentence)”48. Such a conclusion had previously 
46 Ibid., 258. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., 259. 
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been reached by the Brussels Court of Appeals in the Elliot case. This 
decision had attracted significant academic criticism.
The court in NML justified this interpretation by reference to the 
differences between sovereign debt and corporate debt:
“When sovereigns default they do not enter bankruptcy pro-
ceedings where the legal rank of debt determines the order in 
which creditors will be paid. Instead, sovereigns can choose for 
themselves the order in which creditors will be paid. In this con-
text, the Equal Treatment Provision prevents Argentina as payor 
from discriminating against the [defaulted] Bonds in favour of 
other unsubordinated, foreign bonds”49.
Effectively, the second part of the clause was interpreted as conveying 
a guarantee of rateable payment with other creditors even though the 
clause did not, in terms, state this. The court did not make explicit 
whether this conclusion followed from the fact of non-payment, 
passage of the Argentine law prohibiting payment, or both. This is 
significant as even if a pari passu clause of the type included in the 
Argentine bonds did not confer a right to rateable payment, an argu-
ment can be made that passage of the law prohibiting payment re-
sulted in a change in the ranking of the bonds through subordinating 
the holdouts’ rights to the rights of the exchange bondholders. Such 
an interpretation would have far less practical significance as states 
do not commonly pass legislation of the type enacted by Argentina. 
On this interpretation, all Argentina would need to do was to repeal 
the law. 
Uncertainty as to the precise payment formula resulted in the case 
being remanded to the District Court which held that Argentina 
must pay the same percentage of the amount due on the defaulted 
bonds as it intended to pay on the exchange bonds i.e. if Argentina 
wished to pay 100% of the amount due on the exchange bonds at 
the next payment date it must pay all amounts already due under the 
defaulted bonds50. The District Court saw no injustice in requiring 
payment in full in circumstances where the holders of the exchange 
49 (2012) 699 F.3d 246; 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 22281, 259 
50 NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina United States District Court Southern 
District of New York, Opinion dated November 21 2012, pp. 3-6.  
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bonds had accepted losses of 70 cents on the dollar as part of the 
exchange offer. In accepting, the holders bargained for certainty and 
the avoidance of the burden and risk of litigating their rights. How-
ever, they knew full well that the holdouts were seeking to obtain 
full payment of the amounts due through litigation51. In the court’s 
view it is hardly an injustice to have legal rulings which mean that 
Argentina must pay the debts which it owes.52 
 
Argentina appealed the District Court’s orders and sought a rehearing 
before the Court of Appeals en banc which was refused. The Court 
of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s amended injunctions53. The 
court held that there was nothing inequitable in requiring Argen-
tina to pay holdouts in full: “We believe that it is equitable for one 
creditor to receive what it bargained for, and is therefore entitled to, 
even if other creditors, when receiving what they bargained for, do 
not receive the same thing. The reason is obvious: the first creditor 
is differently situated from other creditors in terms of what is cur-
rently due to it under its contract”54. The court discounted Argen-
tina’s threat not to pay the exchange bondholders if it were forced to 
pay holdouts and stated that it was unwilling to permit Argentina’s 
threats to punish third parties to dictate the availability or terms of 
injunctive relief55. The court similarly dismissed claims by third par-
ties involved in the payment process. The injunctions were aimed at 
Argentina alone and federal law automatically forbids others – who 
are not directly enjoined but who act ‘in active concert or participa-
tion’ with a party – from assisting in a violation of the injunction56. 
This interpretation of the pari passu clause has proved highly contro-
versial. The conclusion of the Court of Appeals was contrary to the 
amicus brief filed by the United States and risks seriously interfering 
with the prospects for consensual debt restructurings in the future. 
If holdouts are able, through the pari passu clause, to require rateable 
payment then a sovereign that defaults on its debts may be unable 
51 Ibid., p. 8. 
52 Ibid., pp. 8-9.  
53 727 F.3d230; U.S.App.LEXIS 17645 
54 Ibid., p. 6. 
55 Ibid., p. 7. 
56 Ibid., p. 8. 
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to prioritise limited funds for payments considered to be significant 
for economic, political or military reasons. Effectively, the sovereign’s 
ability to dispose of its resources in the manner considered to be 
expedient is abrogated. Moreover, the decision will make sovereign 
workouts significantly more difficult to negotiate. Most sovereign 
debt restructurings involve the exchange of ‘old’ bonds for ‘new’ 
bonds that are issued on terms significantly less advantageous to the 
holder than the original bonds. If holdouts can insist on rateable 
payment with bondholders who agree to exchange their bonds what 
incentive is there for bondholders to agree? Given the existing vol-
ume of bonds in issue without CACs this is not an academic argu-
ment. According to briefs filed by Argentina, there is at least $68.5 
billion of sovereign debt outstanding that is not subject to CACs57. 
Indeed, the form of pari passu clause at issue was widely used in the 
1990s and 2000s.
The Court of Appeals argued that the inclusion of CACs “effectively 
eliminate the possibility of ‘holdout’ litigation” making it highly 
unlikely that future sovereigns will find themselves in Argentina’s 
predicament58. However, this also seems unlikely. CACs are not a 
panacea. As has been seen, most CACs operate on a series-by-series 
basis with the result that to trigger CACs on a particular series of 
bonds it is necessary to reach the required supermajority. Investors 
intending to hold-out and seek payment in full can therefore seek 
to acquire a sufficiently large holding in one or more series of bonds 
to prevent the CACs from being triggered. In this case the sovereign 
will have to decide whether or not to pay holdout bonds. CACs may 
therefore make the process of holding out more predictable by en-
abling investors to target certain series of bonds. 
What would an English court make of the reasoning of the US Court 
of Appeals? It is considered that the approach is contrary to estab-
lished principles of contractual interpretation under English law59. 
57 Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing en Banc of Defendant-Appellant the 
Republic of Argentina, November 13 2012, 12-105-cv(L), p. 14, available at http://
www.ambito.com/diario/aw_documentos/archivospdf/2005/id_doc_5849.pdf. 
58 (2012) 699 F.3d 246; 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 22281, 264-265. 
59 T Petch, NML v. Argentina in an English Legal Setting, capital Markets Law 
Journal 266
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The first objection to the rateable interpretation is that sovereign 
bonds may expressly stipulate for rateable payment. For example, 
Italy’s 3.125% Notes due 2015 provide that:
“The debt securities will be the direct, unconditional, unsecured 
and general obligations of Italy. They will rank equally with all 
of our present and future unsecured and unsubordinated general 
borrowing. … We will pay amounts due on the debt securities 
equally and rateably with all general loan obligations of Italy”.
The last sentence is a clear promise of rateable payment. Its absence 
from the Argentine bonds, or most other series of sovereign bonds, 
suggests that ensuring rateable payment is not inherent in standard 
pari passu clauses.
What of the Court of Appeals’ reliance on discrimination against 
the holdouts? If the intention of the parties is to confer a promise of 
rateable payment then the clause protects against discrimination of 
this kind. Otherwise, the ‘discrimination’ referred to is simply not 
legally relevant60. Equally, the comparison drawn by the Court of 
Appeals with corporate bankruptcy is not persuasive. Legal ranking 
is addressed (on any view) by the pari passu clause. The inability 
to liquidate a sovereign and apply its assets in accordance with a 
statutorily defined scheme emphasises the importance of contrac-
tual protections, but cannot a priori dictate what those protections 
should be. This is for the parties to determine under the terms and 
conditions of the bonds. 
In 2005 the Financial Markets Law Committee (‘FMLC’)61 argued 
that the ‘rateable’ interpretation62 is incorrect and that the ‘ranking’ 
interpretation is the proper construction63. The principal reason giv-
en by the FMLC was that an interpretation that requires all creditors 
to be paid rateably would not be acceptable to debtors or creditors 
60 WN Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 
Greenwood Press, 1978. 
61 FMLC, Issue 79 – Pari Passu Clauses, March 2005, available at http://ftalphaville.
ft.com/files/2012/11/fmlc79mar_2005.pdf. 
62 Adopted by the Brussels Court of Appeal in Elliot v. Peru September 26th, 2000 
Case No. 2000/QR/92. 
63 Supra n. 15. p. 2 
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and would be unworkable. It would therefore offend the ‘business 
commonsense’ principle used by English courts to construe con-
tracts. In the view of the FMLC, requiring rateable payment is also 
contrary to the ordinary meaning of the clause. The FMLC focused 
in its report on the practical difficulties64:
“if the borrower is a sovereign state unable to service its foreign 
currency debt as it falls due, it will not be allowed to pay any 
of its senior creditors in full. These include the IMF, the World 
Bank and any of the other multilateral organisations that may 
have lent it money. The restriction potentially bites even wider 
than this and would prevent the borrower from paying in full 
creditors who have sold it commodities or licensed it intellec-
tual property rights or from paying in full its government min-
isters, civil servants, police force, armed forces, judges and state 
teachers”.
The FMLC also referred to the difficulties the interpretation would 
present for the restructuring of sovereign debt, noting that the or-
derly and expeditious resolution of sovereign debt crises in a man-
ner beneficial to both debtors and creditors is a policy objective to 
be pursued. The use of the pari passu clause to disrupt the process 
does not make business sense65. The rateable interpretation requires 
imputing to the parties an understanding of the standard clause that 
no sovereign borrower would agree to66. Sovereign debt crises and 
sovereign defaults have been with us since the dawn of time. Absent 
a statutory framework, such as the SDRM, contractual solutions re-
main the only means for addressing such crises. Where a sovereign 
does not tie its hands by promising rateable payment, both investors 
and sovereigns know that negotiations will be needed to restructure 
sovereign debt if an issuer becomes unable to service its debt burden. 
This requires the ability to privilege certain functions, such as the po-
lice power or armed forces, as well as maintaining current payments 
to international financial institutions such as the IMF. 
64 Ibid., p. 14 
65 Ibid., p. 17. 
66 L Burn, Pari Passu Clauses: English Law after NML v. Argentina (2014) 9 C.M.L.J. 
1, 5-7. 
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Conclusion
Absent any legal framework, the market has developed mechanisms 
for the effective restructuring of sovereign debt. Where a state re-
quires debt relief it has been able to obtain it on reasonably effective 
terms. However, the current institutional framework is not ideal. In 
a report published on April 26 2013 the IMF reported that debt 
restructurings have often been too little too late, thus failing to re-
establish debt sustainability and market access in a sustainable way. 
Secondly, while creditor participation has been adequate in recent re-
structurings, the current contractual, market-based approach to debt 
restructuring is becoming less potent in overcoming collective action 
problems. Thirdly, the growing role and changing composition of 
official lending call for a clearer framework for official sector involve-
ment, especially with regard to non-Paris Club creditors. 
These criticisms all make cogent sense and raise the question of 
whether a statutory scheme should be given another look, purged of 
the conflicts of interests that were seen in locating the SDRM within 
the IMF. There is no reason why a sovereign bankruptcy court could 
not be established that would rely to a degree on the IMF for expert 
evidence but would not be bound by its analysis. If this is deemed 
too ambitious then further work on aggregative CACs would im-
prove the ability of creditors to bind holdouts while it may be help-
ful to clarify that the pari passu clause does not confer a promise of 
rateable payment (unless it expressly does). This would be controver-
sial given the amount of sovereign debt already issued with existing 
forms of the clause. However, it could be helpful in avoiding upsets 
such as Elliot or NML. Interestingly, in December 2013 the Interna-
tional Capital Markets Association (‘ICMA’) published a consulta-
tion paper on sovereign debt in which it proposed industry standard 
wording for aggregated CACs and the pari passu provision clause. 
The proposal on aggregated CACs is designed to allow a sovereign 
issuer to modify several series of notes, including series of notes gov-
erned by local law as well as foreign law. The proposal on the pari 
passu provision extends to ranking but specifically does not extend to 
an obligation to make rateable payments. Finally, given that sover-
eign debt crises are for the most part the result of states accumulating 
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unsustainable levels of sovereign debt, a perhaps forlorn plea may be 
entered for greater fiscal responsibility by states when accumulating 
new debt.
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Speech to the European 
University Institute
Tony Barber 
The demand for certainty is one which is natural to man, but is neverthe- 
less an intellectual vice… To endure uncertainty is difficult, but so are 
most of the other virtues.
Bertrand Russell, Unpopular Essays (1950)
My subject tonight is the virtue of uncertainty – or, to put in an- 
other way, the importance for European policymakers, as they strive 
to repair the damage inflicted for seven years on Europe’s economy, 
financial system and political institutions, of keeping an open mind, 
closing off no avenue of intellectual inquiry and, above all, rejecting 
the temptations of dogma masked as wisdom and guesswork masked 
as truth.
Uncertainty governs Europe’s condition. But if I can be certain of 
anything, it is that most of us around these tables regard ourselves 
as virtuous, in the sense that we do not claim to possess unassailable 
insights into how to rectify the ills of Europe, and do not claim the 
power to forecast with pinpoint accuracy the patterns of political and 
economic change in the European Union over, say, the next 10 years.
Of course, it is the intellectual’s privilege to stress the limits of hu- 
man knowledge; and to point out, from the sidelines, that the con-
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sequences of political decisions or financial market behaviour may, 
more often than not, diverge from the intentions behind them. But 
is this awareness of fallibility a luxury that for some reason is not 
permitted to those who hold the reins of government, or who trade 
tens of millions of euros every day on the stock, bond and currency 
markets? Or should it, in fact, be imperative for those wielding most 
power and influence in our societies to appreciate the unpredictabil- 
ity of outcomes, to alter course when results fall short of expecta- 
tions, to adjust flawed models – in brief, to be humble in the face of 
uncertainty?
The dangers inherent in proceeding as if certainty governs the mo- 
tions of free market democracies were illustrated in the first 10 years 
of European monetary union. From the start the union was upheld 
as a construct so unbreakable that investors, regulators and the Eu- 
ropean Central Bank itself treated all government bonds as equally 
risk-free, with the result that interest rate differentials all but van- 
ished between Germany at one extreme and Greece at the other. In a 
process that was initiated by the euro’s creation, but was then driven 
on by private sector investment decisions – thousands upon thou- 
sands of them, week by week, month by month, year by year – vast 
amounts of credit were poured from Germany and other affluent 
countries into less prosperous nations on the entirely false assump- 
tion that risk had disappeared.
The collapse of this assumption has not, I fear, removed the impulse, 
now that the first acute phase of the crisis is behind us, to seek cer- 
tainty where none exists. First, there is the prevailing view among 
financial market actors that the ECB’s announcement in 2012 that 
it would defend the euro, whatever it took to do so, has shrunk risk 
to the point at which it is safe to reinvest in the sovereign debt of the 
eurozone’s most fiscally and economically challenged nations. Bond 
yields in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain are all suddenly back at 
pre-crisis levels. This creates an illusion of stability that rests not least 
on the notion that, if the financial markets have pronounced the 
return of safety, then safety must indeed have returned, because mar- 
kets are efficient and markets know best. How quickly the lessons of 
the recent past are unlearnt!
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In reality, the return of apparent calm to bond markets disguises 
the fact that the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions initiative 
re- mains an untested, albeit firmly stated commitment. It has en-
coun- tered a severe rebuke from Germany’s constitutional court, 
which takes the view that it undermines the German Basic Law by 
em- bracing debt monetisation, or the printing of money by the cen-
tral bank to finance sovereign debt. Despite having referred its ruling 
to the European Court of Justice, the German court may not have 
spoken its last word on this subject. Furthermore, the willingness of 
private sector financial institutions to reinvest in southern European 
government bonds has merely reinforced the so-called “doom loop” 
between shaky banks and shaky sovereigns that was exposed at the 
height of the crisis.
Now, I can think of various ways for banks to allocate money that 
might produce more durable, beneficial outcomes for the eurozone, 
and one of them is to restore the flow of credit to cash-starved com- 
panies which, much more so than in the United States, depend on 
banks, not the capital markets, for funding. The busy accumulation 
of sovereign debt holdings crowds out private lending, and it is surely 
encouraged by the zero-risk weight that banks attach to such hold- 
ings in measurements of their capital adequacy. It might be wise for 
banks and their regulators to phase out zero-risk weighting and, if 
banks must own government debt, to diversify their holdings, so 
that no bank is over-exposed to a single sovereign. Otherwise, as 
the Or- ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
observed in its latest report on the euro area, “financial disruptions 
are still likely”1.
To sum up my thoughts on recent financial market behaviour, then, 
I detect a complacency about the way the crisis has died down which 
is rooted, at bottom, in the same certainties that contributed to the 
crisis at the start: that is to say, that the search for maximum return 
is the proper function of a market; that, where risk is concerned, 
hope must triumph over experience because the alternative is a lower 
return; and that the wider political, social and economic context of 
1 OECD Economic Surveys: Euro area April 2014, Overview, p12 (Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development: Paris, 2014) 
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financial market activity is someone else’s problem, because a Tablet 
of Stone inscribed in the Scottish Enlightenment supposedly stated 
– though I think Adam Smith would take issue with this narrow 
read- ing of his work – that markets are all-knowing and therefore 
must be unfettered in their freedom.
What of the certainties that drive governments, politicians and Eu- 
ropean Union institutions? There is, quite clearly, no single certainty, 
no unanimous agreement about the correctness of the steps taken 
so far, and to be taken in the future. The animated debates about 
austerity, structural economic reform, pro-growth measures, deficit 
and debt reduction and how to organise rescue programmes testify to 
that. Yet what we do see are prejudices and special interests that take 
on the mantle of certainty.
For example, a neutral observer would, I suspect, make the point 
that the banking union which is such a fundamental element of 
Europe’s crisis-fighting response does not yet seem comprehensive 
enough to address the frailties of the financial sector to which I have 
just alluded. It is not only that the authority empowered to handle 
bank emergencies will have one hand tied behind its back. It is that 
a European deposit insurance scheme remains a far-off prospect. For 
these shortcomings there is a general explanation – that no collective 
European will exists to go so far; and a specific explanation – that no 
collective German will exists to do so.
Yet Germany tends to express its reluctance to deepen the content of 
European monetary union not as a straightforward political prefer- 
ence, but as a set of legal, moral and economic certainties. German 
interpretations of the EU treaty law underpinning the euro encap- 
sulate imperishable legal truths; German insistence that everyone 
should repent of their fiscal sins reflects a timeless ethical precept; 
and the path of internal devaluation imposed on southern Europe 
embodies an iron law of economic recovery in a single currency area.
All this was colourfully expressed in a speech in Amsterdam on 
April 7 by Jens Weidmann, the Bundesbank president2. In his view, 
2 Jens Weidmann, “Monetary Union as a Stability Union”, 7 April, 2014 Speech, 
available at http://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Reden/2014/2014_04_07_ 
weidmann.html 
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Europe’s rescue mechanisms – the European Financial Stability 
Facility and the European Stability Mechanism – have weakened 
the principle of individual responsibility, because fiscal responsibility 
has remained essentially national whilst liabilities have been partly 
mutualised. I quote: “The balance between liability and control has 
become lopsided... To put it rather bluntly: you would certainly not 
want to share your bank account with your neighbour if you were 
unable to control his or her spending.”
The difficulties with this argument start with the observation that 
the establishment of the EFSF and ESM was rendered necessary in 
part by the determination of Germany and other creditor nations 
to protect their banks from the consequences of reckless lending to 
southern Europe. In Ireland’s case, the insistence that the govern- 
ment should assume responsibility for its own banks placed unbear- 
able pressure on the sovereign and led to the 2011 emergency rescue 
of Ireland.
More profoundly, the dominance over intergovernmental deci-
sion- making that Germany has acquired as a result of the crisis has 
in- flamed national feeling and led to a sense of disempowerment 
among citizens in debtor countries. Even if Jens Weidmann is right 
and li- abilities have been partly mutualised, that appears as small 
comfort to southern Europeans who, one imagines, would define the 
lop- sidedness of the eurozone’s refurbished architecture in a quite 
dif- ferent way to that of the Bundesbank president. As René Cupe-
rus, the Dutch thinker, puts it: “Does the European Union threaten 
to transform itself from an anti-nationalistic into an anti-democratic 
project...? Can a German-style fiscal union strengthen European sol- 
idarity, or will it, as a sorcerer’s apprentice, unleash the very national- 
ism Europe was designed to overcome?”3
René Cuperus is right to frame this point as a question rather than a 
prediction, because, to remind you of tonight’s theme, we just don’t 
know what the future holds in store. In some respects the spread of 
3 René Cuperus, “Against a ‘One-Size-Fits-All Europe’: Euro-Realists Squeezed Be-
tween Federal Radicals and Anti-EU Extremists”, p32, in Shaping A Different Eu-
rope: Contributions to a Critical Debate, ed. Ernst Hildebrand & Anna Maria Kellner 
(Verlag J.H.W. Dietz: Bonn, 2014) 
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anti-German sentiment and the incidence of social unrest during the 
crisis have been reassuringly limited. On the other hand, populist, 
anti-establishment and anti-EU parties are now well-entrenched on 
the European political landscape and may cause more than a few 
upsets in next month’s European Parliament elections.
What we also know is that public trust in the EU, as measured by 
opinion polls, has dropped sharply since the pre-crisis year of 2007
– not just in rescued countries such as Greece, Ireland or Spain but 
even in better-off countries such as Austria, Finland or the Nether- 
lands. Here is to be found one more reason for being cautious about 
whether a buoyant bond market tells us anything useful about social 
reality.
Naturally, if, as seems to be the case, declining public trust moves in 
close correlation to declining living standards, rising unemployment 
and a shrinking welfare state, then one might expect public trust in 
the EU to go up when an economic rebound takes effect. I suppose 
this depends on how you define a rebound. In its final quarterly re- 
port on the eurozone economy in 2013, the European Commission 
made the startling forecast that, in the absence of vigorous economic 
reforms, the euro area would end up in 2023 with average living 
standards at only 60 per cent of US levels – which is to say, their 
low- est, relative to America, since the mid-1960s4.
Shortly after the Commission released this report, I was in Milan 
and ran into one of its authors, who confided that a great deal of 
agonised internal debate had preceded the decision to go public with 
this forecast. One can see why, though if the forecast had been buried 
and then leaked, the impact might have been worse.
But in any case it’s only a forecast, based on economic models which, 
like politicians, central bankers, academics and most emphatically 
journalists, do not have some scientific or divine power of perfect 
prediction.
4 Quarterly Report on the Euro Area: Volume 12 No. 4 (2013), p14 (European 
Commission: Brussels, 2013) 
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I know what I would like to forecast: a Europe that restores growth, 
controls markets, unlocks its human potential and rebuilds a spirit 
of endeavour and confidence in its future. But I do not have any 
certainty we will get there.
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